Human Rights discourses and their context in the Islamic Republic of Iran by Szonn, Stella
DIPLOMARBEIT 
Titel der Diplomarbeit 
„Human Rights Discourses and their Context in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran“ 
 
Verfasserin                                                                                                                       
Stella Szonn 
angestrebter akademischer Grad 
Magistra der Philosophie (Mag.a phil.) 
 






Kultur- und Sozialanthropologie 
Betreuerin / Betreuer: Dr. Rüdiger Lohlker 
 
Acknowledgment 
First and foremost I would like to express my gratitude to all my interview-partners, for 
their valuable information and active commitments. They clearly are the heart-piece of 
my work.  
Sincere thanks go to my tutor, Dr. Rüdiger Lohlker, who supported me with helpful 
literature and contacts.  
Many thanks go to Dr. Liselotte Abid, who assisted me with literature and her 
engagement into my research field.  
Many thanks also to Mag. Helmut Prantner, who exercised all the patience in order to 
revise my first drafts and who gave me important comments.  
I am very grateful to all my Iranian and non-Iranian friends, who strongly motivated me 
with their courageous and active engagements to a more democratic Iran. 
Of course, I am indebted to my family, especially my parents, Sigrid and Michael, for 
their constant support and loving foothold, despite the distance. 
 
 1 
Table of Contents 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................................................... 1 
TABLE OF GRAPHICS & FIGURES .................................................................................................... 5 
1 PREFIX ............................................................................................................................................. 6 
1.1 MAP OF IRAN ............................................................................................................................. 6 
1.2 TABLE OF TERMS & DEFINITIONS .............................................................................................. 7 
1.3 TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................ 9 
2 FOREWORD .................................................................................................................................. 11 
3 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 13 
3.1 WORKING THEME & RESEARCH QUESTION .............................................................................. 13 
3.2 CONTEXT & RESEARCH GROUP ............................................................................................... 15 
3.3 AIMS ........................................................................................................................................ 17 
3.4 CHAPTER OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................... 18 
4 METHODS ..................................................................................................................................... 19 
4.1 QUALITATIVE & EMPIRICAL APPROACH .................................................................................. 19 
4.1.1 Grounded Theory ............................................................................................................... 20 
4.1.2 Semi-structured interviews ................................................................................................. 21 
4.1.3 Expert-interviews ............................................................................................................... 22 
4.1.4 Ethnographic fieldwork...................................................................................................... 23 
4.2 QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS & INTERPRETATION ................................................................ 25 
4.2.1 Comparative data analysis ................................................................................................. 25 
4.2.2 Coding ................................................................................................................................ 26 
4.2.2.1 Open coding ............................................................................................................................ 27 
4.2.2.2 Axial coding ............................................................................................................................ 28 
4.2.3 Theoretical sampling ......................................................................................................... 29 
4.2.4 Multiple data, depth & saturation ...................................................................................... 29 
4.3 ROLE OF RESEARCHER ............................................................................................................. 31 
4.3.1 Ethical responsibility ......................................................................................................... 31 
4.3.2 Power & Discourse ............................................................................................................ 32 
5 ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN ................................................................................................. 33 
5.1 INTRODUCING OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................ 33 
5.2 CULTURE, RELIGION & SOCIETY ............................................................................................. 36 
5.2.1 Twelver-Shiism ................................................................................................................... 36 
 2 
5.2.2 Iranian intellectuals ........................................................................................................... 38 
5.2.2.1 Islamic ideology ...................................................................................................................... 38 
5.2.2.2 Islamic reform ......................................................................................................................... 40 
5.2.2.3 New intellectuals & Journalists ............................................................................................... 42 
5.2.3 Political reform under Khatami ......................................................................................... 43 
5.2.4 Iran's ordinary people ........................................................................................................ 44 
5.3 ORGANIZATION OF THE POLITICAL & JUDICIARY SYSTEM ........................................................ 45 
5.3.1 Constitution & Referendum ............................................................................................... 46 
5.3.1.1 Legislative power .................................................................................................................... 49 
5.3.1.1.1 Guardian Council ............................................................................................................... 49 
5.3.1.1.2 Expediency Council ........................................................................................................... 50 
5.3.1.2 Executive power...................................................................................................................... 51 
5.3.1.3 Judicial power ......................................................................................................................... 51 
5.3.1.4 The Leadership ....................................................................................................................... 52 
5.4 INFORMAL & FORMAL POWER-FIELDS ..................................................................................... 53 
5.4.1 Semi-opposition.................................................................................................................. 55 
5.4.2 Political instabilities .......................................................................................................... 55 
6 IRANIAN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSES ............................................................................. 57 
6.1 CONCEPTUALIZATION .............................................................................................................. 57 
6.2 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ........................................................................................................ 60 
6.2.1 Iranian identity................................................................................................................... 60 
6.2.1.1 Historical past ......................................................................................................................... 60 
6.2.1.2 We-feeling .............................................................................................................................. 62 
6.2.1.3 Differences & Gaps ................................................................................................................. 63 
6.2.1.4 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 64 
6.2.2 Tradition & Modernity ....................................................................................................... 66 
6.2.2.1 Tradition ................................................................................................................................. 66 
6.2.2.1.1 Tradition in negative terms ................................................................................................ 66 
6.2.2.1.2 Tradition in positive terms ................................................................................................. 68 
6.2.2.1.3 Tradition, a complex term .................................................................................................. 69 
6.2.2.2 Modernity ............................................................................................................................... 71 
6.2.2.2.1 Modernity in positive terms ............................................................................................... 71 
6.2.2.2.1.1 Individuality ................................................................................................................ 71 
6.2.2.2.1.2 Private religion ............................................................................................................ 72 
6.2.2.2.1.3 Globalization ............................................................................................................... 73 
6.2.2.2.2 Modernity in negative terms .............................................................................................. 74 
6.2.2.2.2.1 Fast spread of technical inventions .............................................................................. 74 
6.2.2.2.2.2 Copying Beverly Hills ................................................................................................. 74 
6.2.2.3 Caught between tradition & modernity? ................................................................................. 75 
6.2.2.4 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 77 
6.2.3 Battlefields ......................................................................................................................... 78 
6.2.3.1 Regime vs. Civil society ......................................................................................................... 78 
 3 
6.2.3.1.1 Western values as grievance .............................................................................................. 78 
6.2.3.1.2 No to double life ................................................................................................................ 79 
6.2.3.1.3 State plays God .................................................................................................................. 80 
6.2.3.2 Regime vs. Regime ................................................................................................................. 82 
6.2.3.2.1 Technology vs. Values ....................................................................................................... 82 
6.2.3.2.2 Left vs. Right ..................................................................................................................... 82 
6.2.3.3 Clergy vs. Clergy .................................................................................................................... 84 
6.2.3.3.1 Moderate vs. Radical ......................................................................................................... 84 
6.2.3.3.2 Religious justification ........................................................................................................ 84 
6.2.3.4 Opposition vs. Opposition ....................................................................................................... 86 
6.2.3.4.1 Moderate vs. Radical ......................................................................................................... 86 
6.2.3.4.2 Internal vs. External ........................................................................................................... 86 
6.2.3.5 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 88 
6.2.4 Human rights ..................................................................................................................... 90 
6.2.4.1 Dialogue .................................................................................................................................. 90 
6.2.4.1.1 Media ................................................................................................................................. 90 
6.2.4.1.2 Limitation & Control ......................................................................................................... 91 
6.2.4.1.3 Suspicion of espionage ...................................................................................................... 92 
6.2.4.1.4 Religious & Scientific exclusion ....................................................................................... 93 
6.2.4.2 Women .................................................................................................................................... 94 
6.2.4.3 Education & Information ........................................................................................................ 95 
6.2.4.4 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 97 
6.2.4.4.1 Emotional & Realistic ........................................................................................................ 97 
6.2.4.4.2 Limited room & Restlessness ............................................................................................ 97 
6.2.4.4.3 Nutrient base for dialogue .................................................................................................. 98 
6.2.4.4.4 Flame of hope .................................................................................................................... 99 
7 QUESTIONS OF UNIVERSALITY........................................................................................... 101 
7.1 UDHR & CDHRI .................................................................................................................. 102 
7.2 IRAN & UNO ......................................................................................................................... 104 
7.2.1 Human Rights & Iranian Constitution ............................................................................. 106 
7.2.2 Reservations ..................................................................................................................... 107 
7.2.3 Fall of Rights & Rise of CEDAW ..................................................................................... 108 
7.3 FUTURE BASES FOR DIALOGUE .............................................................................................. 109 
7.3.1 International means ......................................................................................................... 109 
7.3.2 Domestic means ............................................................................................................... 111 
7.3.2.1 Strong civil society ............................................................................................................... 111 
7.3.2.2 Human Rights education ....................................................................................................... 112 
7.3.3 Clerical means ................................................................................................................. 114 
7.4 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 115 
8 CONCLUDING ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES .................................................. 117 
8.1 CULTURE ............................................................................................................................... 117 
 4 
8.1.1 Cultural justification ........................................................................................................ 118 
8.1.2 Internal discourse & Cross-cultural dialogue ................................................................. 119 
8.1.3 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 121 
8.2 CRITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY .................................................................................................... 122 
8.2.1 Normative humanism ....................................................................................................... 122 
8.2.2 Critics............................................................................................................................... 125 
8.3 GLOBALIZATION & CULTURE ................................................................................................ 126 
8.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS FOR A DEEPER, DYNAMIC & INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH ........... 128 
9 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................ 131 
9.1 LITERATURE .......................................................................................................................... 131 
9.1.1 Methods ............................................................................................................................ 131 
9.1.2 Islamic Republic of Iran ................................................................................................... 133 
9.1.3 Anthropology & Human Rights ........................................................................................ 136 
9.2 INTERNET-ARTICLES & HOMEPAGES ..................................................................................... 141 
9.3 INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS, RESOLUTIONS, CONVENTIONS ................................................ 145 
9.4 INTERVIEWS .......................................................................................................................... 147 
9.5 LECTURES .............................................................................................................................. 148 
9.6 RADIO & TV .......................................................................................................................... 149 
9.7 EXCURSION ........................................................................................................................... 149 
9.8 GRAPHICS & FIGURES ........................................................................................................... 149 
10 APPENDIX ................................................................................................................................... 153 
10.1 ABSTRACT IN ENGLISH .......................................................................................................... 153 
10.2 ABSTRACT AUF DEUTSCH ...................................................................................................... 155 
10.3 CURRICULUM VITAE.............................................................................................................. 157 
 
 5 
Table of Graphics & Figures 
FIGURE 1 TABLE OF TERMS & DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................. 8 
FIGURE 2 TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................................... 9 
FIGURE 3 GROUNDED THEORY: DEFINITIONS OF TERMS ............................................................................. 25 
FIGURE 4 GROUNDED THEORY: PROCESS OF OPEN AND AXIAL CODING ...................................................... 28 
FIGURE 5 INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS/CONVENTIONS IRAN HAS JOINED ................................................ 105 
 
GRAPHIC 1 MAP OF IRAN © 2009 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ...................... 6 
GRAPHIC 2 CHECKS AND BALANCES © 2009 U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, AP, WSJ RESEARCH ............... 45 
GRAPHIC 3 THEOLOGICAL HIERARCHY OF THE SHII CLERGY IN IRAN © 2000 WILFRIED BUCHTA .......... 45 
GRAPHIC 4 THE FOUR RINGS OF POWER  © 2000 WILFRIED BUCHTA ..................................................... 54 
 6 
1 Prefix 
1.1 Map of Iran 
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1.2 Table of Terms & Definitions 
Ayatollah lit. ´sign of God`; a distinguished mojtahed 
Basij Persian for ´mobilization`, volunteer 
paramilitary in Iran, subordinated to the 
Supreme Leader and the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps 
Fatwa Religious edict/judgment 
Faqih Jurist specialized in the field of fiqh, 
jurisprudent, jurisconsult 
Fiqh  Religious law, jurisprudence 
Hadith The tradition of Prophet Muhammad's 
sayings and deeds, which are not directly 
included in the Quran and have orally 
spread after his death via various Imams 
Hijab Head-covering for Muslim women; in Iran 
it is for women, starting with the age of 9, 
a dress-code by force (in public) 
Ejtehad Lit. exertion, endeavour; practice of 
independently interpreting Sharia laws by 
employing reason and principles of 
jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh); the opposite of 
taqlid (imitation) 
Imam Arabic for ´leader`, head of society; The 
one who leads the prayer; used also to 
designate a religious leader of the 
community; in Twelver-Shiism, one of the 
12 hereditary successors of the Prophet, 
beginning with Imam ´Ali (the son-in-law 
of Prophet Muhammad) 
Majles; Majles-e shora-ye eslami The Iranian Parliament; Islamic 
Consultative Assembly 
Marja taqlid Source of imitation; a prominent scholar 
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whose rulings and practices are binding 
examples for his followers 
Mojtahed One who is legally eligible by diploma to 
exercise ejtehad 
Nowrooz Persian New Year's celebration; First day 
of spring, around March 21  
Sharia Arabic for ´way`, ´path`; the whole (private 
and public) legal framework of Islamic 
Law; the canonical law of Islam, as defined 
by orthodox authorities 
Shia Second largest denominator of Islam after 
Sunni Islam; the largest Shia branch is the 
Twelver-Shiism (adhering to the Twelver 
Imam lineage, starting with Ali the son-in-
law of Prophet Muhammad) to which the 
majority of the Iranian population belongs  
Sunna After Quran the second method of 
interpreting Islamic precepts, for Shia 
Islam it means words, silence or behaviour 
of the 12 impeccant leaders, it includes the 
normative character of the hadith  
Ummah Islamic community or nation; the whole 
Muslim world (community of believers) 
Velayat-e faqih Guardianship or vice-regency of the 
jurisconsult: a fully qualified clergy over 
the community during the occultation of 
the Shia's twelfth Imam (Iran's ruling 
jurisprudent) 
Quran Divine revelation of God; first and most 
important source of Islamic Law, other 
evidence (Sunna, hadith) is used to better 
understand/interpret this book 
Figure 1 Table of Terms & Definitions 
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1.3 Table of Abbreviations 
CDHRI Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in 
Islam 
CEDAW International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women 
CRC International Convention on the Rights of 
the Child 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 
OIC Organization of The Islamic Conference 
OP Optional Protocol 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UN, UNO United Nations, United Nations 
Organization 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly 
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 




Since the end of the Second World War and the beginning of a new world order, more 
particularly since the drafting of the United Nations Charter in 1945 and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, human rights have entered international norm-
settings. (cp. Wellmann 2003:1) From then on a continuing battlefield around different 
approaches to human rights, concerning its theoretical frameworks, origin, political and 
moral philosophy, cultural validity, universality, formulation, legal justification, etc., 
moved to the centre of different scientific fields such as law, ethics, philosophy, 
anthropology, politics, theology and diplomacy. The complexity of human rights 
discourses through diverse social and cultural values as well as the important fact that 
since the French revolution no strong and globally accepted definition of “universal 
human rights” has evolved, is a clear evidence that one single set of human rights is still 
far from being accepted, respected, promoted, protected and implemented by all 
individuals and peoples on this planet. 
The concept of human rights is a modern phenomenon, which is mainly connected with 
the European enlightenment, especially with the 17th/18th Century Philosophy including 
natural rights and rationalism, and the Western emphasis of individual civil and political 
rights, economic capitalism, (neo)liberalism, democracy and the modern nation state. 
The International Bill of Human Rights, composed of the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the two 1966 Covenants separated between Civil and Political 
Rights (plus its Optional Protocol) and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, mainly 
serves as the only measuring stick when it comes to the valuation of human rights 
systems and standards all over the world. (cp. Mayer 1995:19) 
Within the fundamental debate of universality vs. cultural relativity of human rights, 
Islam is perhaps the most misunderstood religion. (cp. Baderin 2003:358) 
In most analysis, Sharia law is compared to the international human rights regime to 
give legal evidence that Islam is a total obstruction to human rights. Within these 
precarious and sensitive debates, terms like “West”, “East”, “Islam”, “Occidentalism” 
and “Orientalism” easily comprise the endangerment to be homogenized; a dangerous 
risk that threatens to squeeze complex and diverse cultures and societies into static and 
uniform categories, completely denying a common humanity of all individuals and 
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peoples in this world. The vast ignorance about the roots of Islam and the intra-Islamic 
dialogue on human rights issues in current debates, has motivated me to start 
researching on this challenging topic. 
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3 Introduction 
3.1 Working theme & Research question 
The regional focal point of my thesis is the Islamic Republic of Iran, a country with a 
highly diverse society and culture, usually in the cross fire of international politics and 
media, especially concerning human rights violations. I personally got connected to this 
country through a political and cultural field excursion to Teheran in July 2007 where I 
took part in a group discussion and interview with young Iranian students who work as 
journalists and are actively involved in women and human rights activism. I have build 
up close contact with many Iranians, who are either living in Iran, Austria, Germany or 
in the USA and got more and more involved in their worldviews, socio- cultural 
structures and practices. 
 
The working theme of my thesis is: 
Human rights discourses and their context in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
 
I want to find out how Iranians think about human rights in a broader way, to facilitate 
their recognition and to productively contribute to anthropological approaches towards 
human rights theories. I will not be caught in details about which and how structured 
these rights are, or into philosophical discussions about whether they are natural or 
historical. It is my goal to strengthen a broader and integrative framework of human 
rights that takes into consideration the vast impact of Globalization and the dynamics of 
"tradition" and "modernity". 
In order to avoid going beyond the scope of my thesis, I am purely focussing on human 
rights discourses, in terms of different oral, visual and written sources for interpreting 
social and cultural structures, keeping in mind its implicit connotation of power and 
possible contestation. (cp. Lindstrom 1996:163) I want to find out how discourse 
structuring might reveal an understanding about individual intention and the Iranian 
culture at large: "In every moment of talk, people are experiencing and producing their 
cultures, their roles, their personalities." (Moerman 1987: xi) I do not give a detailed 
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juridical analysis, which should be the task of jurists specialized in International Law 
and Islamic Law. 
 
My research question is:  
How can Iranian human rights discourses be situated in the current anthropological 
debate on human rights theories? 
 
Within this work, it is my aspiration to give an insight into different motives, 
paradigms, ideologies, and perspectives which are structuring Iranian human rights 
discourses and where they can be localized within current anthropological debates on 
the characteristics of human rights and culture. I am focussing on intersection points 
between internal and external battlefields, which can become a basis for further debates 
about how these theoretical problems can be solved. 
I use the term “human rights” in a much broader sense, including its social, cultural, 
practical and symbolical dimensions, which develops meaning at different levels of 
society and culture. I do not want to treat human rights only as a body of positive 
International Law with a fixed language of rights and duties. I want to step beyond the 
purely legal vocabulary and rather use more cultural related terms which come up 
during the research process. 
 
Out of this main research question derive several important sub-questions, which I want 
to answer within the chapters of my thesis: 
1. In how far can you speak about one “Iranian identity”? 
2. How deep is the gap between "tradition" and "modernity" within the young Iranian 
society and how should these terms be defined in the era of Globalization? 
3. How many different socio-cultural groupings, ideologies, identities and goals shape 
and flow into Iranian human rights discourses? 
4. How can the battlefields between different human rights discourses in Iran be 
defined? 
5. In what sort of social, cultural, practical and symbolical dimensions are Iranian 
human rights claims embedded in? 
6. How could a continuous intra- and intercultural dialogue be encouraged and 
strengthened to keep up a “productive balance” between the battlefields? 
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3.2 Context & Research group 
First of all it needs to be highlighted that I have planned my research topic and field 
research excursion in the very beginning of the year 2009, and could not foresee the 
chaos evolved out of the presidential elections on June 12, 2009. The questionable 
voting outcome triggered huge demonstrations of the opposition followed by a chain of 
imprisonment by the governmental military of oppositional activists, politicians, 
journalists, and human rights advocates across the country. Therefore a lot of my 
interview partners are currently arrested or have to stop "critical contacts" with Western 
scientists, a sad fact, which has forced me to cancel my fieldtrip. 
Due to the fact that I am not able to do a detailed field research trip including interviews 
with human rights activists and lawyers who are working in Iran, I had to confine my 
research group to Iranians who grew up and went to school in Iran, but moved either 
alone or with their parents to Europe or the USA. They are either political refugees, or 
simply wanted to study or work in another country, learning German or English and 
have the needed resources for doing this. Furthermore, they are all experts on the past 
and present developments, and are either human rights activists, journalists or 
intellectuals. (see Expert-interviews; Conceptualization) The outcomes of the group 
discussion and interview with young Iranian students and journalists in Tehran, which I 
was able to do during the field excursion in July 2007, also flow into my analysis, as 
well as lectures I have personally attended in Iran, Austria and Germany. 
After the election and with the beginning of the Green movement1, more than before 
does the fragmented characteristic of a highly diverse society comes into light. Iran has 
a population of 66.429.284 with a median age of 27 years. (est. of July 2009, CIA 
Factbook [url]) The majority of Iranians is under the age of 30, a young generation that 
contains of dynamic agents of Globalization, widely outnumbering the conservative 
elite, the radical right and its adherents. It is a society wrapped in thoughts of 
                                                 
1
 Within my work I will use the term movement and not revolution. Right now, it makes the impression 
that the majority of the protesters in Iran do not want to overthrough the entire governmental system, but 
reform it from within the framework of the Iranian Constitution and the early ideals of the 1979 
revolution; a reform movement intended to bring about changes on social, cultural, judicial, religious, 
political, and economic levels on a democratic basis. However, it does not exclude the possibility that this 
movement could flow into a revolution at a later stage. 
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imposition, trying to find a respective place in this world, as a society with a dynamic 
social and cultural structure, capable of change. 
Globalization, seen as "a process (or a set of processes) that embodies a transformation 
in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, generating 
transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and power" 
(Held & McGrew [et al] 1999:483), especially in the field of communication networks, 
plays a major role and enhances complexity and hybridity of the Iranian society and 
culture tremendously. Online communication systems like Facebook, Twitter and 
Youtube isochronically report all the happenings on the streets during the last months’ 
protests, Friday sermons and student gatherings, making news available to all 
individuals, who have access to the internet as well as foreign news agencies, which are, 
so far, not allowed to send foreign reporters. Cell phones and internet blogs are the 
primary base for (student) activists or oppositional presidential candidates to freely 
express themselves as well as to organize meetings and protests. Even though the 
government has successfully turned off the cell phone and online access system during 
and after the critical voting days within the country, there were still backdoors to be 
found to other intersection points in order to connect to the outer world; a clear sign that 
Globalization with its advanced technology has, since a long time, absorbed Iran as 
well. 
The structure, goals and actual consequences of Globalization and "modernity", mostly 
seen as a "broad synonym for capitalism, or industrialization, or whatever institutional 
and ideological features are held to mark off the modern West from other, traditional 
societies" (Spencer 1996:378-379), are permanently changing and automatically its 
definition, too. Within the Iranian context, blurry terms like "tradition" and "modernity" 
need to become specified more closely. 
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3.3 Aims 
Through compared analysis and conceptualization of Iranian human rights discourses, I 
am trying to discover variables and perspectives on different social and cultural levels, 
which are influencing and structuring these discourses. Further more I want to find out 
whether there is common ground or a shared basis upon which an intra- and 
intercultural dialogue can build up on, and where possible linkages to current 
anthropological debates on and approaches to human rights theories can be found. 
Within the realms of possibility, I will carefully draw near the goal to give an overview 
of some important influences on human rights discourses in Iran to provide an insight 
into the complexity, which human rights theories are facing. In order to establish a base 
for a gradual approach, I first of all have to percolate core conceptions, core categories 
and in the end linking hypotheses to find out how to situate Iranian human rights 
discourses in current anthropological debates as well as to crystallize clear questions for 
further and more detailed research. 
The highest priority within my work is to avoid ethnocentrism, "the tendency to view 
the world from the perspective of one's own culture, or the inability to understand 
cultures which are different from one's own" (Barnard & Spencer 1996:604); being 
aware that a certain degree is unavoidable, since it "is a function of early enculturation"2 
(Herskovits 1972:80), and consequently the basis of our acceptance of the validity of 
norms and values of our culture, which "provides the individual with a sense of 
identification with his group." (Herskovits 1964:54; 1972:81) 
                                                 
2
 For Herskovits, enculturation is an unconscious and automatic process, in which each member of a 
society "grows into" his/her culture:"[…] if culture is to be thought of as ordering of behaviour in a 
society, enculturation is the mechanism which orders for each of its members the form and extend to 
accepted modes of conduct and aspiration, and also sets limits within which variation in individual 
behaviour is sanctioned." (Herskovits 1972:76) 
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3.4 Chapter overview 
After the second chapter, which gives an overview of the working theme, research 
questions, field, group, aims and context, the third chapter briefly introduces the 
methods or methodology with which the research is conducted. The qualitative and 
empirical approach of the methodology of grounded theory, together with the methods 
of semi-structured interviews, expert interviews and ethnographic fieldwork is 
explained. Further, the methodology of grounded theory is outlined in more detail, 
defining the coding and theoretical sampling processes, in regard to comparative data 
analysis, interpretation and the role of the researcher. 
The fourth chapter gives an introducing overview of the broad and complex context, 
which coints and influences the research group and present actors in the respective field. 
First of all it introduces the Islamic Republic of Iran, with its cultural background, 
Twelver-Shiism and diverse society. The historical and present status of Iranian 
intellectuals as well as of political reform is explained, followed by the organization of 
the political and juridical system, in which, with close reference to the Constitution, the 
three state branches, plus the Leadership and (in)formal power fields are unfold. 
Chapter five displays the qualitative conceptualization and comparative analysis and 
interpretation of the collected data material on the basis of expert interviews and 
lectures. In the end of each categorized umbrella concept, follows a conclusion with 
hypothetical answers to the research sub-questions. The conceptualization and 
categorization draws a bow from "Iranian identity", "tradition and modernity", over 
"battlefields" on four major levels, to "human rights", including dialogue possibilities, 
limitations, and the important role of women and education. 
The sixth chapter deals with "questions of universality" including individual 
perspectives of interviewees and lecturers, referring to Islam and human rights in 
general. Additionally, Iran's official position on human rights internally as well as 
within International Law and the UNO is explained. Prospects for dialogue possibilities 
are described on international, domestic and religious levels of action. The seventh 
chapter is a comprehensive round up with concluding anthropological perspectives and 
theoretical approaches towards human rights theories. It promotes a critical, dynamic 
and interdisciplinary approach to a more comprehensive and extensively empirical 
theory of human rights. 
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4 Methods 
4.1 Qualitative & Empirical approach 
I am using an qualitative and empirical approach, because the question of why and how 
is much more important when it comes to sensitive issues like universality of human 
rights, due to its high ethical, philosophical as well as specific cultural and social 
background. This topic contains a more analytical and symbolical character, which 
means that even facial expressions, as well as the way how the respective person is 
laughing, talking and pausing, is influencing the final interpretation results and is for 
this reason indispensable. From an anthropological perspective, “[…] one needs a more 
sophisticated analytical vocabulary than simply that of rights, duties, and choices. […] 
This vocabulary needs to be grounded in a theory of individual agency conceived as 
deeply shaped by and within social relations.” (Cowan 2006:13) This quotation 
underlines the importance to not simply base on lexical definition of terms but to 
critically bear in mind their contexts, origins, as well as intentions of the subject. The 
apprehension of a subject's action or in general social data, always calls for 
Fremdverstehen or different perspective-taking, which means that the daily life 
knowledge is principally not sufficient for generating differentiated knowledge. (cp. 
Mayring 2008:29) Context-related action stands in the centre of comprehensive 
analysis. 
Therefore, the approach of critical and analytical qualitative content analysing would 
provide the best basis for a better in-depth understanding of the interrelated structures of 
apperception, interpretation, and action of the respective subjects being researched. 
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4.1.1 Grounded Theory 
"This is not to say that we cannot identify some general patterns, but that 
generalized abstractions have to bear the hallmarks of "grounded theory," 
in which intellectual abstractions remain embedded in identifiable empirical 
findings." (Cowan 2006:13) 
Due to the fact that there is little scientific work regarding human rights discourses in 
Iran, and which is actually available to me, I more or less step on new ground. The 
current debates on universality of human rights in Iran are more or less locked within 
small circles and to gain access is not easy. Especially when one considers the difficult 
political situation in Iran right now, in which a lot of human rights scholars are under 
custody or imprisoned and consequently hindered to take part in international dialogues. 
For this reason it appeared to me as a logical approach to enter the scene with the 
methodology of grounded theory. It seems to be the only way to first of all discover key 
themes or phenomena within current Iranian human rights debates, through which I am 
able to develop core variables with certain specific characteristics, which reveal more 
about the overall dimension of the discourses. Since there is not one strong and 
grounded theory concerning "universality of human rights" available, careful 
conceptualizations of different discourses could advance theoretical discussions and 
help solving its fundamental problems. 
Even though grounded theory was developed as a methodology, "a way of thinking 
about and studying social reality" (Strauss&Corbin 1998b:4), which builds theories 
grounded in empirical data (cp. Strauss&Corbin 1998b:8), it is not possible for me to 
generate a totally new and extensive formal grounded theory on "Iranian human rights 
discourses". The limited volume of my thesis and the complexity of the topic would not 
allow it. But since a theory is in itself constantly developing with no absolute endpoint 
(cp. Glaser&Strauss 2005:52), I could give a starting shot for a future emergent theory 
with further refinement. Within the research process, I will integrate the basic approach 
of grounded theory, which is a constant comparative and systematic analysis process, 
involving new data from multiple sources such as lectures, interviews, discussions, 
comments, documents, etc. The research subjects, who embody the primary source of 
new qualitative data, are the most important elements of my work. The methodology of 
grounded theory can be seen as a "vision", which gives a flexible and creative guidance 
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to "where it is that the analyst wants to go with the research" (Strauss&Corbin 1998b:8). 
I can only look behind doors, which are open or at least left ajar and are guided only by 
those chances, which I am able to grasp and realize. 
In order to block findings of eventual new key categories, properties and dimensions, 
out of which I am able to formulate cohere and plausible hypotheses, extensive reading 
of literature concerning human rights theories will only be integrated when the core 
categories of my work are established with its basic conceptual development. (cp. 
Glaser 2004:§46) Of course, a certain previous knowledge is absolutely necessary to be 
able to hold interviews and step into professional dialogue with experts. 
On the other hand, the theoretical access to human rights theories and discourses in 
Western anthropological circles is easy to access and rich on material. However, the 
current anthropological debate will only serve as basis in the concluding end of my 
thesis, when it comes to the localization of Iranian human rights discourses in the 
Western anthropological debate on human rights theories. 
 
4.1.2 Semi-structured interviews 
In my point of view the method of semi-structured interviews is the most adequate and 
compatible way for collecting and comparing new qualitative data. Semi-structured 
means that the interview form has a certain sequence of themes to be covered, as well as 
a list of suggested questions. However, in opposition to full-structured interviews, there 
is an openness to change the sequence and forms of the questions in order to reach 
viable answers in regard to the main research question. (cp. Kvale 1996:124) The 
interviewer is in this way able to improvise follow-up questions and to dig deeper in 
areas of interest that emerge to explore further meanings and dimensions in order to 
specify core categories. (cp. Arksey&Knight 1999:7) In the end interviews are a method 
by which "the world of beliefs and meanings, not of actions" (Arksey&Knight 1999:15) 
is clarified. What people think must not necessarily align with their action. 
Concerning objectivity, I am supporting Steiner Kvale's (1996:66) conception of an 
interview, which is "neither an objective nor a subjective method - its essence is 
intersubjective interaction." He follows Bernstein's (Beyond Objectivism and 
Relativism, 1983) hermeneutical tradition, arguing for a "dialogic conception of truth, 
where true knowledge is sought through rational argumentation by participants in a 
discourse. And the medium of a discourse is language, which is neither objective or 
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universal, nor subjective or individual, but intersubjective." Along these lines, an 
interview does not only involve a professional conversation but also a rational 
negotiation of meaning between the interviewer and his or her respondents. Objectivity, 
then not only depends on the relationship between the researcher and the nature of the 
object studied, but also on a theoretical, critical and reciprocal understanding of the 
content being analysed. (cp. Kvale 1996:64-65) 
 
4.1.3 Expert-interviews 
In my research field, an expert is someone who has a particular or outstanding 
knowledge of contemporary Iranian research. More specifically, it is an intellectual, not 
necessarily an Iranian citizen, who has a thorough and up to date inside view into the 
social, cultural, juridical, political, or economical currents within the Iranian society. All 
experts belong to a certain cultural and social context to which I don't belong and 
subsequently have a special perspective on the topic concerned due to her/his individual 
position and personal observations. 
Therefore, experts are the source for special knowledge concerning my research field 
and the expert-interview is the method to make this knowledge accessible. (cp. 
Gläser&Laudel 2009:12) The interviews serve as basis to analyse the descriptions of the 
respondents' personal acquisition of interpretation, perspectives and attitude concerning 
certain concepts, categories and subcategories in the research field. (cp. Hopf 1979:15) 
The first task is to negotiate access to certain experts, in sending out a personal 
introduction letter which comprises the purpose of studies, the methodology, the subject 
area and the thematic direction of possible questions, as well as the benefit or goal of 
the research outcome. Background knowledge about every respective expert is also very 
important to first of all gain access, and then the needed respect for a productive 
interview at eye level. Background information includes not only the interviewee's 
biographical data and publications, but also active voluntary engagements, position and 
concerns about issues in which the person was historically and is currently involved. 
(cp. Arksey&Knight 1999:124) 
All expert-interviews were recorded with a digital voice-recording device. Therefore, I 
was able to fully concentrate on the content of the interviewee's statements and did not 
need to simultaneously write a protocol, which usually disturbs the flow of words, is 
incomplete through hurried simplification, sketchy reconstruction as well as hasty pre-
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interpretations by the interviewer. (cp. Gläser&Laudel 2009:157) Consequently, I was 
able to analyse all answers in their full completeness, calmly, at any time after the 
interview has taken place. 
 
4.1.4 Ethnographic fieldwork 
Today, social and cultural anthropology does not only deal with the non-European 
"foreign" but also with the own society and culture as well as things that for the 
anthropologist, on the first sight, seem to be "normal" and familiar. An essential basic 
technique of anthropological fieldwork is participant observation, "in everyday 
activities, working in the native language and observing events in their everyday 
context" (Barnard&Spencer 1996:616), a methodology integrated by Bronislaw 
Malinowski3. Concerning my work, the method of participant observation seemed 
unsuitable, on the basis of the facts that I am purely focusing on human rights 
discourses in intellectual Iranian circles. Therefore, the scientific knowhow, practical 
experiences and personal stories of the interviewees forms the fundament of my work, 
and not detailed descriptions about how they actively practice that what they say in 
everyday life. Ethnography in general, as product (writings by anthropologists) and 
process (participant observation or fieldwork), together with the methodology of 
comparison and contextualization, form an anthropological triangle, which is, "in 
essence, the way in which socio-cultural anthropology works as a discipline to explain 
and interpret human cultures and social life." (Sanjek 1996:193) Even though I am not 
able to perform an elaborate field research trip to the Islamic Republic of Iran, I will 
nevertheless use the ethnographic term field or fieldwork, which "can take as many 
forms as there are anthropologists, projects, and circumstances." (Carrithers 1996:229) 
My fieldwork comprises gathering information from all kinds of written, oral and visual 
sources as well as from my short but intense political and cultural field excursion to 
Teheran in July 2007. Therefore my personal reminiscences, experiences and feelings, 
as well as the process of getting access to experts and insiders, which made all the 
interviews possible, are also flowing into my field and are shaping my fieldwork. All the 
knowledge I gather from the above mentioned multiple sources, I have to re-work for 
                                                 
3
 Especially through his fieldwork in the Trobriand islands from 1914 to 1918 and his book Argonauts of 
the Western Pacific (1922). (Panoff&Perrin 2000:159) 
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scholarly purposes. Even while I am sitting alone at my desk, in my mind and memories 
I will continue to be engaged with my research subjects, in an effort to analyse compare 
and re-construct their sayings and to interpret their body language. (cp. Carrithers 
1996:231) 
 25 
4.2 Qualitative data analysis & Interpretation 
The central task of qualitative data analysis lies in the creation of an interpretative 
approach to the collected data material. (cp. Strübing 2008:19) For using the 
methodology of grounded theory, the researcher needs to be much more creative. The 
connection between the researcher and his/her developing scientific work can be 
compared to the connection between an artist and his/her developing piece of art. 
"Analysis is the interplay between researchers and data. It is both science 
and art." (Strauss&Corbin 1998b:13) 
4.2.1 Comparative data analysis 
After Glaser & Strauss, systematic comparative data analysis forms the operational 
basis of generating theory grounded in empirical data. To generate theory, implies that 
the researcher (1) collects, (2) encodes and (3) analyses data parallelly and 
simultaneously. From the beginning of the research to the end the three operations 
merge and permanently intersect. (cp. Glaser&Strauss 2005:52) 
Comparative analysing is about generating many phenomena, concepts, categories, 
properties and its dimensions, subcategories as well as hypotheses to general problems 
and to plausibly integrate them into a categorical system for further comparisons. To 
exemplify my approach using the methodology of grounded theory, I am operating with 
following definitions by Strauss and Corbin (1998b:101): 
 
Phenomena Central ideas in the data represented as concepts 
Concepts The building blocks of theory 
Categories Concepts that stand for phenomena 
Properties Characteristics of a category, the delineation of which defines and gives 
meaning 
Dimensions The range along which general properties of a category vary, giving 
specification to a category and variation to the theory 
Subcategories Concepts that pertain to a category, giving it further clarification and 
specification 
Figure 3 Grounded Theory: Definitions of terms 
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From fundamental importance are memos, which are "the researcher's record of 
analysis, thoughts, interpretations, questions, and directions for further data collection." 
(Strauss&Corbin 1998b:110) Memos arise at all levels of the research process, from 
constant comparison of indicators and concepts, from reading literature, and generally 
from sorting, structuring and writing. Memoing is a systematic process that continuously 
parallels the data analysis process and is consequently the most important and direction 
guiding component of grounded theory. Memos help to develop the properties of each 
category in order to generate a conceptual framework through an integrated set of 
hypotheses. (cp. Glaser 2004:§65-66) 
 
4.2.2 Coding 
The meaning behind data from different sources like texts, interviews, movies, lectures, 
etc. needs to be unveiled first, in order to compare and analyse them. In the case of 
grounded theory, there is no theoretical framework available right from the beginning. 
For this reason, concepts, categories, properties and its dimensions need to be developed 
during the research process in order to formulate integrative hypotheses. Glaser & 
Strauss choose for this approach of data analysis the term coding. (Strauss&Corbin 
1998b:58; Strübing 2008:19) 
It is an analytic process, in close examination of empirical data, used to develop the key 
elements of a generating theory, like concepts, categories and hypotheses. It is "the 
analytic process through which data are fractured, conceptualized, and integrated to 
form theory." (Strauss&Corbin 1998b:3) Grounded theory systematically codes 
material, not necessarily to its full exhaustiveness, but with codes on the basis of 
theoretical concepts and categories, which successively are developed through a 
continuous comparative data analysis. (cp. Strübing 2008:19) It systemizes and controls 
the generation of theory. 
Glaser & Strauss developed a three step coding process, without a fixed hierarchy or 
distinctiveness from each other: 
 
(1) Open coding, "the analytic process through which concepts are identified and 
their properties and dimensions are discovered in data" (Strauss&Corbin 
1998b:101), is used to break off the shell of the surface of the collected data, 
through an analytical extraction of phenomena and its properties. 
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(2) Axial coding, "the process of relating categories to their subcategories, termed 
"axial" because coding occurs around the axis of a category, linking categories 
at the level of properties and dimensions." (Strauss&Corbin 1998b:123) 
(3) Selective coding, which proves the core variables by systematically comparing 
them to other subcategories, in order to refine the theory. "Selective coding 
means to cease open coding and to delimit coding to only those variables that 
relate to the core variable in sufficiently significant ways as to produce a 
parsimonious theory. Selective coding begins only after the analyst is sure that 
he/she has discovered the core variable." (Glaser 2004:§55) It is a systematic 
put-into-relationship process of a core category with other categories, which 
need further refinement and development. (cp. Strauss&Corbin 1996:94) 
 
As mentioned before, it is not my goal to generate a new and fully grounded formal 
theory, but to draw an outline of different motives, paradigms, ideologies, and 
perspectives, which flow into Iranian human rights discourses. Therefore, I will focus 
on the open and axial coding procedure only, in order to generate core categories (see 
Multiple data, depth & saturation) and linking hypotheses (see Axial coding) between 
different contexts, actions, conditions and consequences of the analysed discourses. 
4.2.2.1  Open coding 
Through open coding, the analyst tries to identify experiences, which shall give an 
answer to the methodological question and perspective, about what is all involved in the 
research process. It first of all only deals with the identification and placing of single 
concepts or phenomena. Later, in subsequent analysis, they are integrative and 
knowledgable enough to ascribe them meanings. (cp. Strübing 2008:14) 
The plurality of possible perspectives and facets of every phenomena becomes within 
the process of dimensionalization more abstract, by integrating them into theoretical 
concepts. "[…] whereas properties are the general or specific characteristics or 
attributes of a category, dimensions represent the location of a property along a 
continuum or range" (Strauss&Corbin 1998b:117). Properties can be dimensionalized 
for example in its frequency through questions like how often a phenomena happens, to 
find patterns, which "are formed when groups of properties align themselves along 
various dimensions" (Strauss&Corbin 1998b:117), having in mind that not every 
person, action or object fits a pattern completely. 
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The recognition of general characteristics of a category is important, because they 
deliver the entire scope of dimensions under which a category varies. (cp. Strauss & 
Corbin 1996:51) 
4.2.2.2  Axial coding 
Axial coding aims to create an interrelationship drawn on phenomena. That means that 
the researcher compiles connections between qualified concepts and is testing them 
through continuous comparison. Depending on the status of development of a precise 
research question and the progress of the open and axial coding, usually turn out one or 
two theoretical concepts as central for the developing theory. (cp. Strübing 2008:20) 
According to Strauss (1998:63), axial coding points to possible linkages between a 
certain category and other different concepts and categories. The researcher needs to 
decide, which identified phenomena are or could be relevant enough to clarify the 
research question, and systematically compare them upon questions of their origin, 
circumstances and consequences. Consequently, vague hypotheses are developed, which 
need to be tested in the successive analyses. Hypotheses are nothing more than 
"statements about the nature of relationships among the various categories and their 
subcategories." (Strauss&Corbin 1998b:103) 
Those hypotheses that prove to be fruitful to answer the research question, flow into the 
concluding end. (cp. Strübing 2008:21) 
The parallel, overlapping and intertwining processes of open and axial coding can be 
summarized in following causal connection: 
 
1) Interview summary  2) Content filtering into different phenomena which turn into 
concepts  3) Unify concepts as properties or subcategories under more theoretically 
abstract categories  4) Define the dimension of properties and subcategories for 
further specification of the category  5) Inductive approach: connect categories with 
their properties and dimensions to formulate hypothesises  6) Compare core 
categories to other incidents/phenomena to create a categorical system for further 
analysis  7) Deductive approach: verify hypothesis by means of other 
incidents/phenomena. 
Figure 4 Grounded Theory: Process of open and axial coding 
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4.2.3 Theoretical sampling 
Glaser and Strauss (2005:55) call the process, of simultaneously collecting, coding and 
analysing data with the goal to generate theory, as well as to decide about which data 
needs to be collected in the next step and where they can be found, theoretical 
sampling. Theoretical sampling is a "sampling on the basis of emerging concepts, with 
the aim being to explore the dimensional range or varied conditions along which the 
properties of concepts vary." (Strauss & Corbin 1998b:73) It has the intention to 
discover categories and their properties as well as to design the internal network or 
outline of a theory. (cp. Glaser & Strauss 2005:70) "The basic question in theoretical 
sampling is to what groups or subgroups does one turn to next in data collection—and 
for what theoretical purpose?" (Glaser 2004:§51) 
Not one but many different categories in combination need to be systematically 
analysed, like a combination of different research groups, cultural symbols and social 
practices. It leads the researcher to the question of where the next group for comparison 
can be found, which is different to the one already being researched. When such a 
contrasting group can also be analyzed, it leads to further generation and adjustment of 
his/her theory. (cp. Glaser & Strauss 2005:91) 
Therefore, the process and the final duration of the theoretical realization are not 
calculable in advance. (cp. Glaser & Strauss 2005:55) 
 
4.2.4 Multiple data, depth & saturation 
Different types of data create a broader variety of perspectives, from which the 
researcher is able to establish categories and analyse the connections between their 
properties and dimensions. It is a multisided approach that does not set boundaries to 
the techniques of data collection, the way data are applied or certain data types. Such 
data diversity is helpful for generating hypotheses, because it brings together more 
information about categories, as any other form of data collection. All the possible ways 
to glean categories, automatically force the researcher to generate characteristics, in so 
far as the researcher understands the varieties between the different data layer as 
expression of different conditions under which they are collected. (cp. Glaser&Strauss 
2005:73) To cumulate many different data with the method of comparative analysis 
meets the requirements to cope with a greater variety of conditions and exceptions of 
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hypotheses. Every complement mode of data investigation or source of knowledge 
needs to be theoretically integrated into the research work. Because, every new and 
different type of data does only enrich the theory in process and does not completely 
disprove it. (cp. Glaser & Strauss 2005:76) 
The depth of theoretical sampling refers to the amount of collected data from one group 
or category. Strauss and Corbin (1998b:136) describe saturation as " a matter of 
reaching the point in the research where collecting additional data seems 
counterproductive; the ´new` that is uncovered does not add that much more to the 
explanation at this time." 
Only at the beginning of the research and until the main categories to be analysed 
appear, asks theoretical sampling for the maximized coverage. After that only such data 
are collected, which refer to the core categories. The core-categories or theoretical key 
variables are the most explicative and need to be covered and saturated the complete as 
possible. A core category emerges after extensive comparison of incidents to categories 
and the following saturation of coded categories, which seem to be from higher 
importance to answer the research question. "The core variable can be any kind of 
theoretical code—a process, a condition, two dimensions, a consequence, a range and so 
forth. Its primary function is to integrate the theory and render it dense and saturated." 
(Glaser 2004:§54) When the researcher develops and integrates his/her theory, he/she 
realizes which categories need more saturation and which can be excluded. 
Consequently, the theory itself selects in which direction and how deep it is developed. 
(cp. Glaser & Strauss 2005:77) 
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4.3 Role of researcher 
In order to develop comprehensive hypotheses in full compliance with the collected 
material, the continuously comparing researcher is permanently forced to consider the 
rich diversity of data. "From the start, the analyst asks a set of questions—"What is this 
data a study of?" "What category does this incident indicate?" "What is actually 
happening in the data?" "What is the main concern being faced by the participants?" 
and "What accounts for the continual resolving of this concern?" (Glaser 2004:§48) 
All phenomena/categories need to be compared to other phenomena/categories and 
properties of a category, in order to work out as many similarities or differences as 
possible. Therewith the generating process of constant comparison and theoretical 
sampling is kept in a constant flow, and it is the analyst's duty to permanently pay 
attention to the inner development as well as the outer linkages of relevant categories to 
stay theoretically sensitive. The methodology depends to a high degree on the 
professional skills and sensitiveness of the researcher, who accepts controlled flexibility 
and indecisiveness to creatively generating categories, hypotheses and theory. (cp. 
Glaser & Strauss 2005:85) 
Therefore, the end product of the study is unique in so far that another researcher who 
works independently, even though with the same material, would not come to the same 
results. (cp. Glaser & Strauss 2005:109) 
 
4.3.1 Ethical responsibility 
Every piece of research is context specific and therefore ethical considerations are 
inevitable. The researcher needs to make ethical decisions at all levels and stages of the 
research process. 
An ethical approach implies to obtain the subject's informed consent to participate in the 
study, which needs to be kept up during the entire process, as well as securing 
confidentiality concerning the data collected and every person’s anonymity. It is the 
researcher's ethical responsibility to report knowledge that is as secured and verified as 
possible. Any possible consequences of the study for the subjects who take part in the 
research need to be cleared in advance. (cp. Delgado 2006:209; Hill 2005:65; Kvale 
1996:111) 
Implementing confidentiality in qualitative interviews means that generally names and 
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other personal details of the interviewees must be disguised and everything they say 
must remain private or secret. Depending on how politically, judicially, and/or 
culturally critical the interview questions are, the research subject's age, occupation or 
information pertaining to specific social or family relationships need to be changed as 
well. (cp. Arksey&Knight 1999:134) The interviewee may face risks in terms of 
personal safety, especially when the research deals with citizens of oppressive states 
like the Islamic Republic of Iran where regime critical opinions are reason enough to 
get prosecuted. Therefore every research participant needs to give his/her full consent 
concerning copyrights and has to state whether their information can be cited indirectly 
or directly with their given or with a fictitious name. Any other requests are additionally 
secured in written and signed form from both the researcher and the research subject. 
 
4.3.2 Power & Discourse 
The researcher permanently has to ask him/herself how to counteract losing critical 
perspective on the knowledge obtained and consequently how to ensure the scientific 
quality of the study. This contains to be critically sensitive about how deeply the 
interviews can be analyzed and whether the subjects should be involved in interpreting 
certain statements. (cp. Kvale 1996:111, 120) Therefore, it is important to integrate 
one's work within expanded global interconnections, which includes the anthropologist's 
political, historical, social and cultural heritage and which (power) relationship he/she 
has toward the research field and subjects. After James Clifford (1986:7), ethnographic 
representations are "partial truths" and Lila Abu-Lughod (1991:142) goes further and 
says they are also "positioned truths". Such a critical self-reflection is urgently needed 
especially when talking about universality and avoiding ethnocentricity. According to 
Evans (2005:1049), "discourses promote particular categories of thought and belief that 
guide our responses to the prevailing social environment. In this sense, discourses lend 
structure to our experiences and to the meanings we give to our experiences." Therefore, 
language does not only describe external reality but refers to generalised, socially 
constructed categories of thought, which all consist of important social meanings and 
values in constant interaction with the prevailing social and cultural context. 
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5 Islamic Republic of Iran 
5.1 Introducing overview 
Iran's long timeline is engraved with a variety of historical phases as well as social and 
cultural peculiarities. In pre-Islamic times, Iran included three Persian empires 
(Achaemenid, Parthia, Sassanid) and was from its very beginning a multiple ethnic 
state, which it is still today. The word Iran comes from the middle Persian and means 
"The land of the Aryan", as a term for a political, religious and ethnic unity, which got 
fully integrated in the Sassanid period (224-651). It was a term for the magnitude and 
unity of Persia, which used to be a huge territory including Mesopotamia, the area of the 
present day Afghanistan, the ancient Transoxania (approximately the present day 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and southwest Kazakhstan), Oxus (Amu Darya river) and 
Jaxartes (Syr Darya river). The term Persia simply describes a landscape in south-
western Iran (Old-Persian "Parsa", Arabic "Fars", Greek "Persis") and correspondingly 
a mere geographical term. Both terms Persia and Iran are used interchangeably from 
many Iranians/Persians today, but Iran remains the official, international and political 
term, which I am going to use throughout my work. Important to mention is that a clear 
outlined term like nation, which evolved in the European modern age, and is in its 
meaning strongly bound to one ethnic society, is not suitable for a multi ethnic country 
like Iran, evolved from afar and dynamic epochs. (cp. Gronke 2006:8-9) 
Iran underwent developments, which differ in their specific independence from other 
countries in the Islamic Orient. Iran was able to keep certain specific characteristics 
from pre-Islamic times - despite the Arab conquest and the Islamization process which 
started in the 7th century; despite the Abbaside caliphate (749-1258), Turkish dynasties 
and Mongol leadership (1055-1501); despite the Safawid (1501-1722), Qajar (1796-
1925), and Pahlavi (1925-1979) dynasties; despite Western hegemonic exploitation and 
an exhaustive war with Iraq (1980-88) - to the present Islamic Republic of Iran, 
constitutionally established after the 1979 revolution4. It is the first Islamic Republic 
                                                 
4
 I am consciously writing 1979 Revolution and not Islamic Revolution, since for the majority of the 
Iranians it was not the goal to create an authoritative Islamic regime but solely wanted to over through the 
Shah and set up a entirely new and republican system. The following systematically organized and radical 
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under Shii banner, an experiment which has not reached its end, yet. One of the 
specifics of the country is the commitment to the Twelve-Imam Shii Islam, which is 
since 1501 state religion. Therefore, the Shia Islam (Arabic for "party", or "Ali's party", 
meaning that Ali is the only legitimate successor of the Prophet Mohammad) is the 
central point around which Iranian politics, culture and society is circulating and it 
demarcates the country from all other countries of the Islamic world, in which the Sunni 
Islam is dominating. (cp. Buchta 2004:136; Gronke 2006:23) Today, the Iranian society 
consists of 89% Shiites, 9% Sunnites and 2% form Zoroastrians, Jews, Christians, and 
Baha'is (est. of July 2009, CIA Factbook [url]), of course with different characteristics 
and occurrences. 
A broad diversity of complex changes have constantly and tremendously influenced 
social, cultural, religious, economic and political developments, which makes Iran to the 
most dynamic society and culture of the entire Middle East region despite the rigid 
political system, which is based on unchangeable religious principles under the 
surveillance of the Guardian Council. (cp. Mohssen 2008:1 [lecture]) When doing 
research about the Iranian society, all historical and political happenings — since 
centuries dominated by foreign powers, the nationalization of the oil industry by the 
first democratically elected President Mosaddegh stopped by a CIA/SIS coup, the 1979 
revolution stopped with the ceasefire with their hated Saddam Hussein, whom the West 
was supporting during an eight year long brutal war — need to be kept in mind. Then, it 
starts to seem a lot more logical that the Iranian society now wants to show the world 
that besides all hurdles, it became a modern and advanced country in the 21st century. 
To understand the self-conception of the Iranians, it is inevitable to pay thoughtful 
attention to these intertwining and overlapping changes from internal and external 
influences to which they had and still have to react, constantly. Beside many internal 
struggles, there always have been external influences, which also need to be critically 
examined when analysing Iranian ways of thought. The geopolitical position of Iran and 
its demographical or generational changes are also important aspects which cannot be 
hidden. 
The huge amount of material concerning Iranian and Islamic history within such a rich 
time span, makes it difficult to decide which information need to be included in an 
                                                                                                                                               
islamization process under Khomeini as Supreme Leader, was for many people a deep shock and has led 
to massive emigration waves. 
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"overview" of Iran's history, to properly describe the context, in which current human 
rights discourses take place. Since setting limits is an important factor within the 
Diploma writing process, I am impelled to narrow the timeframe down. Since there is a 
lot of literature available which is thoroughly treating the pre- and post-revolutionary 
period, I decided to concentrate on the very present context, starting with the presidency 
of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, and its current developments around the Green 
movement. I will give a brief overview of Iran's maze of informal and formal power 
centres, within and around the official political and judiciary system of the Islamic 
Republic. The influence of different power centres is important to understand certain 
actions and constraints of the main Iranian protagonists of the present day. I will give 
some basic and historical information about the state's political and judicial system, 
about its culture, religion and society, as well as (political) reform actions, constraints 
and instabilities. 
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5.2 Culture, Religion & Society 
5.2.1 Twelver-Shiism 
After Ali's death in 661, who was the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, a point of 
contention evolved about who is authorized to lead the Muslim society. Strong 
controversies have led to the development of different Shiite groups. The Twelve-Imam 
Shiism promotes the belief that only Ali's sons, with the prophet's daughter Fatima as 
their mother, are legitimate for taking the lead. For them, there are all in all twelve 
legitimate Imams (Arabic for "leader", "head of society/group") starting with Ali 
himself. After the death of the 11th Imam (873/874), who had no male offspring, deep 
divisions about the unsolved problem of who is going to be the next Imam left its mark 
within the Shii community. However, Twelver-Shiites hold the opinion that he actually 
had a son, called Mohammad (like the prophet), who was born in 869. A miracle has 
vanished him and now he is hiding somewhere on this planet invisible for his adherents. 
As a redeemer (al-Mahdi) he will one day come back to his adherents, ending the 
prophet's mission, to abolish tyranny and bring paradise on earth, uniting all Muslim 
people. (cp. Gronke 2006:22-23) 
The historical turning-point of the Twelver-Shiism happened as Hoseyn, Ali's youngest 
son and 3rd Imam, tried to conquer the Ummayyad caliphate; But his Kufi- Shii 
followers from Medina, did not support him on the said day and consequently he died in 
the battle of Kerbela in October 10, 680. This in turn led to a political collapse of the 
Shia and it became an oppositional movement against Sunni leadership. An important 
fact is that only after Kerbela the Shii traditions evolved with its repentance and 
mourning rituals. (cp. Aslan 2006:193-6; Gronke 2006:24-25) 
Twelve-Imam Shiites celebrate the anniversary of their death, as well as the birthday of 
the 12th Imam. The gravesites of the 11 Imams are important pilgrimage destinations 
and are highly worshiped. Since none of their legitimate Imams, ever came to power, 
the Shii society always has lived under an "unrightful" power. Not until the hidden son 
comes back and starts the period of reckoning, all leaders can only be provisional and 
therefore are temporarily limited authorities. (cp. Buchta 2004:138) 
The Shahs of the Safawid dynasty (1501-1722) established a network of Shii 
institutions in Iran and the Shii olama (Arabic/ Persian "scholars") became an 
autonomous Clerus with certain independence and authority vis a vis political powers; 
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An establishment, which is in Sunni Arabic Islamic countries not existing. (cp. Buchta 
2004:139) 
After the 1979 revolution, Iran's Supreme Leader Imam Khomeini established a new 
theory of theocratic government, anchored in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, which is basing on the mandate of the Council of Jurists (velayat-e faqih) under 
the leading and confirming voice of himself, as the Supreme Leader. The Supreme 
Leader is the one who acts as the "substitutional" authority of the Twelver-Shii society 
during the period of occultation of the Twelfth Imam. Hence, the leadership institution 
of velayat-e faqih is the vice regency of the hidden Imam. (cp. Gronke 2006:26; Kamali 
2007:382; Khosrokhavar 2004:195) Today, this absolute clerical power holds Ali 
Khamenei, the successor of Ruhollah Khomeini. (see Guardian Council) 
Hamid Dabashi sees Shiism as a religion of protest, which emerged after the violent and 
unjust deaths of all Imams following Ali's caliphate, called as Martyrs. Therefore, he 
sees a big paradox in Shii Islam being institutionalized in a theocracy, like it is in Iran. 
"Shi'ism […] must always be in a position of defiance and rebellion and thus can never 
come to power without immediately discrediting itself." (Dabashi 2007:190) Therefore 
are those, who revolt against such a theocratic system, actually more likely "Shiites" 
then the regime holder. Now, the Anti-"Islamic Republic" forces became a strong 
ideological opposition, which emerged from the deep inside of the Islamic Republic 
itself, and are usually referred to as "religious intellectuals". (see Islamic reform) 
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5.2.2 Iranian intellectuals 
5.2.2.1 Islamic ideology 
Since a long time, intellectual life in Iran stood at a crossroad of two different sources of 
influence: Western thought and Shiite thought. (cp. Khosrokhavar 2004:191) 
After World War II, intellectuals came from a clerical background, who studied at Shia 
scholarship centres like Qom in Iran or Nadjaf in Iraq. Their main goal was it to 
construct a new collective identity against the Western domination and materialism. 
They more and more saw the reason of their country's backwardness in the 
consequences of Western imperial ambitions. (cp. Khosrokhavar 2004:192) The 
intellectual field in the mid 20th century, including the beginning of the 1979 revolution, 
was coined by radical Islamic thought. Sayyid Jalal Al-e Ahmad (†1969), the son of a 
clergy man and former member of the communist Tudeh party, pointed to the "curing 
Islam", to make an end to the "cultural malaise" through spreading "westoxification". 
(Arjomand 2002:720; Buchta 2004:146) Another important intellectual during the 
60s/70s, who came from a clerical family and received his doctorate in sociology in 
Sorbonne, was Ali Shariati (†1977). He talked about a "unitary classless society", a train 
of thought that subordinated the individual to the Islamic and/or communist community, 
without independent individual choices that were not in common with the "idealized 
Islamic city" or the "culturally harmonious, economically homogenous society of 
communism." (Khosrokhavar 2004:193) Besides philosophy it was Marxism that was 
flowing into the uniting source of the notion of Islamic ideology, which has given birth 
to the 1979 revolution. The revolution started a transformation leading to a redefinition 
of Shiism, which ended in Khomeini's new theory of theocratic government, basing on 
the mandate of the Council of Jurists (velayat-e faqih). The guardianship of the 
jurisconsult is charged with reviewing laws passed by the Parliament (majles) to 
determine whether they are in conformity with Islamic Law and compatible with the 
Iranian Constitution. (cp. Menashri 2001:14; see Guardian Council) The religious and 
political concept of velayat-e faqih originated from Khomeini's book hokumat-e eslami 
("The Islamic State") he wrote in Nadjaf, in 1970. It is basing on his interpretation of 
specific Quran verses and the hadith, which are recommendations, prohibitions, 
practices, and traditions of Muhammad's life, orally channelled through different 
sources and generations after his death and which are not as such included in the Quran. 
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(cp. Aslan 2006:88, 184-5) For Khomeini, the Islamic jurists (faqih) are the only 
legitimate substitute representatives of the occult twelfth Imam, because they are the 
only ones able to interpret the divine law and thereupon the only ones to decide which 
world law is compatible with God's law and which candidates are suitable for political 
positions within the Islamic government of Iran. (cp. Buchta 2004:156) Consequently, 
Khomeini "islamized" politics by "justifying radical social change in Islamic terms" 
(Khosrokhavar 2004:194), basing on the political power of Islamic jurists. 
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5.2.2.2 Islamic reform 
"Through Shiism a traditionalization of a modernizing nation state came 
into being, parallel to the modernization of Shii tradition." (Arjomand 
2002:721) 
After Khomeini's death on June 3, 1989, an eight year long war with Iraq, with millions 
of deaths on both sides, and a destroyed economy leading to deep poverty in Iran, new 
clergy and leymen intellectuals, who all were revolutionaries, gained positions of 
power. 
Reformist intellectuals contested the idea that religion and politics are closely related, 
and came up with terms like civil society, citizens, legality, law-orientedness which 
have been "mythically related by some to the Golden Age of Islam and its supposedly 
pure community where the diversity of ideas was not curtailed by the State." 
(Khosrokhavar 2004:196) Ayatollah Montazeri, Abdolkarim Soroush, Mojtahed 
Shabestari and Mohsen Kadivar are among the most notable intellectuals who refused 
the interrelatedness of religion and politics. 
Ayatollah Montazeri, Khomeini's successor-designate, refuted the idea of the absolute 
mandate of the jurist and subsequently their authority to disqualify candidates for 
election. In an open letter to seminary students on June 7, 1999, he accused the Council 
of overstepping its authority to protect Islam and interfering in the democratic rights of 
people. The task of the Council was to "supervise the elections" and not to "supervise 
the candidates." (see Menashri 2001:157, who has a copy of his letter) 
According to Soroush, a philosopher, who trained pharmacology in London, and who 
was appointed to the commission for Cultural revolution by Khomeini, the new 
religious civil society does not need Islamic norms by Islamic leaders from above, 
which have not been approved by the society. (cp. Khosrokhavar 2004:196; Arjomand 
2002:723) Soroush was in opposition to Shariati in stating that Islam is "richer than 
ideology" because it allows more than one "straight path" for interpretation of the Quran 
and therefore advocated a religious pluralism. He put democracy on three pillars: 
rationality, pluralism, and human rights, and questioned the belief that there exists only 
one absolute theocratical authority. (cp. Arjomand 2002:723-4) 
Shabestari, who received a master degree of modern hermeneutics in Germany, 
promoted the view that Islam has not all the answers to social, economic and political 
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life at all times in history and that there are also different types of knowledge that are 
not necessarily religious. He sees a "de-sacralisation" of religion when interconnected 
with politics. (cp. Khosrokhavar 2004:197) In his books he writes that "a major element 
in modernization is the rationalization of the political order" (A Critique of the Official 
Reading of Religion, 2000) and that "the science of jurisprudence can only offer 
answers to certain questions that arise within the institutional framework of existing 
political regimes." (Hermeneutics: The Book and Tradition, 1996; cited in: Arjomand 
2002:725) 
An Islam critical, pluralistic and hermeneutic perspective entered the scene, against the 
apologetic Islamic modernism, which sees Islam as the most perfect religion that offers 
the best social and political system and answers to all problems, at all times. 
At the same time, another younger and third generation emerged, including Mohsen 
Kadivar, who challenged the system from within the clerical community, and spent 
many months in prison. (cp. Khosrokhavar 2004:194) Kadivar, a student of Montazeri, 
who was completing his doctoral thesis in philosophy, wrote a book about different 
approaches to government in Shii jurisprudence. He criticized every aspect of 
Khomeini's theory of theocratic government from within the tradition of Shii 
jurisprudence. (cp. Arjomand 2002:730) He announced in public, that in order to reach 
freedom and prosperity, the Iranian society needs to "free itself from the shackles of 
past traditions" and adopt a new system "in line with the spirit of the time." (Menashri 
2001:35) For him, the meaning and essence of religion is changing as time goes by and 
today, even the Prophet Muhammad himself would follow a different path, than the one 
he had adopted over 2.000 years ago. (cp. Menashri 2001:35) Kadivar relied on Shii 
theology, underlining that "the occultation of the twelfth Imam in 976 had invalidated 
all temporal authority until his return", consequently the notion of a clerical government 
is a paradox. For him, there is no written document that gives eligibility to somebody or 
a particular class who is authorized by the society to monopolize political power during 
the time of occultation. Therefore, "a democratic government was the only one that can 
claim religious approbation." (Takeyh 2006:48) 
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5.2.2.3 New intellectuals & Journalists 
Another group which promoted a reformist Islam consisted of journalists or 
"intermediary intellectuals". They established a new style of intellectualism, inspired 
by, but sociologically different from, the "grand" Islamic or reformist intellectual 
currents. (cp. Khosrokhavar 2004:194-5) 
Akbar Ganji, a post-revolutionary journalist, who is famous for his harsh language, 
totally opposes a religious government who acts independently of the sovereign will of 
the citizens, who do not need a "Guardian". (cp. Khosrokhavar 2004:198-99) He has 
worked in Soroush's publishing house and branded the conservative proponents of 
"totalitarian Islam" as fascist, and extremist factions in Iran as fascist movements. (cp. 
Menashri 2001:158) He defined fascism as an "opposition to modernity under the 
banner of pre-modern values" (cited in: Arjomand 2002:727), and his book The Fascist 
Interpretation of Religion and Government: Pathology of Transition to the Democratic 
Development-oriented State (2000) was reprinted several times during his second 
imprisonment and two subsequent trials. (cp. Arjomand 2002:727) 
Today, there is a rich diversity of intellectual thoughts and trends within the Iranian 
society. Especially journalists, who are involved in Iran's political and social affairs, 
support the diversification of thoughts. The main problem though is that many 
magazines and journals, which comprise critical views about the social, political, 
juridical and legal system in Iran, are regularly closed down and many writers are 
thrown into prison. (see Limitation & Control) 
There are also very active women writing on issues like inequality between men and 
women and discrimination. Amongst many others there are Shadi Sadr, Hengameh 
Shahidi (NOWROOZ), and Mehrangiz Kar (ZANAN), but all their journals were closed 
down. For them, true religion belongs to the individual inner faith and spirituality and 
not to a rigid political and juridical system. Those new intellectuals connect the ideas of 
"grand" reformist intellectuals to everyday life. Usually, they are students or former 
students and professors, who try to uncover and raise consciousness of discrimination 
within society, using lectures, private gatherings and all media as far as permitted. TV 
broadly is in conservative ownership, but this is not as influential as the new 
intellectuals. More and more, themes like "individual freedom", "sexual autonomy", and 
"peaceful coexistence with the West" move to the new centres of Iranian interests. (cp. 
Khosrokhavar 2004:193) 
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5.2.3 Political reform under Khatami 
The landslide victory (69%) in the presidential elections of Hojjat ul-Islam Mohammad 
Khatami on May 23, 1997, brought a reform in constitutional politics, which was 
questioning the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic, for the first time since 
1979. (cp. Arjomand 2002:725; Menashri 2001:86) After Iranian standards, Khatami 
was a liberal politician, who advocated greater political and social freedom, flexibility, a 
broader education for young people (until his forced resignation, he headed Iran’s 
National Library), women rights, greater emphasis on social welfare, the relaxation of 
cultural Islamization and economic rehabilitation. He did not consider democracy “alien 
to Islam”. In fact he “thinks it’s right there, but the Muslims have missed it”, like a 
foreign commentator stated in the Washington Post of May 25, 1997. (cited in: 
Menashri 2001:80) 
For the "Left Crusaders of the Islamic Revolution" (Mojahedin-e Inqelab-e Islami, MII) 
Khatami’s election espoused a “democratic” reading of Islam: “The people voted for an 
Islam that not only does not see a contradiction between religion and freedom, 
democracy, human rights, and civil society, but believes that these [modern] concepts 
can find their true meaning in Islam. An Islam that recognizes the rights of the citizens 
and discerns the legitimacy of the regime to be based on their consent, which construes 
the vali-ye faqih to be an elected and lawful leader.” (The Election: Islam and the 
Revolution’s Second Generation”, Asr-e Ma, July 16, 1997, cited in: Moslem 2002:253) 
For reformist intellectuals he gave the starting shot with his engagement in a "dialogue 
between civilizations" as a symbol for Iran's emerging civil society. In response to the 
Iranian proposal, the United Nations voted to make the year of 2001 the United Nations 
Year for Dialogue among civilisations. (cp. Boyle 2007:30) In the UN Resolution 56/6 
"Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilization" of November 21, 2001, Article 1 
states: 
"Dialogue among civilizations is a process between and within civilizations, 
founded on inclusion, and a collective desire to learn, uncover and examine 
assumptions, unfold shared meaning and core values and integrate multiple 
perspectives through dialogue." (A/Res/56/6 2001 [url]) 
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5.2.4 Iran's ordinary people 
Iran's social realities look quite different then expected by many Westerners: Over 60% 
of Iranian university students are female, and they are highly educated as well as 
socially, politically, financially active and productive. (Kar 2009:2 [lecture]; Harrison 
2006 [url]) It does not fit anymore the cliché many Westerners have in mind when being 
confronted with Iran. Even though Iranian citizens live under a dictatorship with no 
independent and consequently unpredictable Parliament (majles) and President, as well 
as many restrictions, they are everything than silent and retrogate. Their development 
spread with an enormous speed in all directions, on all levels. There are not only the 
two mostly shown parts of society: on the one side the deep conservatives, men with 
beards and women veiled in black from head to toes, walking their way to Friday 
prayers and on the other side the rich high society who is into aesthetic surgery, and 
striving to live a Hollywood life par excellence. The majority of the Iranian society lies 
somewhere in between, and has been ignored many years by their government, and has 
not be seen by the rest of the world. This is the part of society, which I will call the 
ordinary people (influenced by Mehrangiz Kar 2009 [lecture]). Those men and women, 
who are not necessarily scientific intellectuals, human rights activists or politicians. 
They are those, who have an average high school completion, who study or have a 
regular job, live a "simple" daily life. Those who feel cheated and now, are on the 
streets to shout where their votes are; Those who want to show the rest of the world that 
they have the same goals and desires in life like any other person on this planet and that 
they want to be an equal part of this global network and dialogue. This ordinary part of 
society more and more moves into the centre of the present internal actions and 
discourses and therefore becomes the engine for the promotion and protection of human 
rights. 
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5.3 Organization of the political & judiciary system 
 
Graphic 2 Checks and Balances © 2009 U.S. State Department, AP, WSJ research 
 
Graphic 3 Theological hierarchy of the Shii clergy in Iran © 2000 Wilfried Buchta 
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5.3.1 Constitution & Referendum 
"What Islamization programs will mean in practice becomes clear only once 
their proponents have the chance to implement them. Once in power, they 
have not been able to trust the voting public to keep them there." (Mayer 
1995:16) 
On March 29/30, 1979 after a referendum, which officially changed the authoritarian 
Pahlavi monarchy under Mohammad Reza Shah (the son of Reza Shah who abdicated 
in 1941) to an Islamic Republic, the state and society became islamitized: 
"All civil, penal financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, 
political, and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. 
This principle applies absolutely and generally to all articles of the 
Constitution as well as other laws and regulations, and the fuqaha' of the 
Guardian Council are judges in this matter." (Art. 4 of the Iranian 
Constitution) 
This article establishes that Islamic principles are to be considered as superior to 
ordinary laws as well as overriding provisions in the Constitution itself. The Islamic 
principles are determined by Islamic clerics, appointed by the Supreme Leader (Art. 
110), and subsequently constitute the supreme law in Iran. (cp. Mayer 1995:30) Article 
1 establishes the basis of the Islamic Republic "endorsed by the people of Iran on the 
basis of their long-standing belief in the sovereignty of truth and Quranic justice". 
Article 2 §2 confirms the primacy of "divine revelation and its fundamental role in 
setting forth the laws", and Art. 2 §5 the "continuous leadership (imamah) and perpetual 
guidance, and its fundamental role in ensuring the uninterrupted process of the 
revolution of Islam." 
Due to Khomeini's bad health conditions and the fear that soon he would die, the 
Constitution was revised in 1989 by public vote, in order to be able to eligibly set up a 
successor. This fear was rising, especially after Khomeini's successor designate, grand 
Ayatollah Hosein Ali Montazeri, one of Iran's most powerful revolutionary clerics who 
would have fulfilled all necessary Islamic and juridical qualifications, was disqualified 
due to his call that velayat-e faqih shall not stand above the law and needs to be elected 
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by the majority of people. No other marja taqlid, who would have supported 
Khomeini's principle of the Council of Jurists, could be found. "While alive, Khomeini 
the populist ´modified his rhetoric depending on political circumstances`. Now the 
leader of the Islamic Republic were faced with the classical problem of how to preserve 
the system without a successor or successors of the same statute as its architects." (Moin 
1999:299, citing: Abrahamian1993:132) 
Most importantly to mention would be that the level of religious scholarship 
requirements for the position of the Supreme Leader was lowered, and more weight was 
given to political experience. For Khomeini it was the most important principle that the 
Islamic state he has created would survive and as a result the Constitution, "a cloak 
made for a marja", had to be "re-tailored and made smaller to fit a simple faqih to 
succeed Khomeini […]." (Moin 1999: 294) Previously the Supreme Leader had to be 
recognized and accepted by the majority of the people (ummah) and be a grand 
ayatollah (marja taqlid) (see Graphic 4). Article 109 of the Constitution stating that the 
Supreme Leader should be a marja taqlid was removed and now, according to Art. 107 
of the Constitution, the Assembly of Experts, who has the task of appointing the 
Supreme Leader, can also give preference to those better versed in "political and social 
issues" and not necessarily to those better versed in "Islamic regulations" or "the 
subjects of the fiqh". (cp. Menashri 2001:17; Moin 1999:293) 
Consequently, the current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei "had neither emerged by 
popular consensus nor received the endorsement of the leading authorities for his pre-
eminent religious credentials, but was in fact ´promoted` to the position of Supreme 
Leader by the religio-politicians then wielding power." (Menashri 2001:17) Due to 
Khamenei's lack of theological qualification (i.e. he has no doctor of law (mujtahed) and 
is only a hojjatoleslam (a mid-level theological rank) (see Graphic 4) and not an Islamic 
jurist (faqih) or grand Ayatollah (marja taqlid) and is subsequently not qualified to issue 
fatwa (religious judgment/edict) many Islamic scholars and grand ayatollahs in Qom do 
not respect him in being their religious equal. For them he is only a political leader and 
this clearly violates the revolution's ideology and is a major retreat of revolutionary 
achievements. (cp. Buchta 2000: 52-53; Menashri 2001:18) 
Also important to mention would be that the presidency got weakened and one of his 
key-functions, to coordinate all three constitutional powers, was also transferred to the 
Supreme Leader. Originally, there was a high judicial council, which got elected by the 
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members of the judiciary. Now, there is only one single head of the judiciary, who is 
appointed by the Supreme Leader. (cp. Moin 1999:293) 
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5.3.1.1 Legislative power 
The members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (majles-e shora-ye eslami, in short 
majles) are elected as representatives of the people, by secret vote, for a four year term 
(for more details see Art. 62-70). The main duty of the majles is legislation in the 
framework of the Constitution (Art.71). Besides other functions, the majles has to 
approve international treaties, agreements and protocols (Art.77). 
Within Iran's legislative system, there are two other institutions parallel to the majles, 
which are complementary but cannot initiate legislation: 
 
1. The Guardian Council (shoray-e negahban) 
2. Expediency Descernment Council (majm`a-e tashkhis-e 
maslehat-e nezam) 
 
5.3.1.1.1 Guardian Council 
Chapter VI, Article 91 of the Constitution provides for the Guardian Council: 
“With a view to safeguard the Islamic ordinances and the Constitution, in 
order to examine the compatibility of the legislation passed by the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly with Islam, a council to be known as the Guardian 
Council is to be constituted with the following composition: 
six 'adil fuqaha' conscious of the present needs and the issues of the day, to 
be selected by the Leader. 
six jurists, specializing in different areas of law, to be elected by the Islamic 
Consultative Assembly from among the Muslim jurists nominated-by the 
Head of the Judicial Power." 
According to Art. 93 and 94 of the Constitution, decisions made by the majles will not 
have legislative status unless they are confirmed by the Guardian Council. Within 10 
days the Guardian Council needs to declare its opinion in regard to the compliance with 
the Constitution and fundamental principles of the Sharia. Article 96 adds further: “The 
determination of compatibility of the legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative 
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Assembly with the laws of Islam rests with the majority vote of the fuqaha' on the 
Guardian Council; and the determination of its compatibility with the Constitution rests 
with the majority of all the members of the Guardian Council.”    
Important to mention is that the Guardian Council is assigned to ascertain and confirm 
the eligibility of the presidential candidates before the election and has the 
responsibility to supervise the presidential election process. The Council is also 
responsible for supervising the elections of the Assembly of Experts for Leadership, as 
well as of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and has the direct recourse to popular 
opinion and referenda. (see Art. 118, 99) 
 
5.3.1.1.2 Expediency Council 
The Expediency Discernment Council, or Assembly of Experts (majles-e khobregan), 
has purely the function of arbitration (not legislation) between the majles and the 
Guardian Council. With the increase of disputes, the danger of the Supreme Leader, 
who has the task of supervising the state's legislative, executive, and judicial action, 
influencing the legislation process and consequently threatening its independence, 
became bigger. In order to avoid this, Imam Khomeini issued a decree in February 1987 
for the establishment of an Expediency Council, incorporated under Article 112 of the 
revised Constitution in 1989. (cp. Abghari 2008:15) The Council submits proposals for 
resolving the system's problems which are not resolvable through conventional routes 
(see Art. 110, clause 8) and on that account has the last word when there is a dispute 
between the majles and the Guardian Council. The permanent and changeable members 
of the Council are appointed by the Supreme Leader, and are subjects to his 
confirmation, concerning all rules formulated and approved by the members. (see Art. 
112) 
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5.3.1.2 Executive power 
The executive power in the Islamic Republic of Iran is exercised by the presidency, 
except in the matters that are directly placed under the jurisdiction of the Leadership by 
the Constitution. (see Art. 60) The President is the highest authority after the Supreme 
Leader and has the responsibility for implementing the Constitution. (see Art. 113) The 
President is elected for four years by popular vote, has to possess a "political and 
religious personality", needs to be committed to the principles of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, and has to meet all conditions set forth in Article 115 of the Constitution. The 
functions of the President are all listed under Chapter 9 of the Constitution and are 
amongst others to appoint the ministers (Art. 133), to chair the Supreme Council of 
National Security (Art. 176) as well as signing off the legislations passed by the majles 
and issuing orders for their implementation (Art. 123). 
The Board of Ministers, presided over by the President who is also accountable to the 
majles for its action (Art. 134), is the most important executive authority after the 
Supreme Leader and the President. Each member is introduced by the President to the 
majles for their confirmation (Art. 133) and heads their own department. (cp. Abghari 
2008:19) 
 
5.3.1.3 Judicial power 
The judicial system is a body independent of the executive and legislative branch, with 
a few exceptions. (cp. Abghari 2008:21) The preamble states that the judiciary "is of 
vital importance in the context of safeguarding the rights of the people in accordance 
with the line followed by the Islamic movement, and the prevention of deviations within 
the Islamic nation". The judicial system is basing on "just judges with knowledge of the 
meticulous Islamic fundamental principles" and has to supervise the enforcement of 
laws and implement justice. According to Article 156 of the Constitution the judiciary 
has, amongst others, the duty to pass judgment on grievances, violations of rights, and 
complaints, to uncover crimes, prosecuting, punishing, and chastising criminals. The 
Supreme Leader appoints a just mojtahed (an Islamic scholar, competent by Diploma to 
interpret Sharia law using ejtehad) "well versed in judicial affairs" as the head of the 
judicial authority for a time period of five years. (see Art. 157) His functions in judicial 
matters are, amongst others, the establishment of the necessary structure of the judiciary 
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(Art. 158, clause 1), employment of judges and their dismissal (Art. 158, clause 3), and 
drafting judiciary bills (Art. 158, clause 2). In non-judicial matters his functions are, 
amongst others, the nomination of six jurists of the Guardian Council to the majles, as 
well as to examine the assets of the Supreme Leader, the President, the deputies of the 
President, and ministers as well as those of their family before and after they take office, 
in order to "ensure they have not increased in a fashion contrary to law" (Art. 142). 
 
5.3.1.4 The Leadership 
The Leadership is the highest authority in the Constitution. The Supreme Leader has 
authority over the three branches of state, legislative, executive and judiciary powers 
(see Art. 113, 157), and is elected and removed (in case of the loss of one of the 
eligibility conditions for Leadership) by the Assembly of Experts. According to Article 
109, essential qualifications for Leadership are, amongst others, necessary scholarship 
qualification for issuing fatwa, as well as necessary justness and piety for the 
Leadership of the Islamic ummah (Global Islamic community or nation). The duties and 
powers of the Supreme Leader are listed in Article 110, and are, amongst others, the "1. 
delineation of the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after consultation with 
the Nation's Exigency Council", "3. Issuing decrees for national referenda", "4. 
Assuming supreme command of the armed forces", as well as the appointment and 
dismissal of: "a. the fiqaha' on the Guardian Council, b. the supreme judicial authority 
of the country, c. the head of the radio and television network of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, d. the Chief of joint staff, e. the chief commander of the Islamic Revolution Guard 
Corps, f. the supreme commanders of the armed forces." 
The Supreme Leader also needs to sign the presidential decree after the election. (see 
Art. 110, clause 9) 
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5.4 Informal & Formal power-fields 
The divisions of power and influence cannot be reduced to the office of the President or 
of the Supreme Leader. There are many formal and informal power circles intertwining 
and overlapping and also many contradictions within one power base. Buchta (2000:7-
10) describes Iran's informal and formal power structures with four rings (see Graphic 
4): 
 
The central ring comprises the most powerful political clerics from the executive, 
judicial, and legislative branch, the "patriarchs", who socio-politically tend toward the 
conservative. This central power nucleus controls a large part of the political spheres 
and includes the Council of Guardians, the Assembly of Experts and the informal power 
base of the Society of Teachers of Qom Theological Colleges (jame´e modarresin-e 
house-ye-´elmiye-ye Qom), which comprises 30 clerics; underlining that the most 
influential patriarchs are not necessarily the highest ranking Shii clerics. Supreme 
Leader Khamenei, even though he has the highest position from the political clerics of 
the executive, legislative and judicial branch, is not a grand ayatollah or ayatollah 
´ozma (greatest sign of God) like his predecessor Khomeini. (see Graphic 4; 
Constitution & Referendum) Most Shii theologicans in Iran and beyond have an 
apolitical and quietistic engagement, and all Iranian grand ayatollahs, except Ali 
Montazeri, are opposing the system of velayat-e faqih. (cp. Buchta 2000:7, 54) 
 
The second ring comprises high-ranking governmental officials, state functionaries, 
provincial governors, and administrators, mayors of the most important cities, 
technocrats who are responsible for the design and implementation of the state's 
economic plans. 
 
The third ring includes individuals, who control various groups and organizations, like 
revolutionary foundations, religious security bodies, the voluntary paramilitary 
command (basij), the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and areas of the 
revolutionary press and media. Within this power base, the left-wing Islamic and the 
right-wing traditionalist forces are the two most dominant ideological factions. 
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Within these power rings are many disagreements, for example between the majles and 
the Council of Guardians. Amendments, international and national documents, e.g. the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), which got ratified by the sixth majles, but was rejected by the Guardian 
Council. (cp. Kar 2009:4 [lecture]) Consequently, reforms are passed back and forth, 
e.g. the Parliament's decision of rising the minimum age for girls to marry from 13 
(which already was a big step, since in the Quran the minimum age is 9 years) to 18 




Graphic 4 The four Rings of Power  © 2000 Wilfried Buchta 
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5.4.1 Semi-opposition 
According to Buchta (2000:3-4, 9), internal controversies lead to incoherencies in the 
country's domestic and foreign policies, but also enable "gray areas" where religious 
"semi-opposition" groups can evolve, which are not really visible to other (Western) 
countries. They are the seeds for the growing Islamic civil society and call for peaceful 
liberalization and reform of the Islamic system, within the framework of the 
Constitution. They create the fourth ring of power and are the link between the regime 
and civil society. Resultantly, they have a potential influence on political and religious 
developments, more than the militant opposition in exile. They have an informal 
relationship to governmental functionaries and administrators as well as the Islamic left 
of revolutionary institutions. (see Regime vs. Regime) 
Therefore is the knowledge of formal positions, definitions of laws and bureaucratic 
characteristics not enough to get a more detailed understanding of the internal dynamics 
on different levels of the state's system. (cp. Buchta 2000:7) 
 
5.4.2 Political instabilities 
In order to hold stability, the President and the Supreme Leader have to cooperate, 
despite different opinions. Consequently, in case of strong personal differences, there is 
a problem about who, in the end, holds the political sovereignty. Especially, this 
problem became visible after the election of Khatami as President, who only had a small 
room for reform-oriented action without facing violent counteractions from his 
opposition. In the end, the conservatives under the Leadership of Khamenei seized 
control in the Parliament in the election of 2004, paralyzing Khatami's group, ending his 
unsuccessful attempt to open the structure of government for a religious liberal 
movement. (cp. Buchta 2000:4; Kamali 2007:382) 
During Khatami's presidency, the domestic struggle over the direction of Iran’s 
revolutionary path continued, even intensified and in this way kept the political 
direction of the country blurry. The urge for pragmatism and dogmatic flexibility stood 
in sharp contrast with the devotion of the original values of the 1979 revolution. 
Khatami put up young and highly educated technocrats in his cabinet, with strong 
revolutionary credentials but generally pragmatic inclinations. But the deep factional 
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rivalries disturbed his ambition for reform and he mainly failed because he could not 
establish an independent power base for his plans. (cp. Menashri 2001:88-93) 
The main hurdle was and still is the power of the velayat-e faqih, which stands over the 
President and the republic footholds. But at least these topics were started to be 
discussed openly, questioning the general idea of the clerical role. In the end, the reform 
movement won the battle of ideas but was lacking strategies to practically implement 
them. The people again were left in disillusionment and the conservatives used their 
connections to the full capacity, in order to avoid parliamentary legislation, and closed 
down newspapers, put important reform supporters into jail and suppressed peaceful 
student demonstrations. (cp. Menashri 2001:158; Takeyh 2006:52) 
One of the problems was that the so called "Tehran Spring" reform movement has never 
developed a grassroots organizational network to spread their electoral triumph more 
broadly. It remained more or less in a small circle of intellectuals without further 
connections to vital institutions like labor unions, trade organizations, modern business 
sector, which are important in transforming processes of developing countries. The 
reform movement under Khatami did not or had not the chance to institutionalize its 
power. (cp. Takeyh 2006:51) 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidential victory in 2005 gave the conservative strategy the 
needed power and the right wing has captured all relevant elected institutions. Since the 
populace, especially the poor class of society, hoped that he could finally bring the long 
hoped economic justice. Ahmadinejad brought a mixture of static economic policies, a 
re-imposition of Islamic cultural strictures and reversal of the limited political freedom 
that Iranians had come to enjoy during the reformist interlude. (cp. Takeyh 2006:212) 
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6 Iranian human rights discourses 
6.1 Conceptualization 
Conceptualization took place on the ground of five personal qualitative and semi-
structured interviews with experts (see Expert-interviews), interviews of prominent 
Iranian intellectuals on radio or TV, as well as lectures of Iranian juridical and political 
experts, which I have personally attended. A group conversation with young Iranian 
journalists and blogger in Tehran during my field-excursion in 2007 also flows into the 
analysis. 
 
The experts I have personally interviewed are the following: 
 
Behzad Karim-Khani was born in Tehran in 1976. His parents got politically traced 
due to their left liberal views. They took refuge in Germany, when he was 10 years old. 
He is actively involved in the Green movement and is currently writing on his first 
novel about the last summer he had spent in Iran. 
 
Ebadi, Z. (Name altered for confidentiality) was born in Austria and is a specialist on 
Islamic science. She is lecturer at University as well as free-lance journalist. 
 
Fataneh Kianerci was 25 when she was forced to leave Iran as political refugee. Since 
20 years she is living in Austria working as refugee consultant, as translator for the 
Persian BBC, and is since 15 years actively involved in campaigns against death penalty 
and stoning in Iran. 
 
Leila Salehi Ravesh studied journalism in Tehran and moved to Vienna in 2001 to 
study communication and political science. She has close ties to her family and friends 
in Iran, is actively involved in the Green movement and was currently doing an 
internship at the UNODC field-office in Tehran. 
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Diane Ala'i is the Baha'i International Community (BIC) representative to the United 
Nations in Geneva. She is Persian/French and a Baha'i. She is actively working for the 
betterment of the minority rights situation of the Baha'i community in Iran. 
 
The journalists and students who took part in a private group discussion in Iran on July 
2007 are Soheyla, Amin and Simin (names altered for confidentiality), who are all in 
their mid-twenties and are active bloggers and human rights activists. 
 
The lecture by Mehrangiz Kar in the framework of the Amnesty International event 
"30 years of CEDAW" on October 23, 2009, in Vienna was greatly informative. 
Mehrangiz Kar is human rights lawyer, author and was writing for the Iranian women 
magazine ZANAN (which was closed by the Iranian government in February 2008 
(Human Rights First 2008 [url]). In 2000 she was arrested and convicted to 5 years in 
prison due to her active promotion of women rights in Iran. Through international 
pressure she got released and since then is living in the USA, working as researcher at 
Harvard University. She has earned several human rights awards and writes many books 
about Iran, where they are forbidden. 
 
Informative and inspiring was also the lecture of the journalist and author Akbar Ganji 
on the Human Rights situation and the Green Movement in Iran, held in Bremen on 
November 11, 2009. He was born in 1960 in southern Tehran and is Iran’s preeminent 
political dissident. He is active for a democratic and secular Iran and has spent many 
years in prison, including a four month hungerstrike, to raise international awareness on 
the oppressive conditions and the plight of political prisioners in Iran. He has been the 
recipient of many human rights, press freedom and pro-democracy awards. He left Iran 
in 2006 and since then is writing and giving lectures in Europe and North America.5 
                                                 
5
 For more info see Akbar Ganji's homepage, url: http://www.akbarganji.org/, accessed on December 5, 
2009 
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The main broad concepts or themes within the working field human rights discourses in 
Iran turned out to be: 
 
1. Iranian Identity; 
2. Tradition & Modernity; 
3. Battlefields; 
4. Human rights. 
 
Those concepts function as umbrella topics, and under each of them I have sorted 
theoretically more abstract and concept specific categories, with their respective 
properties and dimensions. For the following comparative analysis, I will first of all 
select those categories, which encompass the most important or dominant data of the 
interviews. Those, I think are the most relevant core-categories to shed light on the 
research field and to develop possible hypothesis, through linking them together. In the 
concluding parts at the end of each conceptual framework, I will give possible and 
hypothetical answers to the respective sub-questions. (see Working theme & Research 
question) Therefore, I hope to step a little further in answering the main research 
question: 
 
How can Iranian human rights discourses be situated in the current anthropological 
debate on human rights theories? 
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6.2 Comparative analysis 
6.2.1 Iranian identity 
Iran is and was from its very beginning a multiethnic state. Today there are 51% 
Persians, 24% Azeris, 8% Gilaki and Mazandarani, 7% Kurds, 3% Arabs, 2% Lur, 2% 
Baloch, 2% Turks, and 1% others, who are living in Iran. (est. as of July 2009, CIA 
Factbook [url]) 
According to Ebadi, there is something like an Iranian consciousness, which was always 
present and expressed itself through different (national and local) movements for more 
independence. 
 
6.2.1.1 Historical past 
"Historical past" is one core category, which primarily includes Western colonial 
exploitation and hegemonic ambitions, the war against Saddam Hussein, the 
demarcation from the Arab region, which leads to a stronger apperception of "we" 
and/against the "others"/oppressors. With the motto: "Wir Iraner haben uns schon 
immer gegen koloniale Ambitionen welcher Macht auch immer gewehrt!" ["We, 
Iranians, have always defended ourselves against colonial ambitions from any power!"] 
(Ebadi 2009:1 [interview]) Now, Iran is coming more and more to terms with its 
historical past and on Iranian TV you can see documentaries with a certain historical 
distance about the end of the Qajar era and the Rezah Shah period. Ebadi (2009:1 
[interview]) also has noticed a strong negative attitude towards the Arab people, 
expressing itself in private day-to-day conversation, but never in official statements. 
Iranians who express this attitude might be common people as well as educated persons. 
Some of the reasons they give are political, e.g.: ‘Palestinians are being supported by 
Iranian oil wealth’ and/or nationalistic. The fear of another Arab invasion, which has 
lead to a foreign rule over centuries, can still be found in the Iranian collective 
consciousness. An important detail is that the Prophet Muhammad as well as the Quran 
are Arabic; the only reason why Iranians are supposed to learn the Arabic language in 
school. Consequently, there can be found a sensation of elevation of the Arab peoples as 
"God's chosen people", which, for many Iranians, has led to a feeling to become 
"islamitized by force". (Karim-Khani 2009b:1 [interview]) Ebadi talks about "an 
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Arabisation of Iranian historical culture and ethnicity supported by the ruling clergy", 
while the Iraqi invasion by Saddam Hussein is rather retreating into a more remote 
memory. "The sub-tenor of such criticism is that the involved governments act against 
‘Islamic unity’, while Iran is promoting ‘true Islam’ and ‘the unity of Muslims’." (Ebadi 
2009b:1-2) 
Leila Salehi (2009:2 [interview]) reports about not-well or not at all integrated Arab 
communities, which mostly live in southern Iran. They are practicing their traditions 
more or less in isolation, and she has experienced some kind of unwillingness to adapt 
or integrate into the Iranian society. 
Behzad Karim-Khani (2009:3 [interview]) is describing a collective consciousness, 
which can be symbolized as a big pot, stuffed with a variety of values, myths, collective 
traumata, attitudes, etc. When something happens that emotionally touches the society, 
they can all grasp into it and they would more or less get out the very same thing. In 
other words, when something traumatic happens and the society becomes angry, they 
would all come up with the same stick. 
Behzad still feels the Iran-Iraq war, even though it is over since 20 years. He feels it on 
a metaphorical way; the way people are talking in Iran. The war, especially to unite 
against one common enemy (Saddam Hussein and the supporting Western countries), 
welded the people in Iran together and shaped their collective identity. An identity 
basing on a concept of an enemy also contributed to a specific radicalization of some 
groups of the society, which is still present. 
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6.2.1.2 We-feeling 
Another core-category would be the Iranian "we-feeling", which always appears 
stronger in crisis situation. Before the 1979 revolution, the general consensus of society 
was to overthrough the Shah regime. Now, with the Green movement, in which the 
colour green stands for Islam, freedom, and for the (stolen) vote for Mir Hussein 
Mousavi as President, the consensus supports diminishing President Ahmadinejad's 
power and strengthening civil and political rights. 
Fataneh Kianerci talks about a strong quest of justice and equality, inherent to the 
Iranian people. The fight for freedom before the 1979 revolution took 100 years. When 
there comes the final straw that breaks the camel's back, groups of all kinds across the 
Iranian civil society, unite and fight together for more justice and equality. In 
connection to the Green movement, which now is active for five months and has not 
stopped for a single day, Fataneh speaks about a strong mutual support, whether human 
rights informed or not, that makes no distinctions between civil class, ethnical or 
religious background. Diane Alai (2009:1 [interview]) underlines her view in stating: 
"The Iranians have made the Islamic revolution, because they could not enjoy justice 
and equality. But unfortunately, it did not happen because of the political and religious 
leaders, they didn't want to implement the hopes of the people. But as you can see in the 
latest events, Iranians have a big sense for this quest of justice and equality." In regard 
to the Baha`i6 people, she says that neighbours and fellow students defend them when 
they get prosecuted, solely because of their religion. She underlines that there are not 
only the human rights defenders who are the only ones active: "Even though when some 
Iranians are not so informed about minority rights, when they see injustice with their 
own eyes, they react!". 
The properties of the category "we-feeling", include terms like reactionary, angry, 
powerful, and encouraging, and lead to a simple causal-connection: injustice makes 
                                                 
6
 The Baha`i religion has been received as a threat by Iran's clerics, because it challenges the doctrine of 
the finality of God's revelation to the Prophet Muhammad. Since the 19th century there are regular 
attempts to eliminate them through persecution, torture, massacre, intimidation, and discrimination and to 
recant their believes and to return to Islam. To bypass Art. 23 of the Iranian Constitution which forbids 
"The investigation of individuals' beliefs" and assures that "no one may be molested or taken to task 
simply for holding a certain belief", the Iranian governments portraits Baha`iism as a political movement, 
justifying executions on the grounds of political crimes. (Mayer 1995:135, 153) 
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people angry, they unite, which makes them more powerful, which is also encouraging 
to react against this injustice. "Meistens ist es tatsächlich so, dass immer erst was 
passieren muss, bevor man sich einsetzt." ["Mostly it is the case that always something 
has to happen first, before you take action."] (Ebadi 2009:2 [interview]) Above all, it is 
the emotional aspect, which is the driving force that leads to discourses and more action 
among the Iranian society: injustice that touches the ordinary people's hearts, and which 
is delivered via photos and videos of victims circulating on the internet or personal 
experience of discrimination in the streets. The dimension of the "we-feeling" with its 
emotional characteristic operates on a wide dimension across the Iranian civil society 
and leads to more or less strong rallies, for example, against official legal decisions on 
child execution or "eye for an eye" death penalty. (cp. Kianerci 2009:6 [interview]) (see 
Media; Women) 
 
6.2.1.3 Differences & Gaps 
On the other side there are tremendous differences of the people inside Iran. Fataneh 
Kianerci points out the formative aspect of parental-upbringing. She grew up within a 
very liberal family, which guaranteed her a lot of personal freedom and security in her 
childhood. She, for example, had a boyfriend with 15 years. But there are also 
conservative families, exercising more or less strict control, with which she never really 
had anything to do, even though they lived in the same street. 
Another point is the difference between people living in a rural or urban environment. 
Kianerci (2009:1 [interview]) describes the gap between people, who either have a rural 
or urban family background, like living on "two different planets". 
The rich society in northern Tehran, where property is as expensive as in upper districts 
of New York, enormously differs in their way of thinking and life-style from the poorer 
districts in southern Tehran, which are living in slums. (Karim-Khani 2009:4 
[interview]) Behzad (2009:10-11 [interview]) goes so far, in saying that the rural 
provinces do not belong to the Iranian civil society, in the sense that they are not 
majorly participating in the political life, which most importantly takes place in cities 
with a high density population, like Isfahan, Tehran, Shiraz, and Ahwaz. 
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6.2.1.4 Conclusion 
Referring to my first sub-question:  
In how far can you speak about one “Iranian identity”? 
 
I can conclude that Iran is a country with many different intertwining and hybrid groups 
and identities, influenced by variables like ethnical or religious background, 
conservative or liberal parental up-bringing, rich or poor social class, rural or urban 
roots. Sometimes, the gaps between these individuals or groups are even very deep. But 
despite such multi-ethnical, religious, social, geographical, linguistic/dialect differences, 
there is a nationalistic sense, which makes them all being "Iranians". This sense 
especially becomes obvious when people from such different backgrounds unite on a 
quest of justice and fight for more freedom, which, in Iran's history, was always been 
present and expressed itself through several revolutions. Therefore one hypothesis could 
be that Iranians are very much unified but solely on a nationalistic ground. This mainly 
is supported by opponents of the present system or by religious people who agree with 
the Islamic system, but might nevertheless be critical of their government's actions, 
through the promotion that Shii identity is the "true Islam". 
The national aspect is as a result a quasi "rhetoric mantle" behind which many different 
ideologies are hiding. When there is no external enemy or thread, which is seemingly 
important for building up a strong "we-feeling", I presume would the immense plurality 
of the Iranian citizens become a lot more obvious. Consequently, to then speak about 
one "Iranian identity" becomes almost impossible. For Iran's judiciary chief and Qom's 
representative in the majles, Ali Larijani, maintaining national unity is the highest 
priority: “Every one should give precedence to national interests over all other matters 
and create an atmosphere of unity in the country,” he has recently said during a meeting 
with Qom's clergy (ulema). (Tehran Times 2009 [url]) "Unification" is a dominant term 
in many of his and Khamenei's speeches, especially after the post-election unrests. 
Since they are aware of the country's immense plurality, which can when out of control, 
threaten its national stability and the power of the regime holder. Drawing a picture of 
"an enemy", has worked greatly in this respect, so far. Hamid Dabashi (2007:186) refers 
to Karl Schmidt's notion of "the enemy" that "locates ´the enemy` as the locus classicus 
of ´the political`". 
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"[The political enemy] need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly; he 
need not appear as an economic competitor, and it may even be 
advantageous to engage with him in business transactions. But he is, 
nevertheless, the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that 
he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, 
so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible." (Schmidt 
1996:26-27) 
After the terror attacks in the USA on September 11, 2001, Dabashi (2007:186) 
observes a "systematic demonization" of "the Muslim" as "the enemy", not only in 
political, but also in moral and aesthetic terms. The climax was reached when former 
US President Bush put Iran on the "axis of evil" together with Saddam’s Iraq and Kim 
Jong Il’s North Korea, completely ignoring the reform movement within Iran during 
that time. (cp. Takeyh 2006:128) Iran's conservatives then said that they were not 
necessarily against democratic rights but merely want to establish security measures to 
defend and safe Iran from foreign interventions. (cp. Takeyh 2006:53) Consequently, 
the hardliners, even though small in number, have historically always needed an 
international crisis and conflict as a means of turn away the attention from their weak 
internal political progress and to strengthen unifying patriotism through propagating 
hatred. Ergo, the concept of "the enemy" got utilized by both, the West, especially by 
the USA, and the Middle East, especially by Iran. 
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6.2.2 Tradition & Modernity 
In the Iranian context, the concepts of "tradition" and "modernity" are closely connected 
to cultural and religious values and norms. On the basis of my interviews, both terms 
got connected to negative and positive connotations, especially in regard to the 
promotion and protection of human rights. 
 
6.2.2.1 Tradition 
6.2.2.1.1 Tradition in negative terms 
For all interviewees, the term "tradition" has for some extent a bad aftertaste and 
includes a black picture. In general, the patriarchal family structures and customs are 
related to tradition, which are criticised from all directions. "Patriarchal structures", 
as an important core-category, are responsible for grievance and oppression and stands 
in close connection to the corrupt regime. It carries the symbol of backwardness, which 
was the main reason why many intellectuals, who had the necessary resources, fled 
during the war in the 1980s. They are the ones, influenced by Western enlightenment 
and intellectuals like Foucault and Marx, who blamed Islam for hindering modern 
development. (cp. Karim-Khani 2009:10 [interview] who speaks of his parents) 
"Tradition", also is mostly linked to the oppressive and corrupt characteristic of the 
regime, which those who feel betrayed by the election outcome, describe as illegitimate. 
All these authoritative and negative aspects are promoted by the Leadership, sectors of 
the clergy, strong conservative elites, revolutionary institutions like the Guardian 
Council, the Revolutionary Guards Corps or the paramilitary basij command, and other 
radical right-wing groups. Friday sermons serve as "infiltration" of all strong 
conservative adherers. (cp. Alai 2009:3 [interview]) Usually, they are the less 
privileged, and follow empty promises of Ahmadinejad for a better life. (cp. Kianerci 
2009:1 [interview]) Leila Salehi (2009:2 [interview]) also points to the financial distress 
and poverty. People who do not have enough money to nourish the family, of course, do 
not have money to travel and to get into contact with different cultural and religious 
values and ways of life in other parts of this world. Under these circumstances, they 
stick to their conservative religious habits that give them stability, even though it is 
marked with inequality and less freedom. 
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Behzad Karim-Khani points to, in his eyes, an important change within the concept of 
"tradition": Before the 1979 revolution and the war against Saddam Hussein (he 
underlines that the Iranian people did not hate Iraq but only Saddam and his Western 
allies), the Shiite was someone who sacrifices himself for all people against tyranny 
from the outside. The Shiite was some kind of "underdog", the oppressed and a victim 
of injustice, which also led to the self-flagellation rituals. Suddenly, especially during 
the first two years of the war, the Shiite became the tyrant and was responsible for 
cruelties like cutting off hands, stoning, spraying acid into women's faces when they put 
make-up on: "Das waren brutale Dinge, die wir nie zu vor im Iran gesehen haben!" 
["Those were brutal things, which we have never seen in Iran before!"] (Karim-Khani 
2009:1 [interview]) 
These happenings have also led to a negative connotation of Islam in general, when 
connected to the base of the current dictatorship in Iran. Religious symbols, like 
wearing a hijab, are put into relation with the authoritative and oppressive regime. 
Fataneh Kianerci reports about an increasing intolerance, which she has witnessed on 
Iranian demonstrations in Vienna: even though they were all fighting for the same goal, 
Muslim women who wore a hijab were treated badly and automatically thrown into the 
Ahmadinejad camp. She highlights that it is very important to differentiate between the 
oppressive religion, which is the base of the corrupt power-machine of the Iranian 
regime, and the private religion, under which every women can decide herself about 
wearing a hijab or not. (Kianerci 2009:7 [interview]) But it seems that this 
differentiation becomes more and more difficult, the more the rational mind is 
influenced by a variety of emotional experiences. 
Concerning the promotion and protection of human rights, religious values do also have 
a abusing characteristic: "Unfortunately, I think that the [Iranian] government uses 
religion for violating human rights, rather than protecting them!" (Alai 2009:2 
[interview]) Diane Alai points to the fact that oftentimes "cultural particularism" is used 
for an excuse by governments not to accord to international recognized legal human 
rights standards, in order to deepen their power and to solely follow their, mostly 
economic, interests. (see Regime vs. Civil society) 
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6.2.2.1.2 Tradition in positive terms 
The positive aspects of "tradition" is mainly connected with the approximately 2700 
year old Persian, pre-Islamic history. Rituals like the new year's celebration Nowrooz 
(the day of the astronomical vernal equinox, which occurs around March 21), which 
according to the Iranian calendar marks the first day of spring, are described as 
colourful and are related to happy family gatherings. "Oh ja, ich bin sehr traditionell 
was Nowruz und das persische Essen betrifft!" ["Oh yes, I am very traditional 
concerning Nowrooz and the Persian food!"] (Kianerci 2009:3 [interview]) For her, all 
positive traditional elements have nothing to do with religion, but she adds that there are 
a lot less official "national traditions" than religious traditions in Iran. 
Behzad Karim-Khani, who grew up under a very critical view concerning Islam and 
how it becomes politicised in Iran, is not very much interested in the religion itself, but 
in the Persian heroic myths before the Islamic conquest. "Das Schiitentum hätte sich ja 
auch woanders ausbreiten können. Warum ausgerechnet im Iran?" ["Shii Islam also 
could have spread somewhere else. Why in Iran?"] (Karim-Khani 2009:8 [interview]) 
From an artistic perspective, he likes to read about antique Persian heroes, described in 
the Shahnameh (The Book of Kings), written by the famous Persian poet called Abu l-
Qasem-e Ferdousi (940-1020). It is twenty times longer than Nibelungen7, is the basis of 
the modern Persian language, and the national-epos of the Persian speaking world. 
Behzad's hobby is to pull out parallels between the pre-Islamic heroes and the following 
Shiite icons. What he sees as a very typical element, which both heroes are sharing, is 
the self-sacrifice for the well-being of all people. The antique Persian hero does not 
knuckle down to tyrants and does not accept injustice: He is ready to sacrifice his life 
and fights alone against all evil, which comes from the outside and threatens his people. 
"Das ist auch die Geschichte Husseins oder Alis, im Prinzip." ["In principle, this is also 
the story of Hussein or Ali."] (Karim-Khani 2009:8 [interview]) Today you can also see 
these parallels leading to Mir Husein Mousavi, who after the election "has become a 
political martyr, a symbol of a man unjustly treated." (Molavi 2009:4 [CNN interview]) 
(See Media) 
Concerning Islamic values, Ebadi (2009:6 [interview]) mentions positive attributes such 
as functioning family structures, including social care for old people, and integrated 
                                                 
7
 German heroic epos, which has its source in the era of Germanic migration in the middle age. 
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youth. Those Islamic moral principles, which do not depend upon the machinery of state 
power, also possess very supporting properties in regard to the promotion and protection 
of human rights and can fully function as the basis of democratic development. Ebadi 
also underlines that the cultivation of such moral Islamic principles, which do not stand 
in connection with oppressing and discriminating women and minorities, is very 
important in all internal political and social discourses. Many NGOs, but also official 
bodies, welfare societies etc., try to activate the religious consciousness on the basis of 
such positive values, with which the development of technology, science, a better social 
and educational system, modern art, etc. are supported. 
 
6.2.2.1.3 Tradition, a complex term 
Summing up the collected views, the connotation of the term "tradition" highly depends 
on the context, in which it is used. But generally, the positive aspects are more related to 
the antique Persian traditions or rituals, which evolved in the pre-Islamic time. 
Celebrating Nowrooz, cooking Persian food with friends and reading Persian 
myths/poetry are things that are referred to as beautiful, fun or interesting. Islamic 
morals and values like strong and supporting family structures that are highlighted by 
almost every Muslim and Islamic Law can also be interpreted in a human rights 
supportive manner, activating social and cultural development such as better access to 
education and creative self-fulfilment. As Ann Elizabeth Mayer (1995:41) points out: 
"The Islamic heritage offers many philosophical concepts, humanistic values, and moral 
principles that are well adapted for use in constructing human rights principles. Such 
values and principles abound even in the premodern Islamic intellectual heritage." 
The negative aspects of the term "tradition" solely include the oppressive, patriarchal, 
authoritative, and discriminating interpretation of Islam. The "political ascendancy of an 
orthodox philosophy and theology that were hostile to humanism and rationalism- and, 
ultimately, hostile also to the liberal ideals associated with human rights" (Mayer 
1995:41), mitigated Islamic philosophical, humanistic and moral values and principles 
supporting human rights, throughout the history of Islamic civilization. The 
authoritative tradition of Islam is strongly connected to the oppressive regime of the 
present Islamic Republic; a connection that is so strong and emotionally afflicted that 
for some Iranians it becomes increasingly hard to distinguish anymore between the 
"regime's" and the "private" religion. 
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The belief that Islam in itself is responsible for "backwardness", hindering modern 
development, got more or less displaced by the goal to liberate the society within the 
framework of the Iranian Constitution and Islamic Law. Islam became more and more 
some kind of a weapon to fight oppressive religious thinking with liberal religious 
thinking. Especially within the clerical circles of Iranian marjas, you can find many 
contradictive perspectives, expressed through different ejtehad and fatwa. (see Clergy 
vs. Clergy) 
"Tradition" is a term in which many different variables with different connotations 




"Alle Iraner wollen modern sein, das kann man fast flächendeckend sagen." 
["All Iranians want to be modern, you can almost say this 
comprehensively."] (Ebadi 2009:5 [interview]) 
6.2.2.2.1 Modernity in positive terms 
6.2.2.2.1.1 Individuality 
The core-category of modernity in relation to social and cultural values and norms 
within the Iranian context, turned out to be "individualism". Important sub-categories 
are, beyond others, "self-fulfilment", "sexual freedom", "career" and "private religion". 
Self-fulfilment is basically connected to self-determination; to decide for yourself about 
your own future, specifically to determine what to reach and how to reach it, setting 
your own framework of action. Leila Salehi (2009:2 [interview]) describes 
individualism as a leap into the dark: "Ich habe nach etwas anderem gesucht, wusste 
aber nicht genau nach was…" ["I was looking for something different, without knowing 
for what exactly…"] 
Today, for many young women marriage is not the highest priority anymore. Over 60% 
of all students in Iran are women, they crave for education and strive to make their very 
own career. Dr. Said Peyvandi, a Paris based professor of social sciences, observes this 
as an historic change, since there will be soon a "strong labor force made up by women 
specialists that never existed in Iranian history." But since this is a sign of further 
liberation for women, he also experiences that conservative but also reformist circles try 
"pushing for laws to limit the admission of women to universities." (Esfandiari 2003 
[url]) There are even discussions about positive discrimination for men in certain "key 
subjects" like the engineering, oil and gas faculties. (cp. Harrison 2006 [url]) Ironically, 
it was due to the 1979 revolution and the Islamization of the educational system, which 
encouraged even very conservative and rural families to send their girls to separate 
girls-schools. (Ebadi 2009:6 [interview]) Many girls have seen this as a great advantage 
and privilege, and as a result, started the process of which we now see first society- 
moving results. 
Some properties of the mentioned sub-categories include attractiveness and rationality. 
Leila (2009:2 [interview]) reports that young men increasingly find it attractive to have 
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a smart girlfriend, only to look good is not enough anymore. Young women think about 
having children a lot more rational, calculating how many she could afford, which in 
average declined to one to two children per family. The economic aspect plays a big 
role in that decision making. 
 
6.2.2.2.1.2 Private religion 
Another important change is that the young generation, unaffected of the 1979 
revolution, more and more calls for moving religion to the private environment. "Man 
sieht, dass die Menschen wollen, dass ihre Beziehung zu Gott zu ihrem Privatleben 
gehört." ["You can see that the people want to keep their relation to God in their private 
sphere."] (Kianerci 2009:5 [interview]) The factor "religion" shall not be decisive any 
more about how you are treated in public. Concerning the Baha`i people, Diane Alai 
(2009:1 [interview]) reports that they "come from all walks of life in Iran – from all 
strata of society. The only thing that will differentiate an Iranian Baha`i from a fellow 
Muslim is, in fact, religion. As soon as the government finds out that they are Baha`is, 
their rights get deprived." She adds that all prejudices against them within the society 
are through the propaganda of certain sectors of the clergy. 
There are many Iranians, who are not following an Ayatollah. Soheyla, an Iranian 
journalist I was talking to during my field excursion in Iran said: "I am not paying 
Ayatollah-tax. Many young students think that they are ridiculous. What happens when 
you don't pay? Nothing! Except: you go to hell!", she was laughing. Amin, a young 
Iranian man adds that usually, politics is not the highest priority for many young men 
and women: "Football is more important to me!" On the question, about what he is 
talking right now the most with his friends, he answered aridly: "Sex!" and then 
explains that many young men go to house-parties and have sex with girls "after work, 
to calm down!" (Amin & Soleyha 2007 [Excursion report 2007:16-17]) 
The Green movement also radicalized itself, holding up signs saying "Independence, 
Freedom, Iranian Republic", crossing out the religious (Islamic Republic) from the 
governmental and political sphere, replacing it to something more nationalistic. (cp. 
Karim-Khani 2009:7 [interview]) 
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6.2.2.2.1.3 Globalization 
"Globalization" is also a dominant core-category, which already has abolished a lot 
taboos within the Iranian society: within the past ten years, the option of divorce got 
more and more taken into consideration, and the education and public commercials 
about contraception methods (after the revolution's baby-boom) got a lot more 
disseminated, at least in the bigger cities. (cp. Salehi 2009:2 [interview]) In smaller 
cities in southern Iran, the majority receives no sexual education at school and generally 
not from their parents either. Consequently, many women unintentionally get pregnant, 
because they do not know how to properly use a condom. There are "wedding classes", 
which are mandatory for future couples who intend to marry, where they, at least, are 
offered sexual education. But before this, some women, for example, do not know that 
an orgasm is not only a privilege of a man. (cp. Hoffmeister 2009 [url]) 
"Der Globalisierung steht man [im Iran] offen gegenüber, man sieht es als Chance der 
Moderne" ["Iran stands open to Globalization and sees it as a chance of modernity"], 
says Ebadi (2009:6 [interview]) and points to global communication-networks and other 
modern technical devices, which have flooded to Iran with an enormous speed. 
For Fataneh Kianerci (2009:4 [interview]), modernity in Iran means when time passes, 
when values change but also when the pressure of the regime becomes tighter: "Unter 
Diktaturen entwickelt sich vieles! Musik, Kunst, Literatur, auch die Frauen haben sich 
ohne fremde Hilfe weiter entwickelt." ["Under dictatorships, many things develop! 
Music, art, literature, also women have developed themselves without foreign aid."] The 
control with which the regime wants to "tame" the youth, actually leads to progressive 
internal developments through the spur to break away from such retrenchments. (also 
cp. Salehi 2009:3 [interview]) 
Modernity in terms of passing time and the change of values does also modify the 
conscious of society. Before the Green movement, the topics of discussions were more 
about "insignificant" things like alcohol, party, fashion, music, etc., with which the 
government tries to distract the broad ordinary society from internal political struggles. 
These are still major topics but now, especially the masses of the urban society become 
a lot more civil, political, economical, social and cultural rights sensitive. 
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6.2.2.2.2 Modernity in negative terms 
The negative properties of "modernity" relate to superficial Western values and the 
immense speed of Globalization. 
6.2.2.2.2.1 Fast spread of technical inventions 
Leila Salehi (2009:2 [interview]) talks about a strong desire of the young Iranian society 
to quench one's thirst with new technical stuff, even though the have not the possibility 
to use it. They want the newest cell-phones with mms (multimedia messaging service) 
application, but the state does not provide its country with a mms, at all. Like here in 
Europe, many Iranians want an iPhone (internet and multimedia enabled smart-phone 
by Apple inc.) but are hindered by the government to use the internet application. But at 
least the feeling of having a Western product, in terms of a higher status symbol, makes 
them feel better and more "modern". After her explanation do all the new inventions 
almost come a little too fast, and that the Iranian society and culture has a few problems 
to adapt accordingly. Leila complaints that whenever she is in Iran, she sees that they 
drive the newest cars, but waste oil on masses, as well as electricity and water, even 
though Iran is very poor on water. 
 
6.2.2.2.2.2 Copying Beverly Hills 
Behzad Karim-Khani has recognized an almost convulsive trend to life a "Beverly Hills 
style" life, copied from American TV shows. He especially talks about the rich young 
men and women, who are living in Northern Tehran; where it is almost the norm for 
every woman to get an aesthetic nose or plastic surgery. According to the German 
newspaper Die Zeit, there are approximately 3000 cosmetic surgeons in Tehran, who do 
60.000 to 70.000 nose surgeries per year; no other country of the world is topping this, 
so far. It is a hype, and broadly stands for change and self-determination, especially for 
women, who have to stick to the Islamic dress-code, starting when they are nine years 
old. There are so many rules, that they are glad to at least determine how their body 
shall look like. (cp. Hoffmeister 2009 [url]) 
Behzad says that the West only delivered commercials about the "perfect life" on a 
material basis but did not deliver any deeper content or values in connection to such 
products. "Sie geben wirklich ihr bestes, aber es ist nicht fundiert genug bei ihnen. Sie 
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glauben so muss es gehen oder ausschauen. Sie sind sehr angestrengt und verlieren 
dadurch fast ihre Persönlichkeit." ["Really, they do their best but it is not substantiated 
enough. They think it has to work and look like that. They are very stressed and are 
almost loosing their personality."] (Karim-Khani 2009:5 [interview]) Behzad gives the 
following allegorical example: "Sie sehen eine Dose Cola in der Werbung und denken 
wenn sie die haben ziehen sich automatisch die Frauen aus. Aber wenn man sie fragt 
wie sie schmeckt, können sie es nicht formulieren." ["They are seeing a tin of coke in 
commercials and think when they have one of those, women get undressed 
automatically. But when you ask them how it tastes, they cannot put it in words."] 
(Karim-Khani 2009:4 [interview]) In other words, the tin of Coke stands for the 
Western capitalism, and certain rich sectors of the Iranian society, especially those 
living in the Beverly Hills districts of Iran's bigger cities mistake the capitalistic image 
of the West for the content of Western values. (Karim-Khani 2009b:8 [interview]) He 
also connects the "American chewing-gum capitalism" superficiality to sexual freedom: 
on the first sight, many of these mentioned young Iranians want breaking away from 
any necessities and have a free sexual life. But when it becomes serious, they realize 
that it is not "theirs", that it is actually something alien to them. Behzad reports about 
many disagreements and misunderstandings when he talked to the high privileged 
Northern Tehran youth. They have, according to him, not a critical distance concerning 
the West. They idolize the West and the image that "maybe in Germany not everyone 
puts gel in his hair, drives a Cabrio or that ring tones for cell phones are not the most 
important thing in a Western student's life, is hardly to get in their heads." (Karim-
Khani 2009:4 [interview]) 
 
6.2.2.3 Caught between tradition & modernity? 
After Fataneh Kianerci (2009:4 [interview]) the spread of the Internet in the 1990s was 
the second revolution in Iran, after the 1979 revolution. Through the internet the Iranian 
people could finally start to communicate with the world they, for a long time, were 
isolated from. Those other worlds were not totally new and they all knew about them 
before, but through the emerging global communication networks they could start 
communicate to them on a regular basis. Over the last 30 years they developed a strong 
desire for showing the world that they are "normal people, like you and me, with the 
same wishes and goals in life, and not living a horrible life described in novels like Not 
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Without my Daughter8". In her eyes, this is the reason why they have developed a great 
hospitality to all foreign visitors to Iran and "even exchange students are treated like 
Gods!" Everyone wants to show them another part of the Iranian live: the private one, 
not the official one. 
Through the "internet revolution" the battlefield between tradition and modernity seems 
not that strong anymore. The global communication network systems more and more 
alleviate the gap between Iranian and Western lifestyle. All interviewees highlight, that 
the majority in Iran is like you and me, with the same goals and wishes in life. But on 
certain social levels, the modern bits representing Western lifestyle, are hard to arrange 
with the own social and cultural values and norms, which originate from or express their 
identities. Through missing information and foreign experience in other countries, the 
picture of the West is too uncritical and biased, basing on product commercials and 
American TV soaps. The consciousness of dealing adequately with the growing 
possibilities of modern development is not matured yet, which harms environment, 
people's health, and generally taking responsibility. Through the pressure of adapting a 
distorted picture of Western life-style, some are even hindered to develop an own 
personality, which makes them to superficial copies of "Hollywood beauties". 
But it needs to be highlighted that these stories and experiences are only single and 
context-specific extracts and can definitively not be generalized. Maybe you can say 
that for some, the "modern" development with the full protection and implementation of 
human rights and democracy cannot go fast enough. For others, it goes a little too fast 
and does not really fit properly in their identity. For some it shall go fast, but when they 
are directly confronted with it, they feel that it is still foreign to them. Some say, that all 
modern things and values that come from the West harms the youth for building up a 
proper Iranian or Muslim identity, and so on. (see Regime vs. Civil society) 
                                                 
8
 A novel by Betty Mahmoody (1988), basing on a true story. 
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6.2.2.4 Conclusion 
Referring to the second sub-question:  
How deep is the gap between "tradition" and "modernity" within the young Iranian 
society and how should these terms be defined in the era of Globalization? 
 
I can conclude that in general it seems that there is not a simple dualism of "tradition" 
vs. "modernity" anymore. The majority of Iran's young society adopts hybrid forms of 
"traditional" and "modern" categories and characteristics, and their identity is not caught 
between them, but constantly evolves out of dynamic context-constellations, out of 
which they adapt various influences with different intensities, on different dimensions. 
One hypothesis would be that they are not caught in the decision of either going the 
Western or the Islamic Republic way, but they are what they make out of the situation 
today, which leaves no room for rigid dualism. Stereotypes from all sides especially 
concerning Islamic religion, morals, and values, lead to such binaries and is, in this way, 
not properly mirroring reality's complexities. Consequently, the concept of "tradition" 
and "modernity" within the Iranian context is a very perplexing and multilayered one, 
which mirrors the complexity of the Iranian society quite well and leaves clichés of any 
kind looking inadequately. 
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6.2.3 Battlefields 
I am focussing on four main battlefields in Iran, which include a variety of contention 
points on different levels: 
1. Between the regime and the civil society; 
2. Between the regime and the regime; 
3. Between the clergy and the clergy; 
4. Between the opposition and the opposition. 
 
6.2.3.1 Regime vs. Civil society 
6.2.3.1.1 Western values as grievance 
One point of contention between the regime and the civil society is about Western 
values. The Iranian government, especially the Supreme Leader, warns the Iranian 
youth about Western "individualism". For certain conservative circles, it stands for 
extreme egoism, breaks families apart, and destroys the future of the young generation 
that might get lost in disillusionment. (cp. Ebadi 2009:5 [interview]) “Insight is the 
compass to find the right path in today’s complicated social situation. If anyone does 
not have this compass and is not able to read maps, he may suddenly find himself 
surrounded by enemies” (Tehran Times 2009b [url]), told Khameinei to a people's 
gathering in Chaloos, last month. Basically, Khamenei's message to the youth is to not 
loose the hope of the future and to save all self-consciousness in front of Western 
cultural influences used as "soft weapons". (cp. Ebadi 2009b:6) If they abandon 
themselves to the excessive Western individualism, they will fall into disillusionment. 
"He also perceives it as frightening that so many students study the humanities in Iran", 
Leila (2009:3 [interview]) points out. Khamenei recently said to a group of female 
Quran science students that "the base of the Western human sciences is materialistic 
ideology, which is contrary to religious and Kuranic [sic!] teachings, while we should 
seek essence of human sciences in the Kuran [sic!]." (Office of the Supreme Leader 
2009 [url]) According to Iranian news services, he says that studying social sciences 
"promotes doubts and uncertainties" and urges defenders of Islam to "review the human 
sciences taught in Iran's universities", which "promote secularism." (Slackman 2009 
[url]) This reminds of the "cultural revolution", which Khomeini has proclaimed right 
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after the 1979 revolution. All universities in Iran were closed for two years in order to 
renew the curriculum and to handpick professors and lecturers, whose views were in 
full accordance with the Islamic ideology of the nation's leaders. It was the time when 
"loyality tests and ideological standards [were] determining admission to universities, 
the civil service, and the armed forces." (Takeyh 2006:28) 
Ebadi (2009:6 [interview]) talks about certain social and cultural affairs in the Western 
world, which are interpreted as grievances and connected to the Western ways of life. 
Beyond others, these are violent youth gangs, destroyed families, isolated old people 
(kept in homes for the aged, away from their family), as well as alcohol and drug abuse 
starting from a young age. The Supreme Leader wants to preserve the youth from such 
grievances, which are all undesirable consequences of Western influences. On the other 
hand, Ebadi (2009b:2) underlines that western ideal culture, in terms of classical music, 
poetry, scientific and civil achievements, are appreciated and valued by many Iranians. 
What becomes criticised is that the West more and more removes itself from its ideals, 
which also becomes obvious in international political affairs. 
The famous exile-Iranian, intellectual and author Bahman Nirumand, significantly 
indicated at a TV discussion about the West as object of hatred in Muslim countries: 
„Wir [Iraner] wünschen uns, dass die westlichen Länder ihre eigenen Ideale 
respektieren, auch wenn sie ihre Grenzen verlassen.“ ["We [Iranians] would wish 
ourselves that the Western countries respect their own ideals, although when leaving 
their borders."] (Nirumand 2009 [tv]) 
 
6.2.3.1.2 No to double life 
On the other hand, especially the majority of the young Iranian society wants to enjoy 
free self-fulfilment, no "taming" attempts of the Leadership, no patriarchal oppression 
within families, and no religious dictatorship. (see Modernity in positive terms) Behzad 
Karim-Khani (2009:11 [interview]) calls the restless war-babies (born during the Iran-
Iraq war,1980-88), to which he belongs, the toufan ("storm") generation: they are silent, 
but internally they are boiling and are waiting for the right moment to break out. "Die 
Jugend kämpft auf der Straße um ihre Ehre zurück zu holen!" ["The youth is fighting on 
the streets to get their honour back."]. Since the 1979 revolution, the ordinary society 
started to build up a double-life: one in their private homes, where million of women 
don't wear a headscarf (hijab), were families have parties, drink alcohol, talk freely 
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about everything, watch American movies, cook, learn, all simple or trivial things, 
which can also belong to an everyday life in Western countries. The second life is that 
on the public streets and in public buildings, with compulsory dress code, limited 
freedom of expression and behavior. It is this double-life of which the majority in Iran 
is tired. They want to live their private life in public, too. They do not want to hide all 
the time and be scared of revolutionary guards on the streets who mainly check on 
women's dress code, whether it is Sharia conform enough. This pressure and control of 
the government and above all the Supreme Leader, urges the ordinary society to jump 
out of this system of playing hide and seek, and to make themselves visible to everyone 
in this world. (cp. Kianerci 2009:4 [interview]) 
"Vor der Revolution hat man zu Hause gebetet und auf der Straße Vodka getrunken. 
Nach der Revolution trinkt man zu Hause und draußen betet man!" ["Before the 
revolution people were praying in their houses and were drinking Vodka on the streets. 
After the revolution people drink at home and go outside to pray!"](Karim-Khani 
2009:11 [interview]) Behzad talks about the language he had to learn while growing up: 
to keep certain things secret and when criticising something, than very carefully to 
avoid repressions. "Wir sind viel intelligenter als die. Die die uns sagen wie wir uns auf 
der Straße verhalten sollen, sind nicht intelligent!" ["We are a lot more intelligent then 
them. Those, who tell us how we should look like on the streets, are not intelligent!"] 
He reports that in 1986 a sixteen year old boy told his father how he should wear his 
beard. The revolutionary guards also stipulated the women to not put make up on. Then 
women started to get their eyebrows tattooed. Behzad complaints about such trivial 
things become political issues. 
 
6.2.3.1.3 State plays God 
Leila Salehi (2009:5 [interview]) points out that at first, within patriarchal family 
structures, the father was God. Now it is the state that is playing God. But she concludes 
that even after so many years of brainwashing and censuring the youth, they still strive 
to other goals then those promoted by the government and certain sectors of the clergy. 
She underlines that the authoritative regime with all limitations does not at all bring any 
sustainable changes, and that it is a never ending "cats-and-mouse-game" between the 
civil society and the regime. The people install satellite dishes again and again, despite 
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round up controls that take them off. Whenever young women get the chance, they take 
off their hijab and dress how they like. 
For Behzad (2009:6 [interview]) the Green movement resulted out of the neo-
conservative militarization and radicalization of the regime, which obtained control over 
the presidential election by fraud. (also see Molavi 2009:1 [CNN interview]) "Enough is 
enough", the neo-conservative regime brings up roles, and when happenings do not suit 
their plans and threat their power, they break them. "Der Wächterrat selektiert nur vier 
Präsidentschaftskandiaten aus 4000-5000 Bewerbern. Nach so einer krassen 
Vorzensur… dann gewinnt einer, und dann ist das noch ´der Falsche`" ["The Guardian 
Council selects four out of 4000-5000 presidential candidates. After such blatant a pre-
censorship one of them wins, and then it is ´the wrong one`!"] 
Parag Khanna (2009:1 [CNN interview]), author of the book "The Second World", talks 
about an "inter-generational conflict". Despite the fact that even the next generation of 
clerical elite and basij have members from the younger generation, "still, the masses 
that you are seeing out there are not going away!" 
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6.2.3.2 Regime vs. Regime 
The battlefield between the regime and the regime, is coursing around many 
dichotomies. 
6.2.3.2.1 Technology vs. Values 
Globalization is accepted, since it brings more and better modern technology. On the 
other side, the regime wants its people to see that they do not need the West for 
development and technical advancement; under the motto: "Western values: no! 
Western technology: yes!". But internally the regime asks itself to what extend it can 
afford to isolate from the West. In the end they need the West to get their oil refined, 
and for other technical support and knowhow. "Die Katze beißt sich in den eigenen 
Schwanz!" ["The cat bites in its own tail!"] that is how Leila Salehi (2009:5 [interview]) 
puts the governmental discrepancies in words. 
 
6.2.3.2.2 Left vs. Right 
Then there is a deep gap between the two main political and religious wings: the left 
and the right. The left wing includes a wide spectrum from mild liberals from the "old 
guard" like Mousavi, Montazeri, Rafsanjani, and all others who want to restore the 
Islamic Republic and do not want a revolution to overthrough the system. What they 
want is a "U-turn", driving back to the needs of the long ignored civil society in order to 
maintain the original Islamic character of the revolution. The Islamic left wants to 
change the course within the framework of the Iranian Constitution and to build up a 
democratic Islamic civil society. (cp. Karim-Khani 2009:7 [interview]; Majd 2009:2 
[CNN interview]) On the other side of the left-spectrum are more radical reformists like 
Karroubi and Khatami, who are standing for more fundamental constitutional changes. 
The right wing, or the "new guard", includes people around Ahmadinejad and 
Khamenei, the Revolutionary Guard Corps, the basij and certain conservative sectors of 
the clergy, who want to keep their power and resultantly do not accept any reforms that 
would diminish their authority. (cp. Molavi 2009:1 [Interview]) Nevertheless, there is a 
constant internal discussion about whether possible negative consequences of economic 
and diplomatic sanctions from the West puts a shadow over possible benefits of human 
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rights violations in order to preserve the Islamic ideology in the way it is promoted by 
the Supreme Leader. (cp. Karim-Khani 2009:12 [interview]) 
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6.2.3.3 Clergy vs. Clergy 
6.2.3.3.1 Moderate vs. Radical 
Different interpretation of the Quran and the hadith, are playing a major rule, especially 
concerning human rights. 
Mehrangiz Kar (2009:2 [lecture]) talks about a "clash between moderate and radical 
Islam" in Iran. After the 1979 revolution, she has personally experienced that whenever 
people wrote and talked critically about the system, the radical Islamists accused them 
for operating "against Islam". "We were not allowed to judge social inequalities and say 
that something is bad. Because everything is according to Sharia, so everything is right 
and cannot be criticized. Sometimes the punishment meant death." On the other side 
were more liberal clerics who helped her and other journalists criticising the system 
with more liberal interpretations of Islamic Law. Kar reported about clerics that helped 
her writing critically about the state's violation of women rights, when she was still 
working as lawyer in Iran. She reports that a few moderate clergies said: "Yes, Ms. Kar 
is right! We do have something like discrimination in our family law." They referred to 
a different and more liberal interpretation of Islam and subsequently pointed out that the 
legal system in Iran is not "perfectly Islamic". She describes those supporting clerical 
interpretations as "good facilities" with which she could write with more self-
confidence, being sure that the regime cannot accuse her for working "against Islam". 
Basically the point of contention is about "one single interpretation of Islam vs. many 
independent interpretations of Islam". Within the circles of religious intellectuals, 
questions came up like "what are human rights in Islam?", "Shall the clergy interfere in 
political issues?", "Shall there be religious individualism?" Many different answers 
were following. 
 
6.2.3.3.2 Religious justification 
Diane Alai talks about a religious justification, in order to either promote or violate 
human rights: "People will invoke religion, depending on their thinking. The marja who 
believes in human rights invokes religion to protect human rights, and the marja who 
does not believe in human rights will invoke religion in order to violate human rights." 
(Alai 2009:2 [interview]) In other words, every marja or source of emulation can issue 
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fatwa, which can be contradictive to each other, depending on the marja's ambition and 
thinking. "They do not necessarily result out of religious ambition, sometimes they are 
solely against the government", stressed Diane Alai (2009:2 [interview]). She adds, for 
example that Ayatollah Montazeri issued a fatwa on the Baha`is, in which he pleads that 
the right to "water and earth" means the right of citizenship. Although as religious 
leader - officially not recognizing the Baha`i religion - he promotes that different 
religious thinking should not be a reason to ban Baha`is from citizen rights, enjoyed by 
any other Iranian. There are also other rights, like prohibition of torture, which are 
linked to citizenship, which are also invoked by religious, and not only by secular 
people. (cp. Alai 2009:2 [interview]) 
What also seems to be contradictive on the first sight, is that in the Shii theological 
centre Qom, exists a Center of Human Rights Studies at the Mofid University, which is 
organizing yearly International Human Rights Conferences9, with human right scholars 
from all over the world, focusing on the universality of human rights and Islam. 
A fact, which points to a search for international and religious dialogue, especially in 
scientific and theological circles. 
                                                 
9
 This year in May, it was the fifth conference in cooperation with the UNDP within the framework of the 
"Cluster Project on National Capacity Building for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights for 
Greater Access to justice". url: http://www.mofidu.ac.ir/_DouranPortal/Documents/7292685a-cb73-4d40-
bcfe-31aaf1f8fcf6.pdf, accessed on November 12, 2009  
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6.2.3.4 Opposition vs. Opposition 
6.2.3.4.1 Moderate vs. Radical 
Fataneh Kianerci (2009:6 [interview]) experienced in her work as human right activist a 
division between radical and moderate activists. She for example has seen many radical 
advocates of abolishing death penalty, who rail in public about, e.g. the parents who 
allow execution as just and equitable compensation for the loss of their son. Fataneh 
underlines that when you, as Iranian woman, talk about freedom and human rights, you 
also have to tolerate women who wear a hijab out of free will. (see Tradition in negative 
terms) As a result, she has witnessed a certain disrespect, which can even lead to 
divisions within human rights activists. 
 
6.2.3.4.2 Internal vs. External 
Behzad Karim-Khani witnesses an even deeper division between the opposition who is 
living in and outside Iran. Those people, like his parents, who had the necessary 
resources and could leave Iran in the 1980s, accuse those who couldn’t flee that they are 
not able to take responsibility and blame the regime all the time. Under the motto: "we 
overthrew the Shah, have fought for more freedom and then had to flee to save our life. 
Then, all the peasant from rural areas came and rearranged their life with that we have 
set up. They cannot complain that we left them in the lurch!" Those intellectuals who 
were not able to flee blame those who left: "You sought shelter and we had to face the 
music!" (Karim-Khani 2009:9 [interview]) Behzad also reports about feelings of guilt 
from those who could flee, and a feeling of envy of those who did not leave. This is the 
reason why his father, who is living in Germany, and his uncle who, is living in Iran, are 
not talking to each other any more. He underlines that they are not a singular case, in the 
1980s approximately one million left the country, out of which 90% belonged to the 
intellectual part of the society. Mostly they have belonged to the communists and were 
revolutionaries. They have left right after establishing a new regime but without setting 
more specific conditions and consequently left behind a big hole. "Wenn wir morgen 
eine Demokratie im Iran hätten, wären das die zwei Gruppen die sich als letztes 
umarmen würden!" ["If there would be democracy in Iran by tomorrow, those two 
groups would be the last hugging each other!"] (Karim-Khani 2009:9 [interview]) 
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Behzad now feels the division between the children of the parents who left Iran and 
those who stayed in Iran, which is marked with a superficial picture of the West and 
resultantly leads to misunderstandings during cross-cultural communication. (see 
Modernity in negative terms) He thinks that the nouveau-rich in Iran would not be ready 
for a sudden change to a free and democratic state. Many great things, like the 
implementation of human rights, would happen, but also very "ugly" things. He for 
example assumes that the porn industry would flourish. "Sie sind noch nicht gewappnet 
für den dekadenten Teil der Freiheit!" ["They are not prepared for the decadent part of 
freedom!"], Behzad is laughing ironically. (Karim-Khani 2009:13 [interview]) 
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6.2.3.5 Conclusion 
Summing up the collected views, in regard to the third sub-question:  
How many different socio-cultural groupings, ideologies, identities and goals shape and 
flow into Iranian human rights discourses? 
 
It can be concluded that in Iran's intellectual, political and religious history were and are 
many individuals and groups, who follow different perspectives, thoughts, ideologies 
and goals concerning human rights and the future of their country. The lines between all 
these factions are not clear cut but overlap and are blurry. Voices for reform and/or 
conservative attitudes come from all walks of Iranian life: from deep traditional sectors 
of the clergy to university professors. Right now, there prevails a very sensitive "thaw" 
over these internal battlefields: one part of the civil society, the government and the 
clergy thinks that the second Ahmadinejad administration is legitimate and the other 
part not. What needs to be highlighted is that even though the election was a fraud, 35% 
of the votes for Ahmadinejad are legitimate and remain. (cp. Majd 2009:2 [CNN 
interview]) 
Usually, Western people do not very often communicate with individuals and groups of 
the society who form these 35%. Therefore, all statements and conclusions so far are 
basing on facts provided by those Iranians, which are either living in the West or at least 
can speak English and are the ones you talk to and meet when you visit Tehran. It 
should not be forget that Iran still has a very conservative and religious society, 
particularly outside the Northern Tehran enclaves. But in regard to the present situation, 
the overall people are fed up with the governmental authoritative operations, the bad 
economic situation with high food prices and un-/under-employment rates, but not 
necessarily with the Islamic aspect of it. People, also from rural areas, do know what 
sanctions mean for the country and become more and more human rights sensitive and 
are striving for a change, including certain secular demands. 
One important answer to the fourth question,  
How can the battlefields between different human rights discourses in Iran be defined? 
refers to cultural and religious justification. 
Depending on what the marja taqlid wants to reach with his interpretation, Islamic Law 
is either constricting and oppressive or releasing and liberating. Ambivalent arguments 
about whether wearing a hijab is a religious obligation or not, whether stoning is 
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acceptable as an option of religious punishment or not, whether Baha`is, even though 
their religion is officially not accepted in Iran (See Art. 13 of the Iranian Constitution10), 
shall enjoy civil rights or not, all of these points of contention highlight the fact, that 
there is definitively more than only "one right path" of practicing Islamic religion. The 
cultural and religious justification in connection to the interpretation of human rights 
plays a decisive role in present Iranian human rights discourses. The Quran and Sunna 
remain the central base around which the most important argumentations are 
circulating, especially concerning the legitimization of actions supporting or violating 
human rights. 
                                                 
10
"Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians are the only recognized religious minorities, who, within 
the limits of the law, are free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies, and to act according to their 
own canon in matters of personal affairs and religious education." (Art. 13 of the Iranian Constitution) 
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6.2.4 Human rights 
6.2.4.1 Dialogue 
The categorical focal point in regard to the concept of Human Rights is "dialogue" and 
mainly focuses on the Iranian urban and ordinary society. The society holds dialogue on 
a variety of possible levels and dimensions. Behzad Karim-Khani explains that through 
the Green movement, the political consciousness of the ordinary society is more and 
more raising and that they are more and more "showing their face" in public spheres. 
(Karim-Khani 2009:10 [interview]) An important property is the growing interest 
within the ordinary society, and the realization that they have to move together in order 
to change something. Behzad compares the present situation in Iran to the post-9/11 
situation in the West: suddenly, people, who have never talked to each other before, 
started to have intense political conversations. They have realized that they have a 
certain interest in common. 
 
6.2.4.1.1 Media 
An important subcategory of dialogue is "media", especially the internet. Iran is the 3rd 
largest country in terms of blogs. (cp. Deutsche Welle 2008 [radio]) More and more 
people started to freely write down what they think, using faked user names. Within 
Iran, blogs became a secure base for authors, who want to avoid strict state-censuring of 
their books, for journalists, who want to publish uncensored reports, for Iranians in 
exile, who want to communicate with their families and friends in Iran, for student 
groups and non-governmental organizations, who want to coordinate their activities, 
and for ordinary people, who want to publish thoughts, diaries, stories, poems, and 
expressing themselves freely, in a way, which is not allowed within state media. (cp. 
Alavi 2005:11-12) Via global communication networks like Twitter, Youtube and 
Facebook they show the world photos, videos and reports from all internal happenings, 
including human rights violations. After Mousavi officially stated to be "ready for 
martyrdom", he appealed to his supporters via Facebook "to not go to work" but to 
protest, because "today, you are the media and it is your duty to report and keep the 
hope alive." (CNN Article 2009 [url]) 
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Oftentimes, their username is "Mousavi" and they have at least something with a green 
color in their profile pictures, showing their support of the Green movement. Even non-
Iranians from other parts of the world upload the sentence "where is their vote?" on 
their profile, showing solidarity. Facebook groups like "I bet I can find 1 million people 
who do not like Ahmadinejad" are started or you can become a fan of opposition leaders 
or human rights activists. Competitions are started to free Iranians who got prosecuted 
for their human rights activities, like the lawyer and journalist Shadi Sadr, who has 
spent many days in prison for her moral courage she has shown in protecting and 
promoting the rights of her Iranian fellow citizens11. She recently got the 2009 Human 
Rights Defender Tulip award from the Dutch government in The Hague, and the foreign 
affairs Minister Verhagen called her "an ordinary women who has performed great 
deeds." (Tulip 2009 [url]) 
Ebadi (2009:2 [interview]) reports about "semi-state" (see Semi-opposition) 
publications, which in her eyes, are the biggest chance so far for creating internal 
discourse-bases, "if a discourse between the public and those with an open ear within 
‘the system’ is sought." (Ebadi 2009b:8) The paper's license holder usually has a good 
relation to the government and can on that account provide a little more free space for 
dialogue for the ordinary society. The semi-state domain is very active and needs to be 
supported in a stronger way. The internal achievements in that field are not easy to see 
for outsiders, and as a consequence remain ignored by other countries. 
 
6.2.4.1.2 Limitation & Control 
"When human rights activists are released from jail, that doesn't mean that 
they are free: sometimes they are not allowed to leave the country, 
sometimes they get arrested again and again." (Kar 2009:2-3 [lecture]) 
Another core-category within the concept of human rights, which stands in clear 
opposition to "dialogue", is "limitation and control", which is executed by the Iranian 
government. With the start of Ahmadinejad's presidency, all the windows, which 
                                                 
11She set up Raahi, an organization that conducts research on how to improve women rights, mainly in 
the field of family law and is the co-founder of the "Stop Stoning Forever" campaign. For more 
information see url: http://meydaan.org/English/default.aspx, accessed on November 12, 2009  
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Khatami has opened, were closed again; a backlash that was very frustrating especially 
for women. Kianerci (2009:5 [interview]) complaints that they have lost five years 
under Ahmadinejad; would have Khatami won another time, a lot more internal human 
rights discourses would have continued to flourish. Behzad (2009:6-7 [interview]) adds 
that Khatami has understood that such things like intra- and inter- cultural and religious 
dialogues need time to develop. It cannot be enforced through revolutions, which, in 
Behzad's eyes, are not sustainable. 
Now, Iran's society has to experience a constant decline in free space for discourse 
possibilities. Homepages are blocked and blogs are filtered. Soleyha, a blogger I was 
talking to in Tehran, explained to me the biggest problem of such limitations: when 
your blog gets blocked, you have to change your domain-name. Consequently you are 
loosing readers. Simin, another blogger added, that you have to train being good in 
writing (oppositional) messages between the lines, "I should get better in hiding, 
though", she was laughing. (Soleyha & Simin 2007 [Excursion report 2007:16]) 
They have to be careful, because many human rights activists so far got thrown into jail 
charged with "taking action against Iran's national security", "disturbing public order", 
"propaganda against the state", "having unauthorized relations with Iranians outside the 
country", etc. even though they have only participated in peaceful demonstrations or 
critical discourses. (cp. Human Rights First 2008 [url]) 
 
6.2.4.1.3 Suspicion of espionage 
Another hurdle that hinders Iranians taking part in international dialogue is the 
suspicion of espionage, which is still very present. Leila has experienced such situations 
while she was working in Iran, especially on multilateral conferences. She, as part of the 
Iranian delegation, was immediately mistrusted when she was more actively talking to 
foreign delegations. An important factor is that besides Persian, she knows German and 
English very well, that makes her automatically suspicious, since many Iranians won't 
understand her. The director of the "Österreichisches Kultur Forum" ["Austrian Cultural 
Forum"] (ÖKF) in Tehran12, Dr. W. Banyai, said that the state does not censure German 
                                                 
12
 The ÖKF is an important platform for Iranian and German speaking students and artists. It has the best 
German teachers, the biggest German library and a relatively high cultural budget (in 2007 it was 
70.000€). I contrast to the Austrian embassy, they are free in using it. In 2006 they have organized a 
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books, because they cannot understand them. That is why they have such a wide range 
on German literature in their library for their students. But when they are organizing 
public readings, there has to be a pre-censuring. (cp. Banyai 2007 [Excursion report 
2007:17]) 
 
6.2.4.1.4  Religious & Scientific exclusion 
Diane Alai reports about the intentional exclusion of Baha`is in inter-religious dialogues 
in Iran, "which remain between the four recognized religions, which are the Islamic, 
Christian, Zoroastrian and Jewish religions." (2009:2 [interview]; see Art. 13 of the 
Iranian Constitution) 
Another problem, which hinders dialogue, is the strong limitation on scientific 
resources, especially in the field of the humanities. Even though there are new fields of 
study like master programs in women and family studies, at the Al-Zahra Women 
University13 in Tehran or at the women study center at the University of Tehran, there is 
only a limited budged and scientific resources available to students. The state puts more 
money into natural sciences, in genetics and engineering, subjects in which they think 
limb behind the Western standard. (cp. Ebadi 2009:4 [interview]) A friend of Fataneh 
Kianerci studied sociology and women studies in Tehran and wanted to write her 
dissertation about the lesbian scene in Tehran. Only through a contact, Fataneh could 
give her, of a homosexual Iranian professor teaching in the West, she was able to write 
an empirically proofed scientific work. (cp. Kianerci 2009:9 [interview]) 
                                                                                                                                               
Mozart-week and invited Austrian, Armenian and Iranian soloists to sing with an Iranian orchestra. 
(Excursion report 2007:19) 
13
 the wife of Mir Hussein Mousavi, Zahra Rahnavard, was the chancellor of the university but lost her 




Another important core-category of human rights is dedicated to "women". After the 
1979 revolution, especially women were the part of society who activated the engine for 
demonstrations, shouting for equality in family law, non-discrimination on all levels, 
freedom of movement and expression, children's rights, women's rights, against 
compulsory hijab, and a lot more. Oppositional movements in Iran were always to a 
certain extend intertwined with Women Rights movements. Women from different 
camps, whether conservative or secular, find a common denominator like "no 
polygamy", and mobilize signature campaigns or write letters to the Parliament against 
certain laws. The 1 million signature campaign, a grassroots movement calling for an 
end to the legalized discrimination against women, which started in June 2006, is the 
best example: even people from the conservative Shii centre Qom have signed. (cp. 
Salehi 2009:3 [interview]; Ardalan 2009 [url]) 
Women were also the ones who have "recognized that peaceful demonstrations are the 
way to go." (Kar 2009:2 [lecture]) "Auf Gewalt soll nicht mit Gewalt geantwortet 
werden" ["Violence shall not be the answer of violence"] (Salehi 2009:3 [interview]), is 
also the motto of the present Green movement. The protesters do not want to act as 
violently as the basijis, who attack them with batons from driving motorcycles, tear gas 
and water cannons. 
Again, an important characteristic is that consciousness-raising within the ordinary 
society is based upon an emotional and realistic level, showing human rights violations 
drawn from everyday life. Ebadi (2009:2-3 [interview]) reports about a women's 
magazine that brought the story title "Victim of her Love", concerning the execution of 
a young woman in May 2009. Her story was widely discussed in the Iranian media 
landscape, and some of them tried to defend her in reporting that she only confessed to 
be the murderess of her aunt, in order to save her boyfriend's life, who actually 
committed the crime. Since she was a minor at the time of the murder, she thought she 
would not be charged with death penalty. Interviews with her parents and school 
friends, as well as the pictures she has painted in prison were circulating through blogs, 
in order to mobilize more people to stop her execution. In the end, all efforts were futile. 
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6.2.4.3 Education & Information 
"We need to make the ordinary society ready for approaching a human 
rights dialogue!" (Kar 2009:2 [lecture]) 
Another important core-category of human rights is "education and information". 
There is still a big lack on human rights education, especially targeting the ordinary 
society. There is almost no reference to international human rights law in the Iranian 
press landscape. Fataneh says that when you ask a 70 year old woman if she is 
protesting for a specific human right in the way it is defined in International Law, she 
would say "no", because she does not know what this specifically means in her context. 
She knows exactly what she does not want anymore, like Ahmadinejad as President or 
high food prices etc. (cp. Kianerci 2009:5 [interview]) However, the link to 
international human rights law is barely there. 
Fataneh sees a big problem about the human rights vocabulary used in International 
Law. If you want to inform the Iranian ordinary society, it needs to be pronounced in 
their specific vocabulary and mentality. Iranian human rights activists, who are living in 
exile for many years, start to forget about the Iranian mentality very fast. She speaks 
from her own experience: whenever she comes back to Iran after a longer break, she 
needs a while to get used again to the Iranian argumentation and perspectives. Such 
abstract rights like human rights need to be explained with practical examples in regard 
to their every day life, using indigenous vocabulary and argumentation tools. She says 
that she got easily signatures from women on all social levels in Iran, after she has 
explained how such law reforms would affect their everyday praxis. (cp. Kianerci 
2009:6, 8 [interview]) 
Consequently, an important property of education is respect; to hold dialogue according 
to the context, to adapt to different mentalities, using respective words and body 
language. Fataneh told a little story about her mother, who, before the revolution, was a 
teacher at a girl's school in a poor district. She is not religious but she wore a hijab 
everyday, when she was teaching. When they asked her why she is doing that, she 
replied that for her it is important that the girls go to school, and she knows that when 
she does not wear a hijab some parents would not let her girls go to her class. She 
accepted that and for her it did not matter how she dresses or looks like. "Die 
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Instrumente müssen geeignet sein für die Kultur" ["The tools have to suit the culture"], 
concludes Fataneh (2009:6-7 [interview]). 
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6.2.4.4 Conclusion 
6.2.4.4.1 Emotional & Realistic 
Referring to the fifth sub-question: 
In what sort of social, cultural, practical and symbolical dimensions are Iranian human 
rights claims embedded in? 
 
The connection with the emotional and realistic characteristic of human rights 
consciousness-raising comes to the foreground. Mostly, human rights claims in Iran are 
basing on daily life constrictions in the area of family law, dealing with divorce, 
marriage, child custody, polygamy, and death penalty of children. People are summoned 
to put themselves into the position of victims: "How would you feel and act when it 
would be your daughter/son who gets executed? When your husband has a second wife? 
When you loose custody of your children only because you marry another man after 
divorce? When your husband does not give you the permission to work?" 
 
6.2.4.4.2 Limited room & Restlessness 
When summarizing the collected views under the concept of human rights, the main 
problem is the limited room for internal discourse and external dialogue. There are 
many political taboos like the hijab debate or religious minorities. Especially for the 
ordinary society, there is only a marginal area left to act and to make human rights a 
public and conscious topic. Since the media landscape is in strong conservative hands, 
little human rights information reaches the civil society. But since Persian is 
astonishingly widely present on the internet, it is apparent that the society, especially the 
younger toufan generation, is craving for more free internal discourse and international 
dialogue possibilities. On the other side, Iran is one of the few countries with the most 
slowest and censured internet possibilities. This is an obvious evidence of the 
unstableness and uncertainty of the government, which is trying to hold down the 
restless, unjustly treated and long ignored masses on the streets. The government seems 
to be scared and does not know what to answer to the desperate outcries and courageous 
actions for reform, since there was never even a slightest dialogue between the society 
and the regime. But the more the government puts up controls and makes taboos, the 
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desire for such forbidden things grows within the society. Despite the Guardian 
Council's veto power, conservative censuring, governmental blockings, political taboos, 
religious exclusions, razzia, death penalty, torture, propaganda, limited access to 
scientific material at universities, an so on, the motivation and the strength to change 
something has for most Iranian activists not stopped: 
"This is how it goes under dictatorships: they cannot remove us and our 
ideas! They just make it more difficult for us to spread them!" (Kar 2009:5 
[lecture]) 
 
6.2.4.4.3 Nutrient base for dialogue 
Referring to the sixth question:  
How could a continuous intra- and intercultural dialogue be encouraged and 
strengthened to keep up a “productive balance” between the battlefields? 
 
It is first of all important to establish a nutrient base on which human rights discourses 
can be rooted and slowly but steadily grow. To reach this, there has to be more human 
rights information available, which is specifically targeting ordinary society. A student 
with an average high school degree might not understand complicated theoretical texts 
like those by Soroush. "The intellectuals will find their way, in any way!", underlines 
Fataneh Kianerci (2009:9 [interview]). Human rights information need to come from 
the inside, from Iranians who are familiar with the contexts of the ordinary society and 
who, like Fataneh has highlighted, speak in their mentality and explain the abstract 
rights with practical everyday examples. The spread of information and the 
enlightenment on human rights needs to be nourished and developed from within. In 
order to reach this, all interviewees generally agreed that dialogue takes time to spread 
and develop. The strength and courage is there, the only thing they can do, now, is to 
"talk every day about human rights, to talk and write and write and write, every day, no 
matter about what human right. We cannot wait for a miracle and we have to work hard 
for it. The Europeans also had hundreds of years of dialogue. Nothing like this can 
change immediately, but it will change, in the long run…" (Kianerci 2009:6 [interview]) 
The more the consciousness of human rights is rising, the more discourses are opened. 
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Even though the development of intra- and intercultural dialogue are hindered and 
restricted on many ways, there are still spaces to be found, which could function as 
platform in order to tie in with other platforms within and outside of Iran. 
 
6.2.4.4.4 Flame of hope 
What seems astonishing to me is that in most Iranians an inherent flame of hope is 
burning, since they are aware of the dynamic history of their country, marked with 
sudden changes. "Now, we don't have any chance for regime change, but who knows: 
Iranian people are unpredictable", concludes Mehrangiz Kar her lecture (2009:4 
[lecture]). Simin also ended our conversation with a similar sentence: "We have no 
statistics for the future development. In Iran you can never say for sure what can 
happen…" (Excursion report 2007:17) Behzad, is fully wrapped in enthusiasm, and 
shows promise upon the Green movement: "Ich bin mir sicher, die Revolution wird 
kommen und das Ding stürzt ein und es wird einen demokratischen Staat geben! Und 
dann werde ich auch ernsthaft darüber nachdenken da hin zu fahren und mit 
anzufassen!" ["I am sure that the revolution will break through and I think in less than 
two years it will become a democratic state. And then I will seriously think about 




7 Questions of universality 
The question of "universality" of human rights in the Iranian context remains a difficult 
one. For Diane Alai, human rights clearly are universal and sees the argumentation 
about that they are a pure Western product, as an excuse to violate them. She highlights 
the fact that nations from all parts of the world worked on the Draft of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. The International Bill of Human Rights covers a huge 
spectrum of social, cultural, economic, civil and political rights, in which "every 
[cultural] specificity finds its place without diminishing the universality." (Alai 2009:3 
[interview]) 
Behzad Karim-Khani (2009:11-12 [interview]) has so far not experienced criticism of 
human rights that they are based on Western values and correspondingly not applicable 
in Iran. "If we would have democracy tomorrow, I think, principally the universal 
human rights would get accepted." He assumes that the first rights, which would be 
implemented very fast, would be children's rights especially the death penalty on 
children would be abolished, immediately. "Die Frauen wären die Gewinner dieser 
Revolution" ["Women would be the winner of this revolution"], he is convinced, and 
sees most future reforms in the area of women's rights. But he is sceptical about the 
general death penalty, and thinks that it will probably take a longer time until this one 
also becomes history. All in all, he thinks that the Iranians, especially those in his 
generation, do not need "missionary books" about human rights, because as soon as 
there is no control and censuring of the media anymore, the education-hungry society 
will automatically inform themselves in human rights. 
Fataneh is also convinced that international human rights would be accepted, provided 
that they are described with context-specific examples, considering and respecting the 
Iranian culture and mentality. In her view, they need to be described and no rewritten. 
Linking the abstract articles with their daily wishes and desires, with the reasons why 
they are on the streets fighting against Ahmadinejad. Fataneh (2009:2 [interview]) 
speaks for implementing the "whole package of democracy". In her opinion, anything in 
between and with exceptions would not work out: "You cannot be an Iranian human 
rights activist promoting democracy, and on the same time accept death penalty for 
children… that is a paradox!" 
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7.1 UDHR & CDHRI 
The main concern which triggers most tensions is that the concept of human rights is 
uncritically equated with Western philosophy. This criticism is rebutted first of all 
through the fact that Western powers, especially the USA ("exceptionalism") and GB, 
were against many aspects of human rights ideas, which for non-Western states were 
central in their fight against colonialism and racism. (cp. Kalny 2008:2 [lecture]) 
Secondly, during the 20-year long negotiation process on the establishment of an 
International Bill of Human Rights, there was from the very beginning on an active 
engagement of delegations from countries with a Muslim majority. (cp.Waltz 2004:837) 
In general, the power and influences exercised by Western and Muslim countries should 
never get negated, but it should not be exaggerated nor discounted either. An often 
ignored fact is that the resistance against certain human rights principles were not 
divided between religious blocs but transnational alliances. (cp. Kalny 2008:2 [lecture]) 
That there is not one "Islamic" position on human rights, showed the active internal 
dispute between many Muslim states during and after the draft of the UDHR.14 
The uneven record of Muslim countries ratifying the major international human rights 
conventions shows that there is no single and definite interpretation of Islamic Law 
existing that hinders the acceptance of international human rights. The Organization of 
the Islamic Conference (OIC), the international organization to which all Muslim 
countries belong, expressly endorses International Law and fundamental human rights 
and is treating them as compatible with Islamic values. (cp. Mayer 1995:11-12) The 
Preamble of the updated OIC Charter of March 14, 2008, replacing the one of 1973, 
asserts that the members are obliged "to uphold the objectives and principles of the 
                                                 
14
 Concerning article 18 of the UDHR, which establishes freedom of thought and religion, including the 
right to change one's religion (UDHR 1948 [url]), Pakistan was in support of the right of conversion, 
Saudi Arabia was not. Pakistan also could not share the Saudi Arabian amendment, proposing that 
marriage rights shall be subject to national laws, since Pakistan feared that would enable countries with 
laws discriminating women to continue to apply them. (UNGA Third Committee, 3rd Sess., at 374 (1948), 
url: http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/udhr/meetings_1948_3rd_3c_ga.shtml) The only Muslim country, which 
abstained when it came to the vote of the UDHR was Saudi Arabia, mostly on the grounds that the 
provisions for religious liberty violate Islamic Law. But in the end, like all other members, Saudi Arabia 
voted for the two Covenants on Civil and Political, as well as Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in 
1966, which clearly shows that Saudi Arabia was everything than disengaged from the human rights 
project. (For more details see: Kelsay 1988: 35-36; Waltz 2004: 819-821) 
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present Charter, the Charter of the United Nations and International Law as well as 
international humanitarian law while strictly adhering to the principle of non-
interference in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
State", "to protect and defend the true image of Islam, to combat defamation of Islam 
and encourage dialogue among civilisations and religions" (Art. 1§12), and "to promote 
and to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms including the rights of women, 
children, youth, elderly and people with special needs as well as the preservation of 
Islamic family values" (Art. 1§14). (OIC Charter 2008 [url]) 
The OIC Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI), adopted on August 5, 
1990, gives an overview on Islamic perspectives on human rights, affirming the Sharia 
as its only source, and is on these grounds the main guide to all OIC members 
concerning human rights. 
The preamble principles clearly highlight the compatibility of human rights and Islamic 
values: 
"Believing that fundamental rights and universal freedoms in Islam are an 
integral part of the Islamic religion and that no one as a matter of 
principles has the right to suspend them in whole or in part or violate or 
ignore them in as much as they are binding divine commandments, which 
are contained in the Revealed Books of God and were sent through the last 
His Prophets to complete the preceding divine massages thereby making 
their observance an act of worship and their neglect or violation an 
abominable sin, and accordingly every person is individually responsible 
and the Ummah collectively responsible for their safeguard." (OIC CDHRI 
1990 [url]) 
These formal acceptances of (international) human rights norms, actually binds Muslim 
countries to these norms and subsequently are subject to being judged under them. 
There is also a growing notion that some principles of international human rights law 
become more and more a fixed part of customary International Law and are binding 
states regardless of their ratification of single conventions. Therefore, the adherence by 
Iran (and Saudi Arabia) to Islamic Law in order to justify diminishing International 
Law, is not maintainable. Derogation from international human rights standards is 
permitted only under specific and narrow conditions, "which do not include denying 
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people human rights by appeal to the standards of any particular religion." (Mayer 
1995:12; for more details on derogation: Nowak 2003:58-59) 
 
7.2 Iran & UNO 
The efforts by the Iranian government to justify their rejection of international human 
rights norms on the basis to "safe" their specific Islamic ideology, seems paradoxical, 
since it has accepted International Law as the law of nations. Iran, like all Muslim 
countries, joined the international community under UN auspices and as a result agreed 
to be bound by International Law. Consequently, Iran, like all other UN member 
countries, is able to contribute to the formulation of public International Law, drawing 
up and ratifying conventions. Iran was a founding member of the United Nations and its 
Charter, in which Article 1 §3 affirms each member's commitment to promote and 
encourage respect for human rights. (cp. UN Charter 1945 [url]) Iran has also worked 
on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948. Fereydoun Hoveida, 
who later became Iran's ambassador to the UN, together with Rene Cassin, his French 
law professor, was one of the most influential drafters. (cp. Mayer 1995:10-11) 
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Iran has joined the following most important international treaties and multilateral 
conventions as state party (see Abghari 2008:161): 




The United Nations Organisation Charter 1945 1945 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 1948 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide 
1948 1955 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 1975 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the 
Slave trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery 
1957 1958 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination 
1965 1968 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights* 
1966 1975 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* 1968 1975 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Protocol 




International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment 
of the Crime of Apartheid 
1973 1984 
International Convention against Apartheid in Sports 1985 1987 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 1994 
Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate 
Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child 
Labour and its Recommendation Supplement 
2000 2001 
Figure 5 International covenants/conventions Iran has joined 
*Iran has ratified the ICCPR and the ICESCR, before the 1979 revolution; an important 
fact, which needs to be kept in mind. 
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7.2.1 Human Rights & Iranian Constitution 
The draft Constitution was subject to criticism from many sides. The Iranian Lawyers 
Association and the Iranian Committee for the Defense of Freedom and Human Rights 
wanted to ensure the independence of the judiciary and protecting individual rights and 
the rights of women. They wanted to incorporate the UDHR in the Iranian Constitution, 
and along these lines implement international human rights in Iran's domestic law, in 
order to enable international human rights advocates to intervene in Iranian courts and 
defend Iranian nationals against their own government. (cp. Mayer 1995:67) 
The present Iranian Constitution does not endorse the UDHR but (at least) makes 
references to human rights in Art. 20 "All citizens of the country, both men and women, 
equally enjoy the protection of the law and enjoy all human, political, economic, social, 
and cultural rights, in conformity with Islamic criteria", in Art 14, which is explicitly 
referring to respect the human rights of non-Muslims, as well as in Art. 3 §14, which 
ensures individual rights in "securing the multifarious rights of all citizens, both women 
and men, and providing legal protection for all, as well as the equality of all before the 
law." 
But as mentioned before, human rights are subordinated to the principles of Islamic 
Law, in the way it is interpreted and promoted by the Supreme Leader. Consequently, 
International Law does not determine how many human rights, and with which 
objections, will be implemented into domestic law. 
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7.2.2 Reservations 
International human rights documents like the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), even when ratified by the majles 
and approved by the Guardian Council, would not bring a human rights paradise to Iran, 
if it still operating in the present authoritative theocratic system. The best example is the 
Convention on Children Rights (CRC), which Iran has ratified but is completely 
ignoring. Through the reservation upon ratification: 
"The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran reserves the right not to apply any 
provisions or articles of the Convention that are incompatible with Islamic Laws and the 
international legislation in effect" (NIHR [url]), Iran indefinitely limits its respective 
legal obligations under the CRC. On these grounds, Iran executed at least 8 juvenile 
offenders (out of an overall of 346 reported executions) in 2008. (cp. AI report 2009:15-
16) This violates International Law: Article 6 §5 of the ICCPR and article 37(a) of the 
CRC prohibits anyone under 18 years old at the time the crime was committed from 
being sentenced to death. (cp. ICCPR 1966 [url]; CRC 1989 [url]) Article 49 of the 
Islamic Penal Code excludes children from criminal responsibility. "However, the 
article's accompanying note defines a child as someone who has not reached the age of 
puberty (bulugh) as stipulated by the Sharia and as specified in the 1991 Civil Code 
[Art. 1210] as 15 lunar years for boys and 9 lunar years for girls." (Baghi 2007:9 [url]) 
Consequently, boys with 15 and girls with 9 years are treated like adults before penal 
court. The age difference of criminal responsibility also shows the inequality between 
men/boys and women/girls. (cp. Kar 2009:3 [lecture]) 
The reservation was followed by several objections by Western states, with the reason 
that the reservation invokes general principles of national law, which limits the 
responsibilities under the CRC and undermines the basis of international treaty law. (cp. 
NIHR, Sweden [url]) Consequently, without further clarification what the reservation 
means in detail, a final assessment to its admissibility under International Law cannot 
be made. (cp. NIHR, Austria [url]) The concluding observations of the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child in 2000, expresses concern that the "broad and imprecise nature 
of the State party's general reservation potentially negates many of the Convention's 
provisions and raises concern as to its compatibility with the object and purpose of the 
Convention." (CRC/C 2000, §7) 
 108 
7.2.3 Fall of Rights & Rise of CEDAW 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) got adopted by the UNGA on December 18, 1979. In the very same year 
women in Iran were deprived of many rights, which they have painfully gained in the 
60s/70s. Khomeini nullified the Iranian Family Protection Act of 1967 as amended in 
1975. It included progressive rules requiring that all divorce actions have to be brought 
before court, eliminating the husband's right of extrajudicial divorce. Now, divorce is an 
unlimited right for men, and women have to provide more evidence, documents and 
witnesses to the court or have to pay money to their husbands to get his permission to 
get divorced. The Family Protection Act also determined that custody shall base on the 
best interests of the child, and not automatically reverted to the father after age two for 
boys and age seven for girls. In addition, when a mother remarries after divorce, she 
will automatically loose her right for child custody. Therefore, when women marry a 
second time, they are punished as if they were criminals." (cp. Kar 2009:3 [lecture]; 
Mayer 1995:111) The Family Protection Act also included the requirement that a 
married man has to get a court's permission before marrying another wife, which could 
only be given if he convinced the court of his ability to provide justly for both wives. 
Now the polygamy law allows husbands to get a second wife, but they need the 
permission of the first wife. There are currently many women activists, who are trying 
to abolish polygamy in Iran for all. Another backlash after the Act's abolishment was 
that the marriage age for girls was lowered from 18 to 13 years, and for men from 20 to 
15 years. (cp. Kar 2009:3 [lecture]) 
Ironically, the preamble of the Iranian Constitution (Women in the Constitution) states: 
"In the creation of Islamic foundations, all the human forces which had been in the 
service of general foreign exploitation will recover their true identity and human rights 
[my emphasis]. In doing so, women who have endured more tyranny up till now under 
the idolatrous order, will naturally vindicate their rights further." Further on, it says that 
the "family unit is the basis of society, and the true focus for growth and elevation of 
mankind. […] Reassumption of the task of bringing up religiously-minded men and 
women, ready to work and fight together in life's fields of activity is a serious and 
precious duty of motherhood." This clearly puts emphasis on the women's role to raise 
children, setting them back into the domestic family scene, after all their progress in 
education and gaining a bigger role in public life. (cp. Mayer 1995:110) 
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7.3 Future bases for dialogue 
7.3.1 International means 
"[Iran] ratifying CEDAW is a lot better than nothing. It is another step 
towards dialogue." (Kar 2009:4 [lecture]) 
Ratifying international human rights conventions like CEDAW, would be another 
chance for local Iranian women to become more integrated in international dialogues 
and to receive more support from other countries, which can put stronger pressure on 
the Iranian government. 
In case Iran would ratify CEDAW, the state has the obligation to send regular reports on 
the situation of women rights to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women. This is an independent monitoring body and a quasi judicial body, 
whose 23 members (all experts, mainly women) are elected by the state parties for the 
duration of four years and maybe re elected. (cp. Nowak 2003:96) In general, the treaty 
monitoring bodies have the task to "critically examine the state reports in public 
sessions." (Nowak 2003:97) The state reporting procedure is the only mandatory 
monitoring procedure in all seven ´core` treaties15. 
Each ´core` treaty obligates states to submit regular periodic reports on the steps they 
have taken to implement the rights recognized by the treaty. They include the point of 
progress, problems and difficulties that may arise during implementation, sufficient 
legal and statistical information, anything that enables the respective Committee to draw 
a realistic picture about the current human right situation of the member state. Ideally, 
in reality rather an exception, such reports should be the result of a "comprehensive 
national discussion process", including Parliament, national human rights commissions, 
and above all, an active involvement of the civil society. (cp. Nowak 2003:97) 
                                                 
15International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), International Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),  
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families (MWC) (for more info see Nowak 2003:98) 
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The first optional protocol of CEDAW (OP to the CEDAW 1999) provides an 
individual communication (Communication from individual who claims to be the victim 
of a violation of CEDAW to the CEDAW Committee) and an inquiry procedure (in 
cases where the Committee has received reliable information of gross and systematic 
violations (cp. OP to the CEDAW 1999:Art. 8). (cp. Nowak 2003:87-88; 102-103) 
To have the possibility for an individual complaint would be another step forward for 
women in Iran to enforce human rights. The exhaustion of "domestic remedies" is one 
of the prerequisites for admitting an individual complaint, corresponding to the general 
principle of International Law whereby "legal remedy against human rights violations is 
primarily to be ensured at the national level while international bodies are to provide 
subsidiary remedy only." (Nowak 2003:63-64) Another criteria, is the "non-anonymity" 
(cp. Nowak 2003:267) of individual complaint applications, which could be an 
impediment in cases when the victim could face prosecution or even execution by 
oppressive states like Iran. 
Akbar Ganji (2009 [lecture]) also puts hope into the UN Security Council, which only 
has to forward documents to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to officially accuse 
Ahmadinejad for "crimes against humanity16". Like Sudan, Israel and the USA, Iran has 
only signed the Rome Statute (on December 31, 2000) and not ratified it, consequently 
has no obligations under the Statute. (cp. ICCnow [url]) Nevertheless, when the 
Security Council takes action17, such an accusation can be managed like it was recently 
done with Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir. 
                                                 
16
 for exact definition see Art. 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, url: 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm 
17
 according to Resolution 1674 adopted by the SC on April 28, 2006, the SC has the responsibility to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. url: 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/331/99/PDF/N0633199.pdf?OpenElement 
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7.3.2 Domestic means 
Domestic means of enhancing human rights is the bedrock for the development of 
internal and external dialogue. 
7.3.2.1 Strong civil society 
According to Kamali (2007:382, 385) Iran has two civil societies in opposition to the 
government: 
1. A quasi modern, quasi traditional one, which includes Islamist modernists, who put 
forward the opinion that religion, modernity and democracy are compatible. 
2. A hybrid, Westernized one, which includes secularists, who are calling for complete 
secularism. 
For Mehrangiz Kar (2003:132), the core problem poses the revolutionary Constitution 
of the Islamic Republic. She also splits the oppositions into "reformists", who believe 
that the Iranian Constitution has the positive potential to lead the revolutionary 
government toward democracy, and "secularists", who think that the Constitution blocks 
meaningful reform. 
In my point of view, dividing Iran into two different civil societies of opposition is not 
appropriate, since again that only leads to one-dimensional pigeonhole thinking. Those 
two groups do also include a variety of forms and sectors of other groupings. But it is 
another extract that shows the complexities and struggles between many groups and 
individuals in Iran. The different oppositional currents within the civil society, mostly 
share positions on immediate political issues, and are united against the regime 
supporting conservatives; but their splitting hinders the development of a stronger civil 
society-base, which is needed to establish a firm grassroots-base for a sustainable, 
"bottom-up" democratic development and the general promotion and protection of 
human rights. 
To counter this problem, Akbar Ganji (2009 [lecture]) suggests that workers, women, 
students, etc. from all social levels have to form a broad union, to first of all advocate 
for one human right. The various oppositional movements need to find one common 
denominator, like the abolishment of the death penalty, for which they fight together. In 
his eyes, the abolishment of the death penalty would be a major step to build a 
fundament for further implementations of human rights. 
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Once the transition to democracy takes place in Iran, Ganji puts forward to draw a line 
under the motto: "to forgive but not forget"; a clear analogy to what Nelson Mandela 
has said in 1994, in regard to the establishment of a truth commission to investigate 
abuses during apartheid. (cp. Mutua 1994 [url]) In his eyes, Iran will, in the long run, 
reach democracy too, since there are many societies which have also fought and finally 
won against oppressive and authoritative regimes18. 
 
7.3.2.2 Human Rights education 
Iran lacks on human rights education, even though Islamic Law recognized the duty of 
the state to promote and protect human rights. The OIC CDHRI declares in Art. 9: 
"(a) The quest for knowledge is an obligation and the provision of education 
is a duty for society and the State. The State shall ensure the availability of 
ways and means to acquire education and shall guarantee educational 
diversity in the interest of society so as to enable man to be acquainted with 
the religion of Islam and the facts of the Universe for the benefit of mankind. 
(b) Every human being has the right to receive both religious and worldly 
education from the various institutions of, education and guidance, 
including the family, the school, the university, the media, etc., and in such 
an integrated and balanced manner as to develop his personality, 
strengthen his faith in God and promote his respect for and defense of both 
rights and obligations." (OIC CDHRI 1990 [url]) 
Along these lines, Iran as a state has the duty to make diverse or "worldly" education 
available to its society, "for the benefit of mankind", to which the broad concept of 
human rights, including international and religious roots, surely belong. (see UDHR & 
CDHRI) Islamic and international human rights education at schools, religious 
institution and media, would be of major importance to reach a broader awareness of the 
society about the state's duty to promote and protect human rights of individuals. (cp. 
Baderin 2003:223) 
                                                 
18
 He specifically highlighted Chile, Argentine, Spain, South Africa, and the Check Republic. 
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Establishing independent national and regional human rights commissions and 
organizations, as encouraged by the UN (e.g. see UDHR 1948:Art. 8; ICCPR 1966:Art. 
2(3)), would be the best suitable means to enhance human rights practice, protection and 
promotion, in the Iranian context. They could become a strong engine to facilitate 
human rights education and to realize domestic judicial training on human rights. 
Domestic judicial training in human rights is very important, since, according to 
International Law, all available domestic judicial remedies need to be exhausted before 
international institutions like the UN Human Rights Council can take action. (e.g. see 
OP1 to the ICCPR 1966: Art.5 §2(b)) 
"However, justice is to a degree relative to a judge's understanding and values" (Baderin 
2003:224) and for this reason, makes raising human rights consciousness on the grounds 
of both, Islamic and International Law, based on rational facts and examples without 
emotional parameters, more than important. 
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7.3.3 Clerical means 
Another hope would be grand Ayatollahs like Hossein Ali Montazeri, who have 
theologically a superior position as that of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Montazeri, 
as the main religious leader of the opposition movement, could build up a strong union 
including former architects of the Islamic Republic, like former speaker of majles and 
presidential candidate Mehdi Karroubi, former President Mohammad Khatami, and 
former prime minister and presidential candidate Mir Hussein Mousavi, who can use 
"religion to attack the government." (Slackman 2009b [url]) Now in his mid-80s, he still 
is a big help to the opposition movement, issuing numerous politically charged fatwa 
from his base in Qom. Of course there are also clerics opposing his actions, since for 
many of them, clerics shall not intervene in political issues. But, he more and more 
gains popularity within the young society and the pious masses. (cp. Slackman 2009b 
[url]) 
In Montazeri's and Kadivar's eyes, the Islamic Republic is neither Islamic, nor 
democratic "but the will of a single ruler", and subsequently has lost its legitimacy. (cp. 
Rooz report 2009 [url]) In another comment, Montazeri states: 
“A political system based on force, oppression, changing people’s votes, 
killing, closure, arresting and using Stalinist and medieval torture, creating 
repression, censorship of newspapers, interruption of the means of mass 
communications, jailing the enlightened and the elite of society for false 
reasons, and forcing them to make false confessions in jail, is condemned 
and illegitimate.” (Payvand Iran News 2009 [url]) 
Mehdi Khalaji, a former seminary student in Qom and now a senior fellow at the 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, says that Montazeri “is able to delegitimize 
Khamenei more than anybody else on the Earth.” (cited in: Slackman 2009b [url]) 
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7.4 Conclusion 
As the collected data shows, there are indeed several bases and points of intersection for 
the development of internal human rights discourses and international dialogue. Action 
through international, domestic and clerical channels has the potential to foster 
conditions, which are favourable for the promotion and protection of international 
human rights standards in Iran. Especially the various currents of Islamic thought in 
Iran make it obvious that there is not one "Islamic" voice and consensus on that issue, 
since Islamic clerics were from the very beginning on divided and probably will always 
remain so. To rely on verses of the Quran and Sunna in the era of the Prophet is one 
way to establish a human rights and fundamental freedom friendly Islamic environment 
and society. However, the present intellectual and political history cannot be ignored, 
especially when talking about Iran. There are many levels of historical and actual, 
internal and external influences and dimensions to be considered; a dynamic condition, 
which only allows room for speculations about Iran's future development concerning 
human rights. But the above mentioned domestic, international, clerical means, hopes 
and possibilities, even in the restricted framework of the present context, are all 
important mosaic-stones in the development of internal human rights discourses, 
international dialogue and Iran's transition to a more democratic system with fair 




8 Concluding anthropological perspectives 
The concluding end of my diploma thesis links and integrates the compiled hypothetical 
research results into anthropological perspectives towards theoretical approaches on 
"culture", "discourse" and "human rights". With the analysed and compared data, using 
the methodology of grounded theory, it is now possible to see which anthropological 
approaches would most productively contribute to the development of a more 
comprehensive and extensively empirical theory on human rights. 
8.1 Culture 
Clifford Geertz (1973:5) supports an interpretative approach for analysing culture: 
"The concept of culture I espouse, […] is essentially a semiotic one. 
Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of 
significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the 
analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law 
but an interpretive one in search of meaning. It is explication I am after, 
construing social expressions on their surface enigmatical." 
A semiotic approach to culture helps the anthropologist to gain access to the conceptual 
world in which the social discourses take place in order to enlarge the "universe of 
human discourse." (Geertz 1973:14, 24) 
In reference to Geertz, the above descriptions of human rights discourses are only 
marginal extracts, small bits of a bigger social discourse. "Cultural analysis is (or should 
be) guessing at meanings, assessing the guesses, and drawing explanatory conclusions 
from the better guesses, not discovering the Contingent of Meaning and mapping out its 
bodiless landscape." (Geertz 1973:20) Culture, "as interworked systems of construable 
signs [or symbols], [...] is not a power, something to which social events, behaviours, 
institutions, or processes can be causally attributed; it is context [my emphasis] […]" 
(Geertz 1973:14), within which these interworked systems of signs and discourses can 
be, to certain extend, described. This context is a dynamic one, which is permanently 
changing; a fact, which puts objectivity even more in a critical light: 
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"Cultures do not hold still for their portraits. Attempts to make them do so 
always involve simplification and seclusion, selection of a temporal focus, 
the construction of a particular self-other relationship, and the imposition 
or negotiation of a power relationship." (Clifford 1986:10) 
8.1.1 Cultural justification 
Cultural and religious justification is a famous card being played at least once by many 
governments and ruling elites. In the Iranian case, the card possesses ambivalent 
political and social implications. Depending on interpretations, which usually are linked 
to certain political and social goals, cultural or religious justifications can either be 
enabling or constraining in connection to the promotion and protection of human rights. 
In Cowan's conjunction "rights as culture", rights as themselves define "social and 
ideational space, one that entailed certain ideas of "self" and "sociality", specific modes 
of agency, and particular rules of the game." (Cowan 2006:10) In Iran, the official 
diminishing and non-implementation of international human rights principles is closely 
connected to the regime's "rules of the game", in order to maintain power and control 
over the national citizens. Consequently, the obtained rights and obligations define a 
social and cultural space according to enforced rules, basing on a radical and 
constrictive interpretation of the Sharia. An-Na`im (2009:74 [1992]) also points to the 
possible danger of powerful sectors within a society, which monopolize certain 
interpretations of cultural norms and manipulate them to maintain their power; a fact, 
which, in the Iranian case, is more than obvious. This monopoly needs to be challenged 
by disadvantaged groups and individuals, using internal cultural discourses as tools to 
spread alternative interpretations for more equality and justice; an approach which can 
be witnessed in all of Iran's reform movements. Consequently, in order to promote 
interpretations that are favourable to human rights, cultural and religious justifications 
can be used as counter weapons. 
Cowan (2006:10) speaks for a perspective, which sees "culture as analytic to rights". 
Rights could be grasped through anthropological methods of cultural analysis, in 
"identifying relationships of meaning and practice between different domains of social 
life." An anthropological method, in her view, automatically includes a dynamic entity 
of culture, which treats culture not as a coherent object but "as an abstraction whose 
exploration offers a window for seeing and understanding other relations and domains 
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to which it is connected." She also highlights the importance of "habit" or "the taken for 
granted" build into the ordinary everyday forms of social exchange and reciprocity, also 
including the "tacit and unspoken". (Cowan 2006:17, also see Bourdieu 1977) Iran's 
ancient Persian as well as liberal values and interpretations of the Sharia could offer 
many windows towards the establishment of a dynamic "culture" formed by Iran's 
diverse society and not by its corrupt government. 
Basing on the collected data, the everyday practice of the ordinary society in Iran is 
very much contrary to the regime's ideal picture of an Islamic society. Especially 
concerning human rights violations and unjust treatment of minorities or women, there 
comes support from many sides, without civil distinctions. The existing Iranian human 
rights notions and ideas, basing on "habit" as well as cultural and religious variables, 
can be fruitful equipment for a sustainable reform movement. 
Internal dialogue is an important prerequisite for building up a strong grassroots base, 
which is fully respecting and including the diverse and multilayered civil society of 
Iran. This would in turn enable a nutrient precondition for the further development of 
internal and international human rights discourses. 
 
8.1.2 Internal discourse & Cross-cultural dialogue 
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na`im (2009:69 [1992]) argues for an approach that develops a 
"universal cultural legitimacy" through internal enlightened discourses and cross-
cultural dialogue. Within the extreme cultural diversity of this world, to broaden the 
area and quality of agreement among the cultural traditions is necessary, in order to 
build a foundation for the widest possible range and scope of human rights. A "least 
common denominator" is, according to him, not satisfying, since it would exclude many 
vital rights. An-Na`im's (2009:70 [1992]) cultural legitimacy thesis "accepts the existing 
international standards while seeking to enhance their cultural legitimacy within the 
major traditions of the world through internal dialogue and struggle to establish 
enlightened perceptions and interpretations of cultural values and norms." Thereupon, 
the legitimacy within each tradition is the precondition for establishing a cross-cultural 
legitimacy, for which people of diverse cultural traditions can agree on the "meaning, 
scope, and methods of implementing these rights." Internal reinterpretation and cross-
cultural dialogue about the meaning and implication of basic human values and norms 
are necessary for the development of a "universal consensus" on the formulation and 
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implementation of human rights. This approach bases on the assumption that all 
cultures, despite their diverse specificities, share certain fundamental interests, concerns 
and values, which possess the potential to create a framework for a "common ´culture` 
of universal human rights." 
He underlines that the shared moral values must be "authentic" and not imposed from 
the outside. (cp. An-Na`im 2009:73 [1999]) When the state of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, in Montazeri's eyes, is an oppressive political system based on force, voter fraud, 
censorship, "Stalinist torture", repression and corrupt jurisdiction (see Clerical means), 
is a clear proof that it cannot embody an "authentic" culture and tradition. Such 
descriptions rather remind oneself on the "totalitarian" characteristics of the Soviet 
Union.19 This leads to the assumption that "authentic" culture is automatically accepted 
and does not have to be violently imposed on the civil society.20 (cp. Mayer 1995:14) 
If cultural changes cannot be culturally approved and adapted to pre-existing norms and 
institutions, the culture would loose its stability which is the vital prerequisite for its 
proper socializing functions. (cp. An-Na`im 2009:74 [1992]) 
                                                 
19
 In the case of Iran, the term "totalitarian" should be treated carefully. The Concise Oxford Dictionary of 
Politics defines "Totalitarianism" as following: "A dictatorial form of centralized government that 
regulates every aspect [my emphasis] of state and private behaviour. Although the term was originally 
intended to designate fascist and communist regimes, totalitarianism is mainly associated with 
characterizations of the Soviet Union. Its proponents do not agree on when, if ever, the Soviet Union 
ceased to be totalitarian, but they tend to converge on the view that at some point the political leadership 
was both all powerful and totally illegitimate. For many commentators, the Soviet Union entered a new 
phase after the abandonment of mass terror on Stalin's death." (Wightfield 2003:543) 
20
 Personal comment: An assumption, which in turn leads to the important question of how to define 




The totalization of "culture" in stating that there is one "Iranian" or "Islamic" cultural 
position on human rights issues, which entails specific cultural habits that violate 
international human rights standards but are defensible within their framework of 
"Islamic" culture, leads to pigeonhole thinking à la Orientalism vs. Occidentalism. The 
complex diversity of Iran shows how sensitive the topic of universal human rights is in 
general. The rich number of characteristics of human rights and cultural interpretations, 
speaks for a theoretical approach, which stays "rather close to the ground" (Geertz 
1973:24) and is not too abstract and detached from reality's complexities. 
Concerning the Iranian case, the utilization of internal discourse has to take place 
simultaneously on many levels such as the intellectual, artistic and political. To 
establish "authentic" norms and values, they must root in Iran's historic developments of 
"traditions" and customs, of the time before and after the Islamization process. 
Economic, political, social, cultural, religious power centres, which intentionally 
exclude certain individuals and groups from taking part on such discourses need to be 
outweighed by dialogue itself. Therefore, once the authoritative regime ends, a "right" 
balance needs to be uphold, which keeps Iran's diverse society from falling into separate 
splinters, in order to maintain a productive stability basing on internal and cross-cultural 
dialogue. 
The establishment of stronger internal discourses would coevally support a cross-
cultural dialogue, since, to establish sustainable changes, they have to rely on mutual 
respect; an important property which got highlighted very often during the interviews. 
Everyone needs to be aware of the fact that a total agreement between all different 
discourses is almost or entirely impossible due to varied interpretations of “rights”, 
which are historically deeply rooted in every human being’s social, cultural, religious, 
economic, geographic, political and judicial context. In order to strengthen such internal 
and cross-cultural respect to the widest margins as possible, An-Na`im (2009:75 [1992]) 
suggests the classic principle of reciprocity, "the rule that one should treat others in the 
same way that he or she would like to be treated." 
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8.2 Critical anthropology 
Mark Goodale (2006:490) describes "human rights discourse" as "coteries of concepts, 
practices, and experiences through which human rights have meaning at different levels, 
levels which are prior to and go beyond the merely instrumental or legal, important as 
these levels are." He supports a "critical anthropology of human rights" that "self-
consciously creates space between itself and ideas and practices that have become 
coextensive with or, in fact, constitute the experience of everyday life." (Goodale 
2006:491) A critical anthropology of human rights possesses a progressive character 
and has to consider potential emancipatory principles underlining human rights 
discourses, accompanied with institutional structures of power. 
In connection to the Iranian context, a critical anthropology is a constructive departure 
for any theoretical approaches in the field of human rights. The focus on power and 
intentions as well as on (un)intended consequences, which stand behind or result from 
human rights actions, is from major importance. 
Seeing human rights as part of a broader framework described as "ethical theory as 
social practice" (Goodale 2006b), is an approach, which could be useful for analytical 
and methodological tools for anthropological research on human rights. It rejects the 
approach of a totally instrumental issue, promoting ethnography as the basis for finding 
grounds on which "human rights can be cross-culturally legitimate" without relying on 
abstract theories of universality. (cp. Goodale 2006:506) This approach, again underpins 
the assumption that cultures, despite their richness in diversity, share certain 
fundamental concerns, goals and values, which could become the base for some kind of 
´universal consensus` on the widest possible scope of human rights. Therefore it is an 
approach to be considered, when one wants to avoid the abstract language of the 
international human rights regime as well as the endless wild-goose chase around 
universality vs. cultural relativity. 
 
8.2.1 Normative humanism 
Mark Goodale (2006:492) developed an alternative analytical framework to human 
rights, calling it "normative humanism". Normative humanism stands for a collective 
ordering, in which people will organize themselves so as to establish "conditions for 
meaningful interactions" that " recognize and formally incorporate a basic set of human-
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centered values, values that balance the whole breadth of local cultural and social 
possibilities with common cognitive, physical and emotional imperatives." As follows, 
"humanism" describes a "human-centeredness" as a basic cross-cultural value. The 
precondition for such a collective organization that reconstitudes human rights in a way 
they are effective and legitimate, is "freedom from constraint". In other words, through 
the absence of constraints, collectivities will create normative systems that are based on 
the recognition of a basic set of "human-centered values". Consequently, normative 
humanism rejects a metaphysical version of universal human rights but it does not 
exclude the possibility that international human rights being adopted as a normative 
system "at certain places and times". The legitimacy therefore does not derive from their 
"universality" but from the condition or context from which they emerge and are 
incorporated. Duties and rights are constrained by cognitive, physical and emotional 
requirements, suspending a radical pluralism or relativism. The dimension or scale at 
which collectivities will organize themselves is something not predictable. 
In general, "normative humanism" bases on the optimistic assumption that 
unconstrained collective orderings, in terms of being "inherently dynamic, historically 
rich, and capable of change", will establish a balance between the individual and 
collective. This will create a normative system, which has meaning in the respective 
historical and cultural context of the collective organization. Subsequently, "Power", in 
relation to normativity, is the "presence of constraints", which hinders the development 
of such a balance. (cp. Goodale 2006:493) 
Goodale's alternative framework of human rights is interesting, and in so far worth to be 
considered, since the majority of Iran's population suffers under the constraints of its 
oppressive regime. Basing on the compared and analysed findings, there is some kind of 
inherent quest for justice and equality, binding many different groups and individuals 
together, even though the official policies and jurisdictions try to restrict any unification 
for reform movements. Now, there comes the question, how Iran and its citizens would 
develop when the oppressive limitation and control is abolished. According to Goodale, 
the incorporation of international human rights law is generally possible as a normative 
framework, when the context provides the respective conditions for these principles. 
Then it would be interesting in which form, if at all, these international standards would 
be implemented, and how it will influence the relation between state and religion. 
Consequently, the question of whether a secular state is exclusively necessary for the 
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full implementation, promotion and protection of human rights, or whether an Islamic 
Republic with certain reforms provides an alternative equivalent framework, would 
move to the center more than before. As the research results show, Iran is a strong 
example for a society which is "inherently dynamic, historically rich, and capable of 
change," and there is a lot "meaningful interaction" on emotional and intellectual levels, 
with different dimensions. The preconditions for Goodale's idea are there. But as he 
already says, the development of the organizational balance between the individual and 
collective, is something unpredictable. 
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8.2.2 Critics 
Goodale's "normative humanism" is of course, a very idealistic (my emphasis) process 
of social ordering and so far does not clearly define central terms like "humanism" and 
"human-centred". Jane Cowan (2006b:500) criticises that "values and norms are better 
socially centered", in a societal ordering, "which differentiate humans, categorically and 
individually, in terms of their position, status and putative worth." In addition, 
Goodale's reduction of "power" to "the presence of constraints" is, in her view, ignoring 
"endogenous dynamics". This leads on the other hand to Michel Foucault, the pioneer in 
discourse analysis, for whom discourses act "as the meeting place for power and 
knowledge." (Evans 2005:1050, referring to Foucault 1977b) He describes power as 
"forms of knowledge", which "produces discourse". Power "needs to be considered as a 
productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a 
negative instance whose function is repression [referring to the state and the law]." 
(Foucault 1977:203) Through accumulation of knowledge, power is rising and again 
enables production of new knowledge: "the formation of knowledge and the increase of 
power regularly reinforce one another in a circular process." (Foucault 1975:216) 
Therefore, power-relations within the structures of discourses also need to be taken into 
consideration, and not only external constraints of the state and the law. The powerful 
impacts of knowledge, also underlines the importance of broad education and the 
possibility of having critical discourses; preconditions a society urgently needs to 
become aware of their rights as human beings and citizens. 
Richard Ashby Wilson (2006b:505) describes Goodale's approach as "counterhistorical 
in that it takes insufficient note of inequality, imperial conquest, global economic 
integration, and the rise of the nation-state over the past 500 years." He points to the 
essential fact that besides the normative and ethical description, there also need to be 
political and analytical questions: What kind of nation-states violate human rights?, 
where is the connection between nationalism and violence?, and how are human rights 
deployed to maintain power and control? In his eyes, a theory of human rights is also a 
theory of law, inequality and political violence. The global and transnational 
interconnectedness cannot be banned from any analysis concerning human rights. 
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8.3 Globalization & Culture 
According to Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson (1992:9), postmodern Globalization, 
spread through the preached and enforced "laws of the market" by multilateral agencies 
and powerful Western states, which led to extremely fast movements of capital, built on 
a more sophisticated communication and information network and better transport 
possibilities of goods and people. The industrial production of "culture, entertainment, 
and leisure" leads to the invention of new forms of cultural differences and creates a 
"transnational public sphere", which makes the picture of one culture strictly bound to 
one geographical restricted space, obsolete. The global dynamic process enables the 
development of new forms of solidarity and identity in a "reterritorialized" space. Social 
life is "localized" in a "globally interconnected world." (Gupta & Ferguson 1992:11) In 
order to meet these dynamic characteristics, terms like community, solidarity, identity 
and cultural differences need be reconceptualised. 
Anthropology sees "space" as something socially constructed, and the question of who 
has the power to make "places of spaces", or to politicise spaces, is a central topic. 
When the postcolonial world is an interconnected social space, a dialogic concept of 
"we" and the "others" seems inappropriate. In the Iranian context, the identity of "one's 
own society" is something that is in a constant development, without a fix answer, 
which especially is highlighted by many emigrated Iranians. The rigid concept by many 
people in the West of ´the other Middle East`, which belongs to ´the other Middle 
Eastern or Islamic culture`, or vice versa, the people in the Middle East of ´the other 
West`, which belongs to ´the other Western or Christian culture`, should have no room 
in a "world of culturally, socially and economically interconnected and interdependent 
spaces." (Gupta & Ferguson 1992:14) Cultural differences are end-products of certain 
power relations, and not a "naturally given". 
"The Iranians" for example are an entity, constructed by historical processes, economic 
and political inequalities and other internal and external interconnected relations. All the 
complex influences within global power-relations need to be put into the centre of 
general thoughtfulness, marginalizing the rigid concept of "one people" to "one culture", 
which only leads to the assumption that differences are a naturally given fact. (cp. 
Gupta & Ferguson 1992:16-17) How places are imagined, constructed, contested and 
enforced are necessary to further understand the dynamics of culture in general and how 
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the spaces are connected and intertwined with each other. Such dynamic consideration 
leads to the important awareness that the rich enclaves of bigger cities in Iran have more 
in common with rich gated communities like Bel-Air or Hollywood in California, as 
with other communities in their own city or even district. (referring to Gupta & 
Ferguson 1992:20) Therefore, physical localization needs to be replaced by a dynamic 
multilayered network which considers factors such as social class, religious and ethnic 
backgrounds, sexuality, language, etc., which are always differentially available to 
people in different contextual power-relations. The question of what "culture" means 
and how it should be defined in the era of Globalization, permanently needs to be 
refaced and reopened. Consequently, the concept of human rights also needs to be 
defined and treated more dynamically. 
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8.4 Concluding remarks for a deeper, dynamic & 
interdisciplinary approach 
In order to enlarge and enrich the research field of human rights discourses in Iran, there 
needs to be a lot more empirical field research, especially about how Iran's conservative 
Muslims think about "rights" and how the actual practices of the state relates to their 
Islamic values and norms. There needs to be more investigation about how their 
interpretations of "tradition" in relation to Islam and rights looks like. Islam in Iran is an 
ambivalent issue, and except maybe some very extreme conservative groups, it is 
everything but a static cultural framework "[…]froze[n] in its premodern formulation 
[…] taking position that Islam rejects both the political changes wrought by 
modernization and the adoption of new ideas and institutions that accompanied the 
process." (Mayer 1995:10) 
The research results make obvious that any analysis should include the historical, 
political, social, cultural, religious, economic, and judicial contexts of human rights 
processes within the powerful and complex energies of Globalization. Human rights 
claims cannot be understood properly without detailed attention to the "particularities of 
time and place" (Robbins & Stamatopoulou 2004:422), besides internationally and 
officially established human rights norms. Emotional and empathic aspects just as well 
play a significant role, when it comes to the respect, promotion and implementation of 
human rights. Edmund Burke puts this recognition in following words: 
"We lay too much weight on the formality of treaties and compacts. […] 
Men [and women] are not tied to one another by paper and seals. They are 
led to associate by resemblances, by conformities, by sympathies. It is with 
nations as with individuals. […] The secret, unseen, but irrefragable bond 
of habitual intercourse holds them together even when their perverse and 
litigious nature sets them to equivocate, scuffle, and fight about the terms of 
their written obligations." (cited in Vincent 1980:256) 
Even though international human rights documents do share certain basic principles 
such as equality before the law and a human dignity, "they do not provide the basis for a 
fully worked out moral or political philosophy.” (Wilson 2006:78) Richard Ashby 
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Wilson highlights the important fact that the human rights regime includes a broad 
spectrum of different moral and political projects, which are often contradictory: 
"The human rights framework is manifestly plural in its conceptualization, 
spanning the continuum from the austere liberal individualism of 
international criminal law to a full-blown multiculturalism that advocates 
group rights and the self-determination of peoples." (Wilson 2006:77) 
Therefore, the plural and fragmented characteristic of international human rights law 
does not create a "comprehensive moral and political charter to resolve all questions of 
the common good" but "they set the baseline preconditions that allow for rational, 
meaningful dialogue on the important political issues of the day.” (Wilson 2006:82, 
referring to Jürgen Habermas 1987) 
Coming to terms with the vast complexity of the entire human rights paradigm, it also 
becomes apparent that an interdisciplinary approach is needed to avoid one sided 
theoretical approaches. The case of Iran shows very clearly that an exclusively 
anthropological ethnographic or philosophical normative approach is not sufficient to 
grasp the complicated transnational and intertwining relations on all (power) levels. The 
globally interconnected political, juridical, and economic aspects also play an important 
role, and need to be integrated. Different scientific approaches should therefore not be 
mutually exclusive, but build on each others experiences and research results. In the 
end, scholars of various disciplines have, according to Cowan (2006:21), 
"acknowledged considerable common ground in our [anthropological] aims and 
concerns around questions of living with diversity." I fully share her view that such an 
interdisciplinary dialogue seems to be essential in the "struggle for more just and 
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10.1 Abstract in English 
The working theme of my work is: Human rights discourses and their context in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. Human rights discourses within their context sre explored, 
taking into consideration the impact of Globalization and the dynamics around 
"tradition" and "modernity". 
In order to properly describe the context, in which current human rights discourses take 
place, relevant aspects about Iran's political and judicial system with its maze of 
informal and formal power centres, as well as its culture, religion and society are 
exemplified. Political reform actions with its instabilities and constraints are also 
treated. Internal and external influences to which Iranians permanently have to react are 
parameters in order to analyse and understand certain ways of thought, actions and 
constraints of the present Iranian protagonists. 
The research question of my work is: How can Iranian human rights discourses be 
situated in the current anthropological debate on human rights theories?  
With the methodology of grounded theory, expert-interviews and data from multiple 
sources are compared and analysed, in order to percolate core-conceptions and core-
categories to create linking hypotheses. The concepts, in terms of grounded theory, deal 
with the general Iranian identity, the sensitive gap between "tradition" and "modernity", 
various battlefields on the state, clergy and society level, and the broad field of human 
rights. Concept specific core-categories shed light on Iran's historical past, Islamic 
values, we-feeling, patriarchal structures, women, education, Western influences, global 
communication networks, as well as inter and intra-cultural dialogue possibilities and 
limitations. 
Additionally, both Iran's official position on human rights internally and externally, 
referring to International Law as well as the UNO is explained. Possibilities for intra 
and intercultural dialogue-options are highlighted on international, national, and clerical 
levels of action, which could foster favourable conditions for the promotion, protection, 
and implementation of human rights. 
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According to my research, Iran's political, religious, and intellectual history and 
presence is marked with many individuals and groups. They follow different 
perspectives, ideologies and goals concerning human rights and the future of their 
country. In this context, the concept of cultural justification, including liberal religious 
interpretations of different ayatollahs, plays an important role. They become some kind 
of cultural soft-weapon to fight the oppressive regime of the present Islamic Republic. 
Voices for reform as well as conservative attitudes come from all walks of Iranian life, 
including the clergy and university faculties. Concepts like "Islam", "tradition" and 
"modernity" possess a very multilayered and hybrid form, constantly evolving out of 
permanently changing context-constellations; a fact which mirrors the complexity of the 
Iranian society accurately and leaves rigid dualism of any kind looking inadequately.  
Generally, it can be said that human rights consciousness-raising emanates from 
emotional and realistic experiences, such as constrictions in daily life and human rights 
violations in the field of family and criminal law. Mutual respect turns out to be the 
most important property to sustainably promote and implement human rights. 
I arrive at the conclusion that human rights education, especially targeting the masses of 
ordinary society, needs to become available on more independent institutional levels, 
and be nourished from the inside of the Iranian culture and society. This is an 
indispensable premise, in order to strengthen a nutrient base on which human rights 
discourses can be rooted. A stable growth requires a more objective and critical 
education on how Islamic and International Law interprets and implements human 
rights. 
The concluding end of my thesis connects the compiled hypothetical research results 
into anthropological perspectives towards theoretical approaches on "culture", 
"discourse" and "human rights". Coming to terms with the vast complexity of the entire 
human rights paradigm, a critical, dynamic, "close to the ground" and interdisciplinary 
approach to a more comprehensive and extensively empirical theory of human rights is 
promoted. In the era of Globalization, it becomes obvious that terms like "culture" and 
"human rights" constantly need to be redefined. 
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10.2 Abstract auf Deutsch 
Das Thema meiner Arbeit lautet: Menschenrechts-Diskurse und deren Kontext in der 
Islamischen Republik Iran. Die Menschenrechts-Diskurse werden in ihrem Kontext 
erkundet, in dem Globalisierungseinflüsse und die Dynamik von "Tradition" und 
"Moderne" mit einbezogen werden. Um den Kontext zu beschreiben, in dem aktuelle 
Menschenrechts-Diskurse stattfinden, werden relevante Aspekte über das politische und 
rechtliche System des Irans mit seinen informellen und formellen Machtfeldern, sowie 
seine Kultur, Religion und Gesellschaft erläutert. Berücksichtigt werden auch politische 
Reformversuche mit ihren Instabilitäten und Beschränkungen. Interne und externe 
Einflüsse, auf die die iranische Gesellschaft permanent reagieren muss, sind Parameter 
für die Analyse und dem Verständnis von Gedankengänge, Handlungen und 
Beschränkungen heutiger iranischer Protagonisten. 
Die Forschungsfrage lautet: Wie können Menschenrechts-Diskurse in der 
gegenwärtigen anthropologischen Debatte über Menschenrechts-Theorien situiert 
werden? Um einer Antwort näher zu kommen, werden mit Hilfe der Methodologie 
Grounded Theory Daten von Experten-Interviews und vielfachen Quellen verglichen 
und analysiert um Kernkonzepte und Kernkategorien herauszufiltern um dann 
verbindende Hypothesen zu schaffen. Konzepte, im Sinne der Grounded Theory, 
beziehen sich auf die iranische Identität im Allgemeinen, die sensible Spaltung 
zwischen "Tradition" und "Moderne", unterschiedliche Spannungsfelder auf staatlicher, 
geistlicher und zivilgesellschaftlicher Ebene, sowie auf das weite Feld der 
Menschenrechte. Konzeptspezifische Kernkategorien beleuchten u.a. Irans historische 
Vergangenheit, islamische Werte, Wir-Gefühl, patriarchalische Strukturen, Frauen, 
Bildung, westliche Einflüsse, globale Kommunikations-Netzwerke, sowie inter- and 
intrakulturelle Dialogmöglichkeiten und deren Limitierungen. Zusätzlich wird die 
offizielle Position des Irans zu Menschenrechten sowohl intern, als auch extern, im 
Bezug zu internationalem Recht und der UNO erklärt. Es werden Möglichkeiten für 
intra- und interkulturelle Dialogoptionen auf internationaler, nationaler und klerikaler 
Handlungsebene beleuchtet, die günstige Konditionen für die Förderung, 
Implementierung und den Schutz von Menschenrechten festigen können. 
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Übereinstimmend mit meiner Forschung ist die politische, religiöse und intellektuelle 
Geschichte und Gegenwart des Irans von vielen Individuen und Gruppierungen geprägt. 
Sie verfolgen bezogen auf Menschenrechte und die Zukunft des Landes 
unterschiedliche Perspektiven, Ideologien und Ziele. In diesem Zusammenhang spielt 
das Konzept der kulturellen Rechtfertigung einschließlich liberal-religiöser 
Interpretationen von diversen Ayatollahs, eine wichtige Rolle. Sie werden zu einer Art 
weichen kulturellen Waffe im Kampf gegen das unterdrückende Regime der 
gegenwärtigen Islamischen Republik. Stimmen sowohl für reformierende als auch für 
konservierende Einstellungen kommen quer aus allen Gesellschaftsschichten, 
einschließlich des Klerus und des Lehrkörpers der Universität. Konzepte wie "Islam", 
"Tradition" und "Moderne" besitzen eine vielschichtige und hybride Form, die sich 
kontinuierlich aus permanent wechselnden Kontext-Konstellationen entwickelt. Diese 
Tatsache spiegelt die Komplexität der iranischen Gesellschaft sehr gut wider und lässt 
starre Dualismen jeglicher Art als unangemessen erscheinen. Grundlegend kann gesagt 
werden, dass die Förderung des Menschenrechtsbewusstseins von emotionalen und 
realitätsnahen Erfahrungen ausgeht, wie etwa alltägliche Einschränkungen und 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen im Bereich des Familien- und Strafrechts. Gegenseitiger 
Respekt präsentiert sich als wichtigste Eigenschaft, um nachhaltig Menschenrechte zu 
fördern und zu implementieren. 
Meine Arbeit kommt zum folgenden Ergebnis. Wenn Menschenrechts-Bildung vor 
allem auf die Masse der gewöhnlichen Gesellschaftsschichten abzielt, muss sie auf 
mehreren unabhängigen institutionellen Ebenen zur Verfügung gestellt und aus dem 
Inneren der iranischen Kultur und Gesellschaft aufrechterhalten werden. Auf diesem 
Nährboden können Menschenrechts-Diskurse wurzeln. Für ein stabiles Wachstum 
bedarf es weiterer objektiver und kritischer Aufklärung darüber, wie islamisches und 
internationales Recht Menschenrechte interpretiert und implementiert. 
Der Schlussteil meiner Arbeit verbindet die erarbeiteten hypothetischen 
Forschungsergebnisse mit anthropologischen Perspektiven und theoretischen 
Herangehensweisen an "Kultur", "Diskurs" und "Menschenrechte". Um der enormen 
Komplexität des gesamten Menschenrechtsparadigmas gerecht zu werden, wird eine 
"bodennahe" kritische, dynamische und interdisziplinäre Herangehensweise in Richtung 
einer übergreifenden empirischen Menschenrechtstheorie befürwortet. Es wird deutlich, 
dass im Zeitalter der Globalisierung Begriffe wie "Kultur" und "Menschenrechte", immer 
wieder von neuem definiert werden sollten. 
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